海外之声 | 中国人民银行的权力，中央银行新范式？（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是IMI国际委员、国际清算银行原高级经济学家Herbert Poenisch。

作者着重谈论比较了各国中央银行的不同作用，同时简要介绍西方和中国金融危机的原因，西方国家政府的反应，中国共产党为金融部门提供的范式，最近全国人大采取的确保金融稳定的措施，以及关于中国的一个结论。

中文译文如下：

中国人民银行的权力，中央银行新范式？

Herbert Poenisch

翻译：谭笑

审校：罗添

自从一系列不稳定事件损害了中国领导人作为金融稳定的守护者的形象以来，金融稳定问题一直萦绕在中国领导人的心头。在西方国家，2008年全球金融危机之后的指责游戏引发了类似的相互扯皮。但是，它们的政策应对却极为不同，反映了金融部门作用，与政府以及整体治理的关系。本文将着重谈论中央银行作用的比较。

这篇文章将简要介绍西方和中国金融危机的原因，西方国家政府的反应，中国共产党为金融部门提供的范式，最近全国人大采取的确保金融稳定的措施，以及关于中国的一个结论。中国央行的角色已经发生改变。

1

金融危机的原因

诸多文献对金融危机的原因进行了分析，其中最重要的原因是：在国内，为防止经济衰退而过度信贷扩张。中央政府（特别是在欧元区）、地方政府（在中国通过地方政府融资平台）、企业和家庭获得了充足的贷款，导致偿债率上升。货币政策导致了此次信贷泡沫，利率创下历史新低。以CPI衡量的通胀保持良性，但包括房地产价格，股价以及债券价格在内的资产价格上涨。由于资产抵押品价格出现通胀，信贷得以进一步扩张，这加剧了恶性循环。

因此，2017年中国私人非金融机构的信贷总额占GDP的比例达到260％，而在美国，这一数值占GDP比重为160％，在欧元区为145％。如果去看信贷缺口，即私人非金融机构的债务同其长期趋势的偏差，情况也是一样的。在2017年初，中国和香港特别行政区远高于上述趋势，而美国和欧元区则低于上述趋势。 最近国际清算银行的研究提出了一系列金融危机的指标。 其中包括三个主要金融指标：信贷缺口、偿债缺口和资产价格缺口，这三个指标可以由其他指标来补充。货币指标是广义货币M2的增长速度。 2017年末，中国M2达到GDP的300％，而美国的比重达到75％，欧元区在采取多年量化宽松政策后，其广义货币M2占GDP的比重接近100％。

在中国，对金融机构的协调监管不力引发对于潜在稳定性风险的忧虑。周小川行长着重提到了四个方面：影子银行、资产管理、互联网金融和金融集团。 

他还提到，一旦对稳定的信心出现明显崩塌，即所谓的“明斯基时刻”，资产泡沫破裂，金融中介机构的资产负债表出现亏损，地方政府、企业和家庭产生债务偿还问题。这个阶段被则称为金融危机，是很多因素共同作用的结果。

从外部看，相关资产价格是指外汇价格。国内金融过度扩张造成汇率压力，波及经常账户和金融账户，这种压力可以通过调整汇率或加强资本管制进行缓解。

2

西方政府的反应

对2008年全球金融危机（GFC）这一主要金融动荡的应对包含两方面。通过多德-弗兰克法案等，银行业监管措施得到了加强，同时各国央行开始实施量化宽松这一非传统的货币政策。这遏制了全面衰退，但没有像预期的那样刺激经济增长。

这扩大了中央银行的资产负债表，增加了经济的流动性，但向实体经济部门的传导仍然不足。银行提高了资产负债表的质量，但并未向实体经济部门放贷，理由是因为变严的监管。各国央行乐于遵循其货币政策，以确保充足的增长，因为通胀指标是良性的。因此，触及零下限的史上最低利率对中央银行提出了新的挑战。 

各国央行对金融稳定则采取了不同的政策。它们从全球经济危机中吸取经验，更加关注金融稳定。一些中央银行，主要是新兴市场国家，如中国和马来西亚，扩大了中央银行的权力范围以实现金融稳定。发达国家的中央银行则不愿意采取这样的方式。

有两个主要的理由说明发达国家央行为什么不愿意这么做。首先，金融稳定比货币稳定更难以界定，其次，央行不应该承担过多的责任。瑞士央行行长乔丹甚至警告说，如此高的预期是非常危险的。 尽管如此，央行应当在确保金融稳定方面发挥主导作用至少有三个令人信服的理由：金融稳定影响到央行运作的宏观经济环境；央行是最后贷款人，需要评估交易对手的风险；他们对金融市场的运作有更好的了解。 

因此，西方国家央行承担了稳定金融的责任，主要是促进金融稳定，而不是像稳定货币一样直接确保金融稳定。这是基于有多个主管部门负责金融市场的监管。市场参与者实行自我监管或受专门监督机构的约束。中央银行直接参与货币市场、债券市场和外汇市场，但不直接参与其他金融市场，通常也不为这些金融市场制定规则。

央行监测各种金融市场的发展情况，并当在一段较长的时间内出现重大发展时使用杠杆。货币市场就是一个例子，一些中央银行不干预以平息利息高峰，另一些则定期干预，还有的每天都会进行干预。同样，在外汇市场上，部分央行并不对日常波动进行干预，而其他央行则积极管理汇率。

西方央行认为金融市场出现一定程度的波动是应对市场参与者反应的必要工具。频繁的干预将会削弱这一手段，增加市场的不确定性。它们只有在市场波动阻碍其中期增长和通胀目标时才作出反应。其货币政策目标，比如通货膨胀目标，的透明度是最重要的。

央行对于金融稳定的界定是很狭隘的。大多数央行仍然奉行微观审慎的做法，只监管单个金融机构。中央银行有能力执行宏观审慎政策，因为它们有能力分析系统性风险。 宏观审慎做法，例如抑制资产泡沫，由于缺乏操作上的明确性，尚未被广泛采纳。反对者声称，他们不知道何时进行干预以及干预到什么程度。而利用利率来抑制资产泡沫的做法尚未广泛使用。

3

中国范式

金融部门在社会主义经济中的作用有所不同。中国共产党在2017年7月15日召开的全国金融工作会议后重申了这一点。金融部门应为人民服务，并由中国共产党直接管理。为了实现这一目标，金融稳定发展委员会已于2017年秋季成立，目前由副总理马凯先生担任主席。

社会主义国家从未经历过像苏联时期那样的金融动荡。金融资源被分配到实体经济部门，金融从未成为一个独立的部门。苏联人避免了由于金融管理不善而产生的溢出后果，直到苏联解体时，出现恶性通货膨胀，对于以往问题的清算卷走了苏联人的存款。

中国领导人通过关注历史教训，特别是苏联解体的教训，正试图保护中国人民免受金融动荡的影响。它通过为金融部门的所有参与者制定法规来防止金融动荡。银行通过资产管理和互联网金融参与了许多涉及影子银行的业务，互联网金融通过网络货币、电子支付、众筹融资、P2P贷款以及保险产品向大部分人提供金融服务。非银行控股公司在缺少对整个集团进行适当监督的情况下，通过其一家子公司提供金融服务。

另外，金融市场本身具有动态性，并产生无法调节但需要管理的风险。新任命的中国人民银行行长易纲精通管理固有风险，因为他在美国有丰富的生活、教学经验，并自上世纪90年代中期加入中国人民银行以来曾多次参加国际货币基金组织、国际清算银行和其他论坛的国际会议，这些国际会议透彻分析了西方金融危机的原因。

中国对于金融市场的波动持有不同看法。它是对指导中国历代当局的至高无上的“稳定”这一概念的侵犯。因此，需要防止波动，而不仅仅是管理。 任由市场参与者对波动进行日常管理和对冲是一个外国概念。怎样才能让市场如中国领导人所承诺的那样发挥更大的作用，同时又不带来更大的波动，还需要进一步观察。同样需要进一步观察的，还有如何通过减少外汇管制，让强大的全球金融市场在中国发挥更大的影响力。中国对2016年初人民币离岸市场波动的反应就是一个明确的信号。

4

近期中国举措

2017年7月全国金融工作会议，2017年10月中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会和2018年3月举行的全国人大会议都规定了中国共产党在经济和金融领域的领导地位。 这对金融业意味着什么？它强调了实体经济的权威和大多数人的福利，而不是自我闭环、只为金融精英服务的金融部门。这样，马克思制定的G-M-G（增长-货币增长）模式已经得到恢复。根据这一模式，货币是中性的，只发挥促进实际增长的作用。在西方，这一模式已被转化为M-G-M'，即货币通过实际增长创造利润（M'）。

中国共产党，特别是副总理刘鹤先生表示，他反对通过地方政府融资平台（LGFV）向地方政府以及通过其他渠道向企业（包括大型私有企业和国有企业）以及近期向家庭部门进行过度放贷。去杠杆化进程已经开始。在这些情况下，偿债能力令人担忧。同时，股票和房地产等市场的资产泡沫也令人担忧。中国人民银行被敦促采取措施为资产市场降温。中国人民银行因此得到采取宏观审慎措施的授权。

此外，中国人民银行也被赋予监管金融部门的最高权力。银监会和保监会已合并为一家，以更好地控制金融集团。证监会也受其管辖，因此中国央行覆盖了所有金融部门。

在中国共产党的指导下，中国人民银行一直是主要的负责机构，比其他大多数中央银行承担更多的职能。以刘鹤副总理、郭树清先生为代表，中国共产党主要通过副总理刘鹤、金融稳定发展委员会以及中国人民银行内部的中国共产党代表（郭树清先生），对中国人民银行的工作进行监督。中国人民银行负责促进增长，确保价格稳定，管理汇率，规范整个金融部门以及确保金融稳定。

一家有着如此多任务的机构需要相应的工具、权力和保障。中国人民银行已经被赋予权力，但完善的工具和保障还仰仗于其他政府部门。尽管它可以采取准备金要求、回购利率、中期借贷并且管理日常汇率，关键决策还是由其他政府部门作出。这些部门有权力改变关键利率、制定汇率政策并且为中国人民银行的决定提供保障。

拥有如此广泛的权力将对中国人民银行构成挑战。央行是否具备金融市场各领域的专业知识？它是否具有对不同金融领域出现的风险的前瞻见解？它监测“黑天鹅”和“灰犀牛”事件的风险吗？它是否了解风险是如何通过相互联系传播的？监管是否能明晰风险控制后谁持有最终风险，并且对此做出了充足的规定？

价格波动以及交易对手管理风险的能力造成了现代金融体系的风险。主要参与方可以使用风险分担或风险转移工具。对雷曼兄弟在2008年倒闭的案例研究已经显示了数字时代风险共担的复杂性。耗时数月时间，才弄清在随即引发的损失中，谁受到了何种程度的牵连。

5

结论

鉴于现代经济中金融的复杂性和普遍性，近期中国人民银行增补权力提供了新的维度。虽然这是可行的，但要缩小中国的监管差距、消除金融不稳定性是一项艰巨的任务，几乎是不可能的。

金融波动不可能消除。它可以被控制和管理，但它肯定会发生在一个更加市场化的制度中。如果允许市场参与者发挥更大的作用，他们则会犯错误或对系统造成风险。一旦出现不稳定因素，羊群效应这一市场经济的缺陷将放大最初的冲击。中共还没有确定，损失应由私人承担还是应该由社会承担？在当局承担监管所有金融部门职责的国家，如中国，存在着对于让社会承担损失的偏见，即道德风险。

虽然最近中国共产党和全国人大会议的决定通过为央行提供一个新的范式已经向前迈出了一大步，但许多重大问题仍然悬而未决。应该由中国人民银行还是市场参与者负责管理各种金融风险？是否有足够的工具来管理各种风险？大大小小的市场参与者是否具有充足的教育背景能够管理风险并承担损失？如何处理“大而不倒”的问题？金融体系需要在私人和社会责任之间划分更加明确的界限。在不确定的时期内，政府对损失者的救助，就像2015年股市崩盘之后那样，将成为首选救助机制。

英文原文如下：

Power to the Peoples’ Bank of China.

A new paradigm for central banking?

 Herbert Poenisch

Financial stability has been on the mind of Chinese leaders ever since episodes of instability have tarnished their image as custodians of stability.In Western countries the blame game after the GFC in 2008 led to similar recriminations. However, the policy reactions are very different reflecting the role of the financial sector, the relationship with government and governance in general .This article will focus on the comparative role of central banks.

This contribution will briefly cover the reasons for financial crises in the West and in China, the reaction by Western governments, the paradigm given by the CPC to the financial sector, the recent measures to ensure financial stability adopted by the recent NPC and a conclusionfor China,where the role of central banking has been redesigned.

1

Reasons for financial crises

The literature has ample analysis into their causes, the most important ones of which are: Domestically, an excessive credit expansion to prevent a downturn in economic growth. Ample credit was extended to the government (especially in the Euro Zone), the regional governments (in China through Local Government Financing Vehicles-LGFV), enterprises and households,leading to a rising debt service ratio. The monetary policy contributed to the credit bubble as historically low interest rates facilitated this credit boom. Consumer price inflation stayed benign, but asset prices escalated. These were property prices, share prices as well as bond prices. This reinforced the vicious spiral as credit was increasingly extended against inflated asset collateral.

As a result, total credit to private non-financial entities spiralled to 260% of GDP in 2017 in China, compared with 160% of GDP in the US and 145% the EURO area. Looking at the credit gap, which is defined as the deviation of the private non-financial debt over its long term trendthe pictures is the same. At the beginning of 2017 China and the Hong Kong SAR were well above the trend whereas the US and Eurozone were below . There are a number of indicators of financial crises, as a recent BIS study shows . These are the three leading financial indicators, credit gap, debt service gap and asset price gap, which can be supplemented by others. The monetary indicator would be the expansion of broad money M2. At the end of 2017 China M2 reached 300% of GDP, whereas the US was at 75% of GDP and the EURO zone close to 100% of GDP, after years of quantitative easing.

In China inadequate coordination of regulation of financial intermediationraised concerns of potential stability risks. Governor Zhou mentioned four areas in particular: shadow banking, asset management, internet finance and financial conglomerates .

He also mentioned that once the confidence in apparent stability broke, the so called ‘Minsky moment’, the asset bubble deflated, with losses on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries, and debt servicing problems by local governments, corporates and households. The phase is called financial crisis, the accumulation of a many factors.

Externally, the relevant asset price is foreign exchange. Domestic financial excesses lead to exchange rate pressures, both on the currentas well as the financial account, which can beaccommodated by exchange rate adjustments or preventingnecessary adjustments by tightening capital controls.

2

Reaction by Western governments

The reaction to the major financial instability, the global financial crises (GFC) in 2008 was twofold. Banking regulation was tightened, such as through the Dodd-Frank Act, and central banks embarked on unconventional monetary policy through quantitative easing programmes (QE). This prevented a full blown recession but did not provide the stimulus to economic growth as expected.

This expanded central banks’ balance sheets, increased the liquidity in the economy but the transmission to the real sector was still inadequate. Banks increased the quality of their balance sheets but not lending to the real sector, citing tighter regulation. Central banks willingly followed their monetary mandate, to ensure sufficient growth as inflation indicators were benign. As a result, historically low interest rates, touching the zero lower bound posed new challenges to central banks . 

Their responsibilities for financial stability produced a different picture.Learning the lesson from the GFC, central banks paid more attention to financial stability. It was mostly emerging market central banks, such as China and Malaysia which extended the mandate of their central banks to cover financial stability. Advanced countries’ central banks were more reluctant to go down this way.

There were two main arguments why they did not. Firstly, financial stability is far more difficult to define than monetary stability, and secondly, central banks should not be over burdened with responsibilities.SNB President Jordan even warned that such high expectations are exceedingly dangerous . Nevertheless, there are at least three compelling reasons for central banks to play a leading role in ensuring financial stability. They are: financial stability affects the macroeconomic environment in which they operate, they act as lender of last resort and need to assess the counterparty risk, and finally they have a better understanding of the functioning of financial markets .

As a result Western central banks have accepted responsibility in the area of financial stability, mostly as contribution to financial stability rather than outright ensuring stability as is the case with monetary stability. This takes into account that there are various authorities in charge of financial market regulation and monitoring. Market participants practice self regulation or are subject to specialised supervisory bodies. Central banks are directly involved in the money market, the bond market and foreign exchange market. They deal with other financial markets at arm’s length. They usually do not write the rulebook for these.

Central banks monitor developments in the various financial markets and use their levers if critical developments occur over an extended period of time. The money market is a case in point, where some central banks do not intervene to smooth interest spikes, others intervene regularly and others intervene daily. Similarly, in the foreign exchange markets, daily swings do not prompt some central banks to intervene, whereas other central banks actively manage their exchange rates.

Western central banks consider a certain degree of volatility in financial markets as necessary tool for the reaction of market participants. Frequent intervention would blunt this instrument and add to the uncertainty in the market. They react to volatility only if it counters their mid-term growth and inflation targets. Transparency of their monetary target is of paramount importance, such as inflation targets.

Financial stability in the minds of central banks is narrowly defined, the banking system. Most still pursue the microprudential approach by regulating and supervising individual institutions. Central banks are well placed to conduct macro-prudential policies because they have the capacity to analyse systemic risks . Macroprudential concerns, such as deflating asset bubbles, have not been broadly adopted as they lack the operational clarity. Opponents claim they don’t knowwhen to intervene and by how much. Using interest rates to deflate asset bubbles has not been commonly used.

3

Chinese paradigm

The role of the financial sector is different in socialist economies. The CPC has restated it following the National Financial Work Conference on 15 July 2017. The financial sector should serve the people and as such is under the direct authority of the CPC. In order to achieve this, the Financial Stability and Development Committee has been set up in autumn 2017,presently under the chairmanship of Vice-Premier, Mr Ma Kai. 

Socialist countries never experienced financial instability as during the Soviet Union. Financial resources were allocated to the real sector and finance never took on a life of its own. The population was thus protected from any spill over from financial mismanagement until the end of the Soviet Union when hyperinflation, the reckoning from previous mistakes,wiped out the savings of the population.

The Chinese leadership, bypaying attention to the historical lessons, in particular the collapse of the Soviet Union, is attempting to protect its population from financial instability. It is putting the emphasis on preventing financial instability by designing regulations for all participants in the financial sector. These are the banks which are heavily involved in shadow banking such as through asset management, the internet finance which provides financial services to a large part of the population through cyber currencies, e-payments, crowd financing, P-2-P lending and finally through insurance products.Non-bank holding companies provide financial services through one of their subsidiaries without proper supervision of the whole conglomerate.

In addition, financial markets have dynamics of their own and create risks which cannot be regulated but need to be managed. The newly appointed PBOC Governor Yi Gang is well versed in managing the inherent risks as he has ample experience from living and teaching in the US as well as attending international meetings at the IMF, BIS and other forums where financial crises in the West were analysed thoroughly since he joined the PBOC in the mid1990s.

Volatility in financial markets is viewed differently in China. It is a violation of supreme harmony which has guided Chinese authorities, dynasties before and CPC leadership now. As such, volatility needs to be prevented, rather than just managed . Trustingthe market participants to manage and hedge volatilityon a daily base is a foreign concept. How should a greater measure of market functioning, as promised by Chinese leaders without more volatility materialise, needs to be seen. In the same vein, allowing the powerful global financial markets more influence in China through less foreign exchange control needs to be seen. The Chinese reaction to volatility in the offshore RMB market in early 2016 sent a clear signal.

4

Recent Chinese measures

The pre-eminence of the CPC in the economy and finance has been stipulated during the July 2017 Work Conference, during the 19th Party Conference in October 2017 and in the recent NPC meeting in March 2018 .What does this mean for the financial sector? It enshrines the authority of the real economy, the welfare of the majority of the population rather than the financial sector leading a life of its own, serving only the financial elite. In this way the Marxist stipulation G-M-G (growth-money-growth) has been restored where money is neutral and only facilitates real growth. In the West, this has been perverted into M-G-M’ where money creates profit (M’) through real growth.

The CPC, notably Vice Premier Mr Liu He has expressed its disapproval of excessive credit growth to regional governments throughspecial financing vehicles (LGFV), to enterprises (the big private ones as well as theSOE) and most recently to households. The deleveraging process has already started. In all these cases the debt servicing capacity is a cause for concern. It has also expressed concern over asset bubbles, such as shares and property and prompted the PBOC to take measures to cool the asset markets. The PBOC istherefore authorised to apply macro-prudential measures.

In addition, the PBOC has been given the supreme power to regulate the financial sector. The two supervisory agencies for banks and insurance have been merged into one to better control financial conglomerates. The Securities Commission is also under its authority, thus covering all finance sectors.

Together, the PBOC has been made the main responsible authority under the guidance of the CPC to carry out more functions than most other central banks. The CPC oversees the work of the PBOC, notably by Vice Premier Liu He, the Committee for FinancialStability and Development and the CPC representatives inside the PBOC, notably Mr GuoShuqing. The PBOC is responsible for promoting growth, ensure price stability, managing the exchange rate, regulate the whole financial sector as well as ensure financial stability.

An institution with so many tasks needs the tools, authority and safeguards. The PBOC has been given the authority, but complete tools and the safeguards rest with the political authorities. While it operates through reserve requirements, repo rates, medium term lending and manages the daily exchange rates, the key decision rests with political authorities. They have the power to change key interest rates, stipulate the exchange rate policy and provide safeguards for PBOC decisions. 

Having such a broad mandate will prove a challenge for the PBOC. Does it have the technical expertise in all aspects of the financial markets? Does it have a superior view of the risks emerging in different segments of finance? Does it monitor Black Swan and Grey Rhino risks? Does it understand how risks are transmitted through interlinkages? Does regulation providea clear picture of who holds the final risk after risk mitigation and do they have adequate provisions for these? 

Risks in a modern financial systemare generated through price fluctuations as well as counterparty ability to manage risks. The primary parties have risk sharing or risk transfer instruments at their disposal. The case study of the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in 2008 has given some idea of the complexity of risk sharing in digital times. It took months to reconstruct who was implicated to what extent in the losses incurred.

5

Conclusions

Given the complexity and pervasiveness of finance in a modern economy, the recent additional powers of the PBOC take on a new dimension. While it is feasible, but demanding to close regulatory gaps in China, getting on top of financial instability altogether is a tall order, close to impossible.

Financial volatility cannot be ruled out. It can be contained and managed, but it will certainly occur in a more market driven system. If market participants are allowed a greater role, they will make mistakes or game the system. Once instability appears, herding, a deficiency of market economies, will magnify the initial impulse. The CPC has not decided yet, whether losses are basically private or should be socialised? In countries where the authorities take on overarching responsibilities for the financial sector, such as China,there is a bias for socialising losses, called moral hazard.

While the decisions of the recent meetings of the CPC and the NPC have been a great step forward, with a new paradigm for central banking, major issues are still up in the air. Is the PBOC or are market participants responsible for managing various financial risks? Are there ample instruments available for managing various risks? Are market participants, big and smallsufficiently educated to be able to manage their risks and bear the costs?How will ‘too big to fail’ be handled? The financial system needs more clarity on the red demarcation line between private and social responsibilities. In uncertain times, government bailout of loss makers, as after the stock market crash of 2015, will be the preferred rescue mechanism.

内容整理 罗梦宇

图文编辑 罗梦宇

审校  田雯

监制  朱霜霜

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