海外之声 | 默克尔、马克龙和欧洲集体行动条款：困境中的欧洲如何脱身（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是曾任美国财政部国际货币与金融政策的副助理部长的马克·索贝尔。直到今年早些时候，他还是国际货币基金组织的美国代表。他主持的国际公共-私营联合组织在2014年制定了单一集合条款。

马克就欧洲债务危机和集体行动条款可行性进行分析，并从四方面阐述了对持有政府债务的私营部门进行“自动”减记以换取欧洲稳定机制的不可取性。

中文译文如下：

默克尔、马克龙和欧洲集体行动条款

困境中的欧洲如何脱身

马克·索贝尔

翻译：谢佳

审校：熊若洁

2018年7月9日

欧洲债务水平非常高。除希腊外，政府层面的债务人主要是意大利和葡萄牙，但法国、西班牙和比利时的政府债务也接近或超过GDP的100％。

欧洲就降低风险与风险共担展开激烈讨论。此外，历史上多次发生主权债务重组; 历史正在重演。

私营部门分担高额或不可持续债务成本的问题不可避免。对欧洲来说，这一领域非常敏感。特别是考虑到6月29日，布鲁塞尔首脑会议上就分担移民责任出现的紧张局势，每一步都有可能带来政治挫折和市场混乱。

德国总理安格拉·默克尔和法国总统埃马纽尔·马克龙也加入讨论。德法两国在欧盟首脑会议前发布《梅泽贝格宣言》（以他们在柏林附近的巴洛克式宫殿举行会议的名字命名）。宣言中有一句话晦涩难懂：“为改进现有促进债务可持续性框架，提高效率，我们应着手采用单一集合（single-limb aggregation）欧元区集体行动条款（CAC）。”

这句话背后隐藏着一个持续困扰欧洲的问题：负债政府需要欧洲稳定机制的支持，但如果私营部门贷款人退出，造成负债政府危机和违约升级，应该如何应对？这引发了高债务国和低债务国之间的激烈争议。

集体行动条款被写入主权债券合约，以使债券在一定条件下重组，包括绝大多数债券持有人同意债券减记。这反映了一个事实：与国家破产不同，国际债权人不受在法庭承担损失的约束; 从国家主权来看，全球主权破产法院并不存在，也可能永远不会出现。

梅泽贝格集体行动参考反映了旷日持久的欧元区改革战。对于寻求欧洲稳定机制支持的国家，德国和荷兰希望对持有政府债务的私营部门实行“自动”减记，进而打造欧洲货币基金组织。然而，法国和意大利担心这会导致更高差价和市场不稳定，声称这种行为突破了底线。

原则上，德国人和荷兰人是对的。投资者冒风险获利，也应承担行为后果，而不是纳税人。 市场纪律有助于规避道德风险。不幸的是，现实世界并非如此简单。自动对持有政府债务的私营部门进行减记以换取欧洲稳定机制的支持并不可取，有四点原因。

第一，如果一个国家流动性不足而非破产，那么提供财政支持和避免重组对该国的危害要小得多。但是，要判断一个国家是流动性不足还是破产并不简单。对债务可持续性的判断具有主观性，许多情况模糊不清。必须评估该国的债务和赤字情况，潜在增长率以及调整和运行基本盈余的能力。负责任的政策制定者不应让国家陷入破产境地。

第二，通常需要减记以消除债务积压。但减记成本非常高。各国可能长期无法进入信贷市场。 当银行持有大量国家主权债券时，可能会造成国家资产负债表损失并减少银行资本。

第三，自动减记可能引发自我实现的债券市场挤兑和蔓延。因担心国家债务自动重组，市场参与者很有可能率先行动，抛售有价证券。短期定位会得到回报，买入并持有的投资者则受到惩罚。市场抛售可能会出现在下一个脆弱的国家。

第四，外部环境很重要。2010年5月，私营部门持有的希腊债务重组可能会在全球市场大规模蔓延。到2012年，市场已经能够适应这种情况。

2010年，默克尔和当时的法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐（Nicolas Sarkozy）在法国海滨小镇多维尔（Deauville）的海滩上漫步。他们认为可以让私人债权人承担欧洲负债国的损失，以获得欧洲纾困机制的支持。希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙债券差价立刻飙升。爱尔兰和葡萄牙失去了市场准入机会。欧洲纳税人的税负并未减少。未来的集体行动条款解决方案必须吸取这一教训。

英文原文如下：

Merkel, Macron and euro-CACs

Taming the spectre haunting Europe

Mark Sobel

  9 July 2018

Debt in Europe is very high. The chief debtors at the government level aside from Greece are Italy and Portugal, but France, Spain, and Belgium too have government debt close to or beyond 100% of GDP.

European debates rage about risk reduction v. risk sharing. Additionally, history is littered with sovereign debt restructurings; and history repeats itself.

Questions over private sector involvement in bearing the cost of high or unsustainable debt are inevitable. For Europe, this is an area of extraordinary sensitivity. Every step carries risks of political setbacks and market upsets, particularly in view of tensions displayed at the Brussels summit on 29 June over sharing the burdens of migration.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron added to this debate by introducing into their pre-summit 'Meseberg declaration' (named after their meeting in a Baroque palace near Berlin) this recondite sentence: 'To improve the existing framework promoting debt sustainability and to improve their effectiveness, we should start working on the possible introduction of euro-CACs (collective action clauses) with single-limb aggregation.'

Behind this bewildering phrase lurks a spectre haunting Europe: a spirited controversy between countries with low and high debt about what to do in the event private sector lenders head for the exit and subject indebted governments, needing European Stability Mechanism support, to an escalating spiral of distress and default.

CACs are written into sovereign bond contracts to allow a bond to be restructured under certain conditions, including that a large majority of the bondholders agrees to write-downs. This reflects the reality that, unlike in a national bankruptcy, international creditors cannot be constrained to bear losses in court; a global sovereign bankruptcy court does not exist, and probably never will, in view of national sovereignty.

The Meseberg CAC reference mirrors long-standing euro area reform battles. Germany and the Netherlands wish to impose 'automatic' write-downs on private sector holders of government debt for any country seeking support from the ESM, due to become the European Monetary Fund. France and Italy, however, fearing that would lead to higher spreads and market instability, say such action crosses a 'red line'.

In principle, the Germans and Dutch are right – investors take risks to earn rewards and they should bear the consequences of their actions, rather than taxpayers. Market discipline is salubrious. Moral hazard is to be avoided. Unfortunately, the real world is not so simple. Imposing write-downs automatically on private holders in return for ESM support is a bad idea, for four reasons.

First, if a state faces illiquidity rather than insolvency, providing financial support and avoiding a restructuring is far less harmful to the country. But determining whether a country is illiquid or insolvent is not straightforward. Judgements about debt sustainability are subjective and many cases offer up shades of grey. One must assess the country's debt burdens and deficits, its potential growth rate, and its capacity to adjust and run primary surpluses. Responsible policy-makers should not push countries into insolvency.

Second, write-downs are often needed to eliminate a debt overhang. But they can be highly costly. Countries can lose access to credit markets for long periods. Large national balance sheet losses can emerge and decapitalise banks when they hold significant amounts of national sovereign bonds.

Third, automaticity can set off self-fulfilling market runs and contagion. Market participants, fearing an automatic restructuring in a country, would have every incentive to be the first mover and dump paper. Short-term positioning would be rewarded, buy-and-hold investors penalised. Market selling might then move to the next vulnerable country.

Fourth, the external climate matters. A restructuring of private sector holdings of Greek debt in May 2010 could have engendered massive contagion in global markets. By 2012, markets were able to accommodate it.

In 2010, Merkel and then French President Nicolas Sarkozy took a stroll on the beach in the French seaside town of Deauville. They decided losses could be imposed on private creditors of indebted European states, as a condition for the country receiving support from the European bail-out mechanism. Greek, Irish and Portuguese bond spreads immediately soared. Ireland and Portugal lost market access. European taxpayers did not save money. Future solutions over CACs must learn the lessons of Deauville.

内容整理 罗梦宇

图文编辑 罗梦宇

审校  田雯

监制  朱霜霜

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