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海外之声 | 危机管理：健康危机与金融危机的比较
导读
最后我们来思考：一旦健康危机平息，我们又能预料到什么样的金融危机呢？下一次金融危机会有所不同吗？金融研究机构从不回避称其研究为“管理下一次金融危机”。虽然预防危机在卫生领域和金融领域都极为重要，但现实主义者指出，卫生领域和金融领域爆发重大危机只是时间问题。虽然无法避免金融危机和健康危机，但加强对危机的管理，可能能够将其对金融体系和经济的成本降到最低。目前，尽管在卫生部门和金融领域都必须为危机做好充分准备，但这场危机已经失控。世界各国政府都在努力遏制这一流行病和金融后果。现在是时候超越规则手册，采取实际措施了，在卫生领域，世卫组织负责人建议对受影响的人进行检测和测试，而在金融领域，应对措施应是向需要者提供流动性。
作者 | Herbert Poenisch，IMI国际委员、BIS原高级经济学家
英文原文如下：
Crisis management: health crisis and financial crisis compared
By Herbert Poenisch, IMI International Committee, former BIS senior economist
Health and finance global aspects compared
While there are clear differences between the two, there are also important commonalities. Health is of paramount importance, because the alternative, with a certain probability could be death. While a financial crisis is not life threatening, it is of paramount importance, as it impairs the prospect of physical survival for a large swathe of the population. This is not the decline of financial markets or slowdown in economic growth but the damage caused by loss of jobs, loss of income and spread of poverty, such as through deflation and inflation. The world is facing such a financial crisis once the health crisis runs its course.
Finance affects not only the personal well being but also that of the kin. While health is provided by nature, financial safety is provided by human agreement based on trust. However, trust is usually based on trust in authorities through legal agreements but is ultimately given by nature. Its function is binary, on or off, thus resembling life or death. Once trust is lost we are left on our own. In the ultimate case, nobody can guarantee financial safety in case of a general loss of confidence[3] . We are constantly revising our profile of confidence, just like measuring our state of health.Our health risks are linked with those surrounding us, who might infect us. Thus spread and exponential contamination are the biggest risks presently. Our financial safety is affected by those who provide our finance, our source of income, our payments, our store of value. Guaranteeing health and financial safety are the basic functions of a state. It can be subsumed under ‘taking care of the well-being of the population’. What happens, if the state itself is at risk, in health terms when overwhelmed by an epidemic, such as recently in Hubei, Iran and Europe. In financial terms, the country would be threatened by bankruptcy? In these cases the guarantors, become unable to guarantee us basic safety. The Great Depression of 1929 and 1930 showed the default of banks was followed by the central bank, followed by the ministry of finance and finally the country.For the emergence of an epidemic it is important to understand the ‘epidemic triangle’. It postulates that every outbreak, regardless of its specific traits is dependent on the interplay between three factors: (i) the pathogen (the agent causing infection); (ii) the host (the organism at risk of infection); and (iii) the environment (the setting where the infections occur). Every single epidemic..is the result of a dynamic shift in one of these points of the epidemic triangle, which then causes a domino effect leading to a sudden explosion of new cases[5]. While the application in health is self-evident, in the GFC a small trigger in the CDO markets, accounting to less than 1% of the aggregate financial markets caused contagion in other financial sectors, first and foremost the interbank market, and others to follow. The spread of a computer virus is another illustration of this theory.The interlinkedness of health is clear as we can measure the number of personal interactions every day. Modern technologies allow precise monitoring of these through mobile phones, internet, AI[4]. The interlinkedness of finance can also be measured. Who pays us how much income, how much do we need to pay to others to provide us for basic services, such as food, water, shelter and an increasing array of other basic needs, such as electricity and transport. Finally, who looks after our savings, assuming we do not hoard under the mattress. There are umpteen examples when lifetime savings have been wiped out by inflation, default of the country and others. This drove individuals to desperation, obviously not as bad as a threat to one’s health.These links not only work domestically but increasingly internationally. As people move internationally, spreading health risks across borders is the natural result. Contagion has become the buzzword in the recent pandemic. Equally, financial crises spread across borders because financial agents provide services across borders. The survival of one bank depends on the trusts from other banks to participate in the interbank market. Each country depends on the trust it enjoys from the international community. In the worst case it can be isolated from the others. In case of spread of an epidemic, citizens of a country are confined within their borders, either national, regional, or local. In case of finance, when livelihood cannot be guaranteed people will flee their country as we are witnessing at present with waves of refugees. Within the responsibilities of a state, guaranteeing the health of the population and guaranteeing the financial survival are the key postulates. Over the past years, governments have prepared contingency plans for black swan[6] and grey rhinoceros events in both domains. They have been refined to what resembles business continuity plans (see2 below) and tested in stress testing exercises or simulations. However, they have been challenged and largely overwhelmed by reality as the crises unfold. As the international community is aware of the contagion of health and financial crises, various international bodies have been given the mandate to address such crises on a regional (such as the EU Health Council, the EU Health Committee, the European Central Bank) or even global level (such as the World Health Organisation, the International Monetary Fund). Contingency plans recommendations have been drawn up, simulation exercises run, as well as the necessary coordination has been tested.However, international bodies are at the behest of major countries in taking the leading roles. Recent examples have demonstrated the subsidiary role of the international organisations, such as the WHO and IMF to impose necessary steps. In the COVID19 crisis it was China at the core of the outbreak and in the Global Finance Crisis of 2008 it was the US Treasury and Federal Reserve which took on the leading role, fixing the domestic crisis first and trusting that other countries would follow by taking the appropriate measures. The international organisations play their role as advisory bodies. They can recommend best practices, such as contingency planning and share lessons learned from the past, but they cannot force countries to comply. As a result the current crisis has exposed the underlying weaknesses in national economies, health systems and even political leadership[7].A lot has been gained by learning lessons from recent crises. In the health domain this was SARS, Ebola, H1N1 and MERS. In the financial domain this was the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) as well as other national financial turmoil. Within months, SARS was brought under control by international cooperation and strict public health measures such as isolation, quarantine and contact tracing. Territories and countries which experienced SARS, such as HK and Singapore are better prepared for the present crisis as they have necessary facilities and expertise in place.The major epidemic was the Spanish flu 100 years ago. It was the global spread of a virus within living memory of people. The most prominent factor of the epidemic triangle was (iii) the environment, as soldiers moved between countries in the worst sanitary environment. Then the world did not have the tools to diagnose diseases nor antibiotics to fight secondary infections. Thus it became the worst epidemic in living memory. In the meantime, science and technology have progressed in leaps and bounds.Notwithstanding the fact that a considerable amount has been learnt about crisis management from past experiences, lessons from the past seem to be amiss in terms of guiding future directions, so the risk of repeating mistakes arises[8].Handbook for crisis management
Substantive theoretical work[9] has been done on a general framework and organisations, such as the International Standards Organisation have published manuals (such as ISO standard 22301)[10]. Some countries have propagated their standards as international standards. The 2014 British standard for crisis management (BS11200) is a case in point.
ISO22301 specifies requirements to plan, establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and continually improve a documented management system to protect against, reduce the likelihood of occurrence, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptive incidents when they arise.BS11200 standard[11] defines crisis as an abnormal and unsustainable situation that threatens the organisation’s strategic objectives, reputation or viability, and summarises the key distinctions that make a crisis, as well as suggesting some potential origins and implications. It then makes some recommendations for successful crisis management. Guidance is provided for building a crisis management capability, and also covers aspects such as crisis leadership, decision-making, crisis communication; and training and exercising…One of their main tasks is to detect and treat diseases before they become emergencies.A simple generic list of tasks has been prepared by nyarisk, a private company. For building capability and organization should follow[12]:1)Assessment: This should be based on a series of early warning indicators which have been relevant is past crisis. If early warning indicators have proven to be robust in past crises, these should be adopted for monitoring and assessment.2)Identification: If a number of signals indicates the build-up of a crisis, the experts, such as doctors in the health domain and financial analysts in the financial domain should send the appropriate messages to their superiors. In the recent COVID19 crisis Dr Li Wenliang and his colleagues in Wuhan warned about an emerging new illness. Before the GFC traders at the major merchant banks as well as academics warned about the risks in the CDO market. At that stage it remains among the restricted circles of experts and their authorities, in China including the regional branch of the CPC. In the case of the GFC CEO of banks were informed who preferred the opinion of statisticians that the risk was within the parameters stipulated by internal rules. 3)Triggers: Once the signals reach certain thresholds, such as critical number of patients with the same symptoms, financial indicators exceeding long-term thresholds, this information should be monitored frequently and communicated by the superiors of doctors and hospitals in the health domain, or CEOs of big financial institutions to the restricted circle of authorities such as regional health authorities, central banks and ministries of finance to avoid panic among the population at large. 4)Identify stakeholders: The dedicated authorities communicate this warning to the national political authorities without delay. They identify stakeholders who should be involved in the remedial action. They will be the ones who have the expertise and authority to take actions. In the US these are the Federal Health Department, with the Secretary of Health as member of the Cabinet. It also includes the Surgeon General, who acts as an advisor to the Secretary. It also includes the Centres for Disease Control (CDC), the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, the Agency for Toxic Substances. In addition the Vice-President has been put in charge of fighting COVID19. In the global financial crisis GFC, these were the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve.5)Team building: The various stakeholders need to cooperate, using their special expertise for the common good. Coordination of the various stakeholders is of paramount importance to avoid chaos.6)Recognition: As the authorities recognize that there is a crisis at hand, each stakeholder prepares appropriate measures. A steering committee or person in charge, is put in place which is aware of the capabilities of each participant and able to take the necessary decisions in a timely fashion. On this point, the WHO deplored the ‘inactivity of authorities’ during this stage in the current crisis. The US is a case in point when it failed in three vital areas to respond to the threat[13].7)Coordination: The steering committee assigns tasks to each of the stakeholders, not only experts but also support services, such as the security services and communication with the population. At present the spread of fake news causing panics is a major risk. There is a need for sequencing, as eg lack of testing equipment has hampered taking further steps. In finance lack of precise data, such as mutual exposure in the interbank market had a similar effect.8)Measures: Each stakeholder decides on the dosage and timing of measures. The proposed measures have to be verified by the availability of necessary equipment and funds. China proved very flexible by building a dedicated hospital once the existing facilities were deemed as inadequate. 9)Monitoring of progress: as measures are implemented progress should be monitored and communicated first among the stakeholders and then to the population at large. Regular reporting of statistics is imperative.10)Accountability: each of the stakeholders is accountable to the steering committee for implementing the measures, reporting difficulties in implementation and suggesting ways to improve.This whole framework should be available to various stakeholders through training in normal times as well extended testing. In the financial sphere stress testing of institutions is a case in point. The ECB is conducting crisis scenarios on a regular basis. All tests with viruses in a controlled environment by hospitals and tests of medicines by the major pharmaceutical companies would be the same prophylactic measures in the health domain.Will the next financial crisis be different?
The financial research bodies have never shied away from calling their research “Managing the next financial crisis”[14]. While preventing crises is of utmost importance, in the health domain as well as in the financial sphere, realists point out that it is only a matter of time until a major crisis breaks out in health as well as in the financial domain. While it may not be possible to avoid a financial crisis (and health crisis: author), it will certainly be possible to enhance the management of the crisis to minimize its costs on the financial system and the economy[15]. However, nobody has foreseen a health crisis on a global scale as the present one and financial authorities have not been prepared for the financial fallout, possibly a financial collapse on such a scale.
There are two reasons for this reoccurrence: one is that one crisis, such as the health crisis will most likely lead to another and secondly crisis management needs more attention so that lessons learned can be incorporated into improved techniques to minimize the effects of catastrophic events. Traditional financial crisis planning was based on ‘grey rhinoceros’ theory, where we know the components and the linkages. These were either balance of payment crises followed by exchange rate turbulence or banking crises, where some or a number of institutions experience illiquidity or solvency crises and debt crises, where economic agents or even governments are over indebted[16].In managing a financial crisis in today’s world, an appreciation of the increased interconnectivity in the financial system and the intensification of its internationalization (globalization) has become vital. We are witnessing a transmission of systemic risks throughout the financial system and across borders[17]. This corresponds to pillar (iii) of the epidemic triangle. Previously institutions, markets and governments were at the epicenter of the crises. Even the global financial crisis (GFC) originated in the CDO market, and spread from there to other markets (such as the interbank market) and institutions (such as insurances and foreign banks which bought CDOs ) due to the interconnectivity and internationalization.In the financial crisis to follow the present health crisis the scenario will be completely different. It will be neither institutions, nor markets, nor governments to show the first signs of stress. The attitude of the US White House and the performance of the stock markets in the run up to the pandemic are a case in point. The stress has already appeared below the radar screen. The first shock was a shock to production, owing to the disrupted global supply chains. The second shock is to demand[18]. It is foremost individuals, households and small and medium enterprises which feel the financial pain as they are deprived of income, such as airline crews, hotel staff and many others who have been asked to take unpaid leave of absence. It has been equally dramatic for the mostly small enterprises such as restaurants, hotels, hairdressers, tour operators, small retails shops, local suppliers, organisers of cultural and sports events who had to cancel events. Their livelihoods have been disrupted by quarantines and social-distancing as well as widespread lockdowns.They are running down their savings, if any, but find their chance of financial survival critically impaired. Like dominoes, the next ones to feel the pain will be the local financial institutions and those who have extended consumer credit, such as mortgage institutions. One of the measures adopted in China was the delay of repaying debts, which helps only partially as the loss of income caused the major pain.Major businesses will be unequally affected such as the tourism industry, mostly the airlines, hotels and tour operators. Others experience a boom, such as medical suppliers, undertakers etc. Reports already talk of a cull of airlines which were financially weak before the onset of the health crisis. Looming defaults by highly leveraged entities, such as shale-energy producers in the US and commodity-dependent EME could lead to wider losses in the global financial system[19].The existing crisis manuals of the authorities in charge of financial stability provide necessary but insufficient guidance for policy makers. The US Federal Reserve (FED) states that adequate monetary policy, sound regulation and supervision and providing payment services help maintain the stability of the financial system. It adds that during periods of acute financial strain, these activities may not be sufficient. When the financial system is experiencing great shocks, the FED is equipped to take extraordinary action to keep disruptions spreading from the financial sector from spilling over to the broader economy. Specifically the Fed is prepared to provide liquidity, ie emergency access to cash to financial markets and institutions, performing its ‘lender of last resort’ function[20].In the case of the ECB crisis preparation focuses on the systemic risk by safeguarding financial stability. This includes enhancements of legislative initiatives, regulation and supervision, agreements on voluntary cooperation between responsible authorities, and the development of practical arrangements such as the organsiation of crisis simulation exercises[21]. Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) is provided outside the normal Eurosystem monetary policy operations. The ELA aims to provide central bank money to solvent financial institutions that are facing temporary liquidity problems[22].In case of China, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) under the leadership of the Financial Stability and Development Committee (FSDC) of the State Council, worked with other related government agencies and deployed differentiated policies to address in a well-targeted and timely manner key risks that threaten financial stability. The PBOC improved the regulatory framework by announcing guidelines on the regulation of systemically important financial institutions…The accumulation of financial risk over the past few years has been gradually eased, and explicit financial risks have been addressed in an orderly way. The bottom line is preventing systemic financial risk and maximally protect the legitimate rights and interests of the people[23]. Regarding liquidity, the PBOC is prepared to pump a total of RMB 1.2tr into financial markets to cushion the fallout from the health crisis[24].These are examples of the classical provision for financial stability and emergency liquidity. The financial stability provisions include risk monitoring, improved legal framework and coordination. The emergency liquidity provisions stipulate the trigger for such measures and who is eligible for this support under what conditions. This framework will be challenged by the evolving financial crisis following the COVID19 outbreak in the following way.For tackling the financial fallout from the crisis, three ways have been suggested: (i) increase the government debt-to-GDP ratio; (ii) central banks substantially to expand the monetary base (iii) compensation for business and workers directly from the central bank without intermediation[25].All these provisions are based on functioning financial institutions and markets. As long as this is assured, well regulated and supervised solvent institutions will receive this support and decide how to distribute the funds to the most needy. In the GFC the major financial institutions received liquidity support of close to USD 800 bn to stay afloat but this did not trickle down to the economy as banks fixed their balance sheets and reduced lending to the real economy. The result was slow economic recovery from the GFC as economic agents recovered by themselves without adequate liquidity support from the central banks.In present circumstances these emergency measures are most likely to have the same effect. They have not alleviated the plight of the individuals, households and small and medium enterprises. They might have had access to some support but far short of what they need. They need cash injections to survive let alone reviving their businesses once the COVID19 subsides.The traditional link through financial institutions and markets has to be broken as they merely helped themselves. Government authorities should prioritise employment. The lessons from the Great Depression should be heeded. Job losses have to be minimized and the continuity of pay as staff take leave has to be assured. Employers, big ones as well as medium and small enterprises have to be supplied with sufficient liquidity. Funds have to be released from the central banks and the ministries of finance directly to these enterprises and the people. The US idea of helicopter money addresses this issue but the amounts could be inadequate as the crisis deepens. Additional help from tax relief and rescheduled debt repayment, such as mortgages will be supplementary help. The bottom line should be ‘whatever it takes’ to ensure the financial survival of population.Conclusion
While good preparation for crises in both, the health sector as well as the financial sphere have been necessary, such as early warning indicators and alerts, coordination of responses and good management, this crisis has spun out of control. Governments around the world are scrambling to contain the pandemic and the financial fallout. It is time to move beyond the rulebook and take practical measures, such as a pilot has to cast aside procedures in favour of quick actions . In the health domain, the head of WHO recommends testing, testing, testing of people affected and in the financial domain the response should be liquidity, liquidity, liquidity to those in need.
British Standards Institution (BSI) (2014): Crisis Management. BS 11200 www.bsigroup.comClaessens, Stijn; Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla; Laeven, Luc; Dobler, Marc;Valencia, Fabian;Nedelescu, Oana; Seal, Katharine (2011): Crisis management: early lessons from the financial crisis. In: IMF Discussion Note SDN/11/05 www.imf.org/publicationsDaily Kos (2020): Trump administration response to coronavirus ‘a perfect storm of three failures’ 19 March www.dailykos.comEuropean Central Bank (2017): Agreement on emergency liquidity assistance. June www.ecb.europa.euEuropean Central Bank (2006): The EU arrangements for financial crisis management. In: ECB Financial Stability Review, December www.ecb.europa.euFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2020): What is the FED: Financial Stability. Education www.frbsf.orgGroup of Thirty (G30) (2018): Managing the next financial crisis. An assessment of emergency arrangements in major economies, September www.group30.orgHolmgren, Fredrik and Johansson, Karl-Rikard (2015): Crisis Management: the nature of managing crises. Master’s thesis with Business administration, Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping Universitywww.ju.seISO (2019): Business Continuity ISO 22301 www.iso.orgKaletsky, Anatole (2020): Averting economic disaster is the easy part. In: Project Syndicate 19.03 www.project-syndicate.orgNassim Nicholas Taleeb (2007): The Black Swan. The impact of the highly improbable. Random House (US) and Allen Lane (UK).NYA (2020): Crisis Management and Response. www.nyarisk.comPeoples’ Bank of China (2019): China Financial Stability Report, December www.pbc.gov.cnRaghuram G. Rajan (2020): The Pandemic Stress Test. In: Project Syndicate 13 March www.project-syndicate.orgSingh, Dalvinder and LaBrosse, John Raymond (2012): Developing a Framework for Effective Crisis Management. In: Financial Market Trends, Vol2011-issue2 www.oecd.orgWerb, Dan (2020): To understand coronavirus, look to the epidemic triangle. In: NYT 4.2.WHO (2018): Guidance for contingency planning www.who.intWHO (2020): Technical guidance & global research www.who.intXinhua (2020): China’s central bank injects liquidity into market, March www.xinhuanet.com
ZetiAkhtar Aziz (2014): Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture, June www.bis.org/speeches
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