分税制改革真是的中国土地财政的主因吗?【转】
*中文标题为编辑所加，原标题译为“是什么促成了中国的土地财政？”
————
Nannan Xu,What gave rise to China’s land finance?,
Land Use Policy,Volume 87,2019
摘要简单翻译：
土地财政，是中国城市发展的独特和关键现象。然而，它的起源尚未得到认真解决。这项研究质疑了1994年分税改革导致土地财政的广泛接受的传统理论。该理论假设改革造成了地方财政收入的不足;作为权宜之计，土地财政是在地方政府出售土地使用权以增加收入时制定的。这项研究表明，改革后的地方政府既没有经历过收入的下降，也没有能力建立能够增加土地收入的制度框架。相反，本文认为，严格的财政管理、土地供应垄断、严格的土地使用控制和出让市场机制相结合，是土地财政的主要原因，只有国家机构建设才能实现这些条件。关于制度建设的努力是由国家“土地作为资源和资产”的想法所驱动的。否则，地方必须竞争放松监管以吸引投资，从而使得土地增值收入要少得多，土地财政也会不可能。
Abstract
Land finance, or tudi caizheng, is a phenomenon unique and critical to China’s urban development. Its genesis, however, has not been seriously addressed. This research questions the widely accepted conventional theory that the 1994 tax-sharing reform resulted in land finance. This theory assumes that the reform created a deficiency in local fiscal income; As an expediency, land finance was formulated when local governments sold land usufructs to increase revenue. This research demonstrates that local governments after the reform neither experienced a plunge in revenue nor owned the capacity to create the institutional framework that enables them to increase land revenue. Instead, the combination of rigorous fiscal management, monopoly of land supply, strict land use control, and market mechanism of conveyance, this paper argues, is the primary cause of land finance, and only national institution building can actualise these conditions. The efforts regarding institution building were driven by the party state’s idea of ‘land as resources and asset.’ Otherwise, localities would have to compete to loosen their regulation to attract investments and, therefore, capture much less land value increase, and land finance would be impossible.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.05.034
——END
相关阅读：