海外之声 | 各国央行面临本质冲突：“奖赏失败”产生的问题（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是IMI国际委员会成员、国际货币金融机构官方论坛（OMFIF）主席David Marsh，原文选自国际货币金融机构官方论坛（OMFIF）出版的Commentary。OMFIF是一家全球位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者指出，各国央行将面临金融与政治之间的本质冲突带来的一系列挑战。央行执行的货币政策是否奏效，是否发挥该有的职能，央行与政府及金融机构的关系划分，将影响着世界经济走向和金融态势。

中文译文如下：

各国央行面临本质冲突

“奖赏失败”产生的问题

戴维•马什

翻译：沈冠华

审校：熊若洁

2018年7月16日

各国央行面临金融与政治之间关系中的本质冲突导致的一系列挑战。各国曾采取措施改变本央行的职能，赋予它们新的政策职责，产生了广泛、长期的金融、经济和政治影响。主要发达国家的央行扩大了2008-2009年金融危机以来公开市场操作的范围，其货币政策异常宽松，同时购买并持有了大量政府债券。这样的非常规货币政策虽旨在降低金融危机的影响，但也有可能引发下一次金融危机。目前，只有美国和英国正在缓慢终止宽松货币政策，日本和欧洲大陆地区还没有采取措施。

央行的这些行动有可能会与保卫金融稳定的一系列措施产生冲突。根据宏观审慎监管职责，央行有责任监督、控制和指导整个经济系统内银行和金融机构的资产和活动。

出席新加坡研讨会的一名与会者表示，从许多方面看，央行都在因祸得福。2008年金融危机加剧，央行由于施策不当和预判失败而备受指责。政府官员和民众对央行的信任随之下降。但是，危机过后，央行的职权也已经扩大。管理这些冲突在未来将会成为一个大问题，特别是在世界经济面临下一轮萧条的情况下，央行可能又会被要求采取更多措施。这种情况有可能在复苏正在失去动力的美国出现，虽然特朗普出台了顺周期的减税政策。

政府与央行的责权边界有可能被重新划定。坊间正在讨论下一次危机爆发前，央行会不会获得上调利率的自由，以便在危机降临时有足够的降息空间。与会代表认为，政府举债水平高企，因此政府不能接受上调利率。这种“举债陷阱”有可能会削弱央行的独立性。

在管理本行资产负债表方面，央行与政府和金融机构的关系有可能面临洗牌。这项工作会需要更有效和紧密的协调。一名与会者强调，虽然央行间的沟通是全球性的，许多官员有相似的背景和学历，但国际间的协调并不活跃。研讨会还探讨了有可能导致金融市场瘫痪的金融科技等领域。金融科技的发展一部分是得益于宽松的货币政策。会议认为央行应密切关注金融科技的发展动向。

英文原文如下：

Central banks facing intrinsic conflicts

Problem stemming from 'reward for failure'

David Marsh

  16 July 2018

Central banks face a series of challenges focused on intrinsic conflicts at the heart of the relationship between finance and politics. Governments around the world have acted with central banks to change these institutions' roles and move them into new policy areas with widespread and long-lasting financial, economic and political consequences. In a large-scale extension of their open market operations generated by the 2008-09 financial crisis, central banks in the main developed countries have been running unusually easy monetary policies through buying and holding very significant quantities of government bonds. This unconventional monetary policy, although brought about in a bid to mitigate the effects of the last crisis, could end up triggering the next one. Unwinding this monetary accommodation is taking place only slowly in the US and UK, and has not yet started in Japan and continental Europe.

These central banking actions co-exist alongside, and could potentially conflict with, another set of arrangements to safeguard financial stability – macroprudential regulation – under which central banks have acquired the additional role of supervising, controlling and guiding the assets and activities of banks and financial institutions throughout the economy.

One participant at the Singapore workshop said in many ways the central banks have been rewarded for perceived failures. Central banks have been blamed for policies that may have exacerbated the 2008 crisis, and for not detecting its build-up. Faith in their abilities, both from politicians and the general public, had declined. Yet in the aftermath of these upheavals, they have also been given wider duties and remits. Managing these conflicts would be a big problem for the future, especially as central banks could face further calls for additional action when the next world recession loomed. This could happen in the next two years as the US recovery, despite the procyclical tax cutting action of President Donald Trump, runs out of steam.

There could be a substantial redrawing of the boundaries of action and responsibility between governments and central banks. Questions were being raised whether, in the run-up to the next crisis, central banks would have the freedom to raise interest rates sufficiently to give them the necessary rate-cutting firepower to make a difference when the next downturn hits.  There was a discussion of how some governments' debt levels made them unable to accept interest rate rises ­­­- a 'debt trap' that may end of costing central banks' their independence.

In the management of their own balance sheets, central banks' linkages with governments and financial institutions could be heavily remodelled. This task would require much more effective and close coordination. One participant underlined that although communication among central banks was global, with many officials sharing similar backgrounds and education, international coordination was on a lower scale. There was also a discussion on areas like fintech which were potentially disruptive for financial markets, where growth had partly been spurred by accommodative monetary policies. It was agreed that central banks needed to keep a close eye on developments.

内容整理 罗梦宇

图文编辑 罗梦宇

审校  田雯

监制  朱霜霜

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