德语法学期刊速递 | 《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》2021年第2期
法哲学与社会哲学论丛Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
Political Freedom in a Deliberative System. A Republican Case Against Holistic Evaluations
协商体系中的政治自由——反对整体评价的共和案例
作者：Donald Bello Hutt
摘要：协商民主理论的体系进路支持者认为，协商体系具备多种多样的功能。但是，保证政治自由是否属于协商体系的功能之一，还没有得到学术研究。本文将探究，何种自由概念将支持协商式民主的体系进路。讨论将限定在两个主要选项之间：自由作为没有干预和自由作为没有支配。哪种自由概念能最好地实现协商体系的功能，取决于，是否赞同对体系性的协商运作进行整体评价。本文论证了，整体评价只与没有干预的自由概念兼容。相反，没有支配的自由和整体主义水火不容。最后，本文将提供理由支持没有支配的自由，并反驳整体的体系评价。
Champions of systemic approaches to deliberative democratic theory consider that deliberative systems serve sundry functions. Whether guaranteeing political freedom should be one of those functions has not been explored in the scholarly literature. This article thus examines which conceptions of freedom underpin systemic approaches to deliberative democracy. I explore and circumscribe the analysis to two prominent options: freedom as absence of interference and freedom as non-domination. The answer to which of these alternatives best serves as a function of the deliberative system hinges on the previous question of whether holistic evaluations of systemic deliberative performance are to be endorsed. The article then argues that holistic evaluations are only compatible with freedom as non-interference. By contrast, freedom as non-domination is incompatible with holism. I then provide reasons for endorsing freedom as non-domination and, by implication, to reject holistic systemic evaluations.
“法律多元世界”…或当代法实证主义的黑洞
作者：Mauro Zamboni
摘要：当代法实证主义不仅遭受敌对法律理论（从自然法到后现代进路）的传统攻击，在全球化对法律现象的影响面前，它似乎已经被逼进了死路。现实给法实证主义提供了无数反例——软法：它们并非法，但是大多数法律行动者承认它们是法并将其作为法来适用。
面对这一极端变化的现实，大部分的当代法实证主义者陷入了两难。当代法实证主义一方面必须面对很多法领域的法律全球化和法律多元的现实，这一现实（如软法）改变了这一法律运动所承认的一些基本范例（如谱系命题）。另一方面，当代法实证主义对这一挑战采取了相当消极的态度，他们或者放弃法实证主义的使命共同体，或者继续仅仅将传统的（全球化前）的问题作为根本问题来处理。
本文的目的是对法实证主义提出转移注意的建议：转向已经在他们的项目中的问题（虽然经常作为次要方面），也转向他们自己的解决方案（往往已经存在于法实证主义者的作品中）。这种转向或许可以帮助法实证主义避开法律全球化（和法律多元主义）带来的黑洞。在黑洞当中，法与非法的区别（法实证主义的主要原则）似乎消失了，这对法律现象的存在和正当性提出了质疑。
In addition to the traditional attacks from competing legal theories (from natural law to postmodern approach), modern legal positivism seems to be placed at a point of no return when looking at the effects of globalization upon the legal phenomenon. The reality offers to legal positivists countless examples of soft-law, i. e. law which is not law but is perceived and applied by the vast majority of the legal actors as law.
Faced with this radically changed reality, most contemporary legal positivists appear to be caught in a dilemma. The modern legal positivism, on one hand, is in front of a reality of legal globalization and increasing legal pluralism in many areas of law, that is a reality (e. g. soft-law) challenging some of the fundamental paradigms endorsed by this legal movement (e. g. the pedigree thesis). On the other hand, modern legal positivists have taken a quite passive attitude toward this challenge, either by abandoning the legal positivism as a whole to its destiny or by simply continuing to focus upon traditional (i. e. pre-globalization) issues as the fundamental ones to be tackled.
The goal of this work is to suggest a shift of attention among legal positivists towards questions which have always been present in their program (though often in secondary terms), as also their solutions (often already present in the legal positivist works). This shift would possibly help the legal positivism movement to circumvent the black hole represented by legal globalization (and its legal pluralism), a black hole where the distinction between law and nonlaw (i. e. the major tenant of legal positivism) seems to vanish, putting the very existence and legitimacy of the legal phenomenon under question.
What Could Alexis de Tocqueville Have Told us about Second- and Third-Generation Human Rights?
亚历克西·德·托克维尔可以为我们的第二、第三代人权提供什么启示？
作者：Łukasz Mirocha
摘要：本文尝试将托克维尔的观点运用到选定的第二、第三代人权领域中。这些人权在19世纪上半叶尚未（除了一些例外）规定在实证法中。托克维尔对选定的人权的立场将得到重构。文中简单介绍了第二、第三代人权的现代标准，并将其与托克维尔生前与生后的法国宪法有关条文做了比较。接着，本文将呈现托克维尔对人权概念的立场，并尝试回答文章标题中提出的问题。
The article attempts to apply Alexis de Tocqueville`s views in the area of selected second- and third-generation human rights, i. e. the rights that over the course of the first half of the 19th century were not – with some exceptions – anchored in positive law. It takes form of sort of intellectual exercise in which, based on Tocqueville`s work, his potential stance towards chosen human rights is reconstructed. The paper briefly presents modern standards referring to second- and third-generation human rights, and confronts these with legal provisions provided by the French constitutions during and prior to Tocqueville`s life. The following parts of the paper show general Tocqueville`s stance towards the concept of human rights and attempt to answer the question issued in the title of the article.
Proportionality Test and
Constitutional Social Rights
合比例性审查和宪法社会权
作者：Federico de Fazio
摘要：本文将对合比例审查在宪法社会权的司法裁判中的适用进行理性重构。重构将分两个阶段进行。首先，本文将探究，不作为的合比例审查（积极权利中）与对过度的合比例审查（消极权利中）相比，是否呈现出不同的结构。其次，本文将描述运用于遗漏合比例审查中的论证规则和形式，即适当性原则、必要性原则和狭义比例原则。最后，我将做出一个简短的结论。
The purpose of this article is to make a rational reconstruction of the use of the proportionality test in contexts of judicial adjudication of constitutional social rights. This reconstruction will be developed in two stages. Firstly, I will deal with the question of whether the proportionality test in its variation by omission (that is, in cases of positive rights) exhibits or not a different structure with respect to its (better known and developed) variation by excess (that is, in cases of negative rights). Secondly, I will describe the rules and forms of argumentation implied in the use of the proportionality test by omission, which constitute its respective sub-tests of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Lastly, I will present a brief summary.
What makes Law Coercive when it is Coercive?
当法是强制的，什么使其具有强制性？
作者：Lucas Miotto
摘要：大部分道德与政治哲学家一致同意，典型的法律体系是强制性的。但是，典型的法律体系是强制的，什么使其具有强制性，这个问题并没有得到充分的解释。本文将提供一种解释，并将其与其他四种解释做比较。文末，我将讨论本文提供的解释的优势。除了其他方面，我将展现，为何我提供的解释能帮助说明对强制性法律体系的“比较判断”（如“法律体系a比法律体系b更具强制性”的判断），以及这种解释如何有助于对法律体系强制性的社会科学研究。
Most legal and political philosophers agree that typical legal systems are coercive. But there is no extant account of what typically makes typical legal systems coercive when they are coercive. This paper presents such an account and compares it with four alternative views. Towards the end I discuss the proposed account’s payoffs. Among other things, I show how it can help us explain what I call ‘comparative judgements’ about coercive legal systems (judgements such as ‘Legal system a is more coercive than legal system b’) and how it can help the development of social scientific inquiries into the coerciveness of our legal systems.
The Uncertain Concept of Legal Certainty. Rule of Law, Criminal Law and the Hungarian Constitutional Court
法确定性的不确定概念——法治、刑法和匈牙利宪法法院
作者：Krisztina Ficsor
摘要：在匈牙利法学界占通说的是形式的、技术的法治概念，在刑法领域尤其如此。分析匈牙利宪法法院判例法中对司法判决和刑法法规的违宪审查，可以证明这一点。在宪法诉愿程序中，宪法法院不对法律规范和司法裁判的法确定性问题进行审查，认为法确定性不具有宪法上的重要性，不会涉及到人权问题。本文中，作者主张，将法治和法确定性作为形式的、技术的价值，并将它们与政治道德原则分割开来，会限制和削弱对人权的保护。如果法治和法确定性是与道德无关的价值，（刑法）规范可能被用来为政治利益服务，极端不正义的法也将被认为是合宪的。
Hungarian legal scholarship is dominated by a formal, “technical” conception of the rule of law and this is even truer in the jurisprudence of criminal law. This fact can be demonstrated by analysing the case-law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with regard to the constitutional review of judicial decisions and criminal statutes. In constitutional complaint proceedings the Constitutional Court has ruled out legal certainty issues from the review of legal norms and judicial decisions by stating that legal certainty is not a value of constitutional importance and does not raise human rights issues. In this paper the author argues for the claim that conceiving the principle of the rule of law and legal certainty as a formal and technical value which is isolated from the principles of political morality, can lead to a narrow and weak protection of human rights. If the rule of law and legal certainty issues are regarded as amoral values, (criminal) norms can become servants of political interests where highly unjust laws can be held to be constitutional.
Abuse of Law and Advocacy. A Brief Inquiry into Legal Ethics Jurisprudence
滥用法律和辩护——对法伦理学的简短探讨
作者：Andrea Romeo
摘要：本文将探究法伦理学的世界，它声称，法理学问题与当代的法概念与性质争论深深交织在一起。文中简短介绍了关于法律人角色的主要法律理论，尝试大概说明，法律人角色的概念化以及法律人专业职责的性质与我们所接受的法概念息息相关。对此，本文主要关注法伦理学中的“实证主义转向”。文章结论中，我将处理法律人的“过滤滥用法律”命题。该理解基于这样一种理念：法律规则并没有提供有关自身适用的规范，因此存在有关辩护范围的一般实践商谈空间，这也为法律伦理提供了独立于实定法的作用角色。
The essay explores the world of Jurisprudential Legal ethics, which ever closer claims the status of jurisprudential issue deeply woven into the contemporary debate about the concept and the nature of law. The paper briefly explores the leading jurisprudential theories about the lawyer’s role, in attempt to outline that the conceptualization of the lawyers’ role and the nature of their professional commitments are both a function of the concept of law we adopt, mainly focusing on the “positivist turn” in legal ethics. In the conclusive section the paper I address the abuse-of-law filtes thesis of lawyering. Such reading moves from the idea that legal rules do not provide about their own application, thus there is room for a general practical discourse that regards the scope of advocacy and provides a proper role for legal ethics that would be independent from the bare respect of the settled law.
Desuetudo: A Game-Theoretic Approach
废弃：博弈论进路
作者：Federico L. G. Faroldi
摘要：本文通过博弈论对废弃提出了一个解释。我论证了，惯习（consuetudo）存在不对称，因为它没法通过博弈论得到充分把握，如果将废弃理解为动态的、历时的过程，则可以用博弈论对其进行充分阐释。一个规范（不必然是惯习），当没有人需要它时，便不复存在。在交互的情况下， 为了促进某种平衡，已经废弃的规范也不会成为惯习。这种规范动态没法解释所有种类的惯习，但是可以解释废弃——将废弃理解为从规范相关的状态变为规范漠视状态的动态过程。在博弈论的解释中，动态性是重复发生的游戏，而废弃是与之相反的规范产生过程（不论初始规范是惯习还是实定法）。
I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry with consuetudo, because consuetudo cannot be fully captured by a game-theoretic analysis, while desuetudo, properly understood as a dynamic, diachronic process, can. A norm (not necessarily a consuetudo) ceases to exist because there’s no need anymore, in an interactive situation, to foster certain equilibria, even though the same norm which is going in desuetude might not have emerged as a consuetudo. While this kind of norm dynamics cannot explain all kinds of consuetudines, it can explain desuetudo, understood as a dynamic process ending with normative indifference, from a state which was normatively relevant. In this game-theoretic account the dynamicity is captured by the repeated occurence of the game, while desuetudo is the opposite process, in terms of normativity, with which a norm emerges (regardless of the fact whether the initial norm was a consuetudo or posited).
Hasso Hofmann (1934–2021): Ein Nachruf
悼念Hasso Hofmann (1934–2021)
作者：Horst Dreier
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