精译求精系列之五:华尔街如何对优步(Uber)进行估值?(2)
Management culture
管理文化
Though not a direct input intovaluation, it is unquestionable that when investing in a young business, youshould be aware of the management culture in that business. With Uber, your responses to the news stories about its management team will reflect yourpriors on the company. If you are predisposed to like the company, you willview it as confident in its attacks on new markets, aggressive in defending itsturf, and creative in its counter-attacks. If you don’t like the company, thevery same actions will be viewed as indicative of the arrogance of the company,its challenging a status quo will signal its unwillingness to play by the rulesand its counter attacks will be viewed as overkill.
尽管这一项不在估值的直接考虑范围内,但毫无疑问当你投资一个刚起步的公司的时候你一定会考虑考虑这个公司的管理文化。就优步而言,你对新闻中出现的有关其管理团队的内容的反馈会反映出对这间公司你首先考虑的会是哪些问题。比如说如果你倾向于看好这间公司,你会把抢占新市场看作是他们的信心,把保护领地看作是他们的进取心,把防守反击看作是他们的创造力。但如果你不喜欢这件公司,同样的行为就会被你看作是傲慢野蛮狂妄自大,任何对于现状的改变都会被你当成不按套路出牌,而防守反击就成了为了一家独大的赶尽杀绝。
In New York, I saw this come into play when the mayor and city council decidedto (and Uber in particular)from expanding in the city, using the argument that it was worsening trafficconditions in the city. In response, Uber struck back with a counter publicityblitz which included not only radio and TV ads, but also add-ons to the Uberapp that left no doubt in Uber users’ minds about how these restrictions wouldaffect their choices. I thought that the on the Uber app wasclever, and while , I wonder whether the scorched earth policies that it used will come backto hurt the company down the road.
在纽约,我目睹了管理文化是如何起作用的,当时纽约市长和议会决定限制拼车服务公司(尤其是优步公司)在城市的扩张,理由是它加剧了城市的交通问题。优步通过广告宣传闪电战进行了反击,不仅在电台和电视频道循环播放广告宣传,还通过优步的应用软件推送来告诉用户们这项限令会对他们的个人选择产生多大的影响。我觉得De Blasio在优步应用软件的这项选择上是十分明智的,同时,虽然优步在纽约打了一场胜仗,但这样的焦土政策是否会把公司引向末路还是个未知数。
Bottomline: While there are a few indications that Uber might be trying to soften itsimage, there seems no reason to believe that the company will become lessaggressive in the future. The question of whether this will hurt them as theyscale up remains unresolved.
概要:尽管有些许迹象表明优步在努力软化自己的企业形象,但这并不代表未来优步会在决策上更加温和。随着企业规模的扩大这个问题会不会损害企业利益还有待观察。
Uber: An Updated Valuation
优步:最新估值
In summary, a great deal haschanged since June 2014, partly because of real changes that have happened tothe ride sharing market since then and partly because I had to fill in gaps inmy ignorance about the market. I think that the best way to capture the shiftsin my valuation is to compare my inputs on key numbers in June 2014 with myestimates in September 2015.
总体而言,从2014六月开始价值发生了很大变化,一部分是因为拼车服务市场在那之后发生了变化,还有一部分是因为我要弥补我当时疏忽了市场这方面考虑的错误。我认为要直接观察我在估值上面的变化的最佳方式就是比较我在2014年6月和在2015年9月给出的数据。
I was wrong about Uber’s valuein June 2014, when my estimate of $6 billion was below the $17 billionassessment by venture capitalists then. Correcting for both my cramped visionand the changes that have occurred since June 2014, my estimated value today is$23.4 billion.
当风投机构的同僚给出170亿的资产估值,而我在2014年6月只给出了60亿我就知道我错了。为了弥补之前因为目光短浅而犯下的错误同时也重新考虑了自2014年6月以来发生的各种变化,现在我对优步的估值是234亿美金。
I know my estimated value lags the $51 billion value that VCs are attaching tothe company today. This may very well be a reflection that my vision is stilltoo cramped to capture Uber’s possible businesses, but it is what it is.
我知道我的预测估值仍旧比风投公司附加给优步公司的价值低了整整510亿;这可能又反映出我对待优步的商业模式的目光依旧不够远大,但事实就是如此。
Fire away
补充
When teaching and writing, myobjective is to evoke interest and excite my audience, and failing that, toprovoke dissent and incite argument, but the reaction that I dread the most isboredom. The very fact that you are reading this post still is good news, butif you are in complete agreement with my valuation of Uber, I have failed. Iwould rather that you fall into one of three groups: that you think my value istoo high, that you feel it is too low or that you believe that I have nobusiness even valuing Uber.
每当我教学或者写作的时候,我的目的就是激发听众的兴趣,如果不成功的话,那听众势必会有异议并引起讨论,但是我最怕得到的反馈就是无趣。实际上,这篇文章你已经看到这里了对我来说是个好消息,但是如果你完全不同意我对优步的估值,那么我也算是一个失败的作者了。我宁愿你属于下面这三类:1.你觉得估值过高;2.你觉得估值过低;3.你觉得我根本无权队友不进行估值
If you think I have over estimated the value of Uber, it should not be becauseit is losing money (given its growth trajectory, you should be suspicious if itdid not), is trading at a high multiple of revenues (it should) or because yourstable growth dividend discount model gives you too low a number (it is thewrong tool for a growth company). It should because you think the regulatoryroadblocks will make the ride sharing market smaller than I have forecast it tobe, and that competition will be much more intense (reducing market share andoperating margins).
如果你认为我对优步的估值过高,那么你该放弃这个观点了,因为优步确实是在赔钱(考虑到该公司的增长轨迹,如果不亏本的话那才值得怀疑呢),还因为优步在多方面都做到了创收(这是应该的)或者还因为你的稳定增长股利贴现的思考模式导致你给出了一个过低的数据(这个工具对于一个正在成长的企业来说可是行不通的)。也有可能你认为那些监管障碍会使拼车服务业的规模缩水,竞争也会更加的白热化(减少了市场份额和运营利润)
If you think that I have under estimated the value of Uber (again), don’tblame DCF models for being biased against growth companies. The fault lies withme, and it has to be somewhere in my inputs, i.e., that I am not foreseeingother markets that Uber could enter, that its networking benefits are farstronger globally than I predict them to be (giving it a higher market share)or that the operating margins will bounce back to much healthier levels oncethey navigate their way through the growth phase.
如果你人文我(又)低估了优步的价值,那就不能怪DCF模式对成长中的企业有所偏见啦。错误毕竟是我犯的,而且肯定会在我的数据中体现出来,也就是说,我没有预见到优步可能抢占的其他市场,同时其产业链也比我之前预测的更加全球化(假设他们有更大的市场份额)或者当优步精准定位了他们的成长模式其营运利润可能会反弹回至一个更加健康的水平上。
If your view is that I have no business valuing Uber because I am not atech person, that I am not an expert in the ride sharing business and/or that Ihave not made money as a VC, my responses are guilty as charged, you are rightand without a doubt. I don’t have a tech background, don’t work on the rightcoast and know technology only as a user, but I don’t think any of those areprerequisites for investing in technology companies. I have tried toincorporate what I have learned from technology companies in the market intothe valuation, in the form of easier scaling up, larger networking benefits andbigger market effects, but I might not have done it well enough. There are manywho know a great deal more about ride sharing than I do, and while I have triedto learn about the inner workings of this business from and about the Chinese growth potential from , my ride sharing know-how is limited. Finally, if we didrestrict writing about the valuation of young companies only to venture capitalists who have been consistently successful over long periods, the listof potential writers would be very short, and most of the people on the listwould be too busy investing in these startups to write about them.
如果鉴于我非高精尖人才的身份且在拼车服务领域也并非专家,同时在风投机构也没有赚大钱所以你认为我根本无权为优步估值的话,那么毋庸置疑你是正确的,我承认我的罪名成立。我确实并没有科技背景,也没有在东海岸工作过,我了解到的东西跟一个普通的用户相差无几,但是我认为这些都不是投资科技公司的必要前提。我尽力将我在投资科技公司中学到的东西与估值相结合,例如使规模扩张形式更加简易,使产业链利润更可观以及使市场效应跟有影响力,但是我可能做的还远远不够。有很多比我专业的多的人,例如Harry Campbell,一个该行业的内部从业者,我正在向他学习拼车服务业的内部知识,另外,我也跟Drake Ballew了解了中国市场的增长潜力,毕竟我对本行业营运的具体操作知之甚少。最后,如果我们只为风投从业者写那些能在长期内取得成功的公司的估值的话,那么作者的名单可能要减少一大半,同时剩下的那批人就会忙着去投资那些公司赚钱而不去写作了。
Whatever group you belong to, rather than complain about my mistakes(which are too many to count) or bemoan my limitations (which are legion),please take my and make it yours,putting your superior knowledge and experience into the numbers. In fact, let’sgive this a crowd valuation twist and get a going, where you canpost your results.
不管你是哪一类人,语气抱怨我的错误(错误有点太多了)或者为我的局限性(也不少)叹息,那就看看我做的那个你心中的优步估值的表格然后运用你专业的知识和经验自己去做一份估值吧。实际上,我们可以一起来做一个集体估值然后将自己的结论贴到Google的电子数据表。
To be continued..
未完待续
Notwithstanding the dressingdown that I got from some in the technology/VC space for my first valuation ofUber, or perhaps because of it, there is no company that I have enjoyed valuingand talking about more during the last year, than Uber. The company illustratesall the broad themes in valuation that I have returned in my blog posts andteaching: that uncertainty is part and parcel of valuation, that narrativesdrive numbers and that the pricing and valuation processes can yield differentnumbers. As a teacher, I am constantly on the look out for learning andteaching moments, and few companies have offered me more than Uber.
尽管有批评说我给优步的第一份估值是受了专业人士/风投业者的影响,或者确实有这个原因吧,去年我考虑的最多同时也谈论的最多的公司也只有优步了。优步公司解释了所有我在博客中刊登的和科普的有关估值的主题:跟着估值随之而来的就是不确定性,那些极具戏剧性的数字和估值的过程都可能产生不同的数据。作为一个老师,在传道授业解惑的同时我也在不断学习这,我在优步身上是学到最多的。
To show you how much Uber hasfound its way into my every day thinking, I will end with a personal story.Towards the end of last summer, my youngest son, who is fifteen had a friendover for the afternoon, and when it was time for the friend to leave, I lookedout at the driveway, expecting the “Mom car", the typical mode oftransportation for a 15-year old in the middle of suburbia (where I live). WhenI saw a strange sedan with a bearded man in the driver’s seat, I was takenaback, until I was told that it was an Uber car. Since this happened only twomonths after my valuation of Uber in June 2014, where I labeled it an urban carservice company, my first reaction after I got over my surprise was that Ineeded to revalue Uber afresh. Of such small actions are obsessions born!
我每天都在考虑怎样给你们展示优步的发展模式,接下来我就以一个自己的小故事来结尾吧。去年夏天快结束的时候,我十五岁的小儿子有个朋友有一天下午过来我家玩,他该走的时候我看了看外面的马路想找一辆“妈妈车”(我住在郊区,这种车对一个15岁的孩子来说最合适不过了)给他。当我看到一个大胡子男开着一辆完全陌生的车过来的时候,我还有点害怕,但听了他是优步派来的司机之后我就放心了。因为这件事就发生在我2014年6月给优步估值的两个月之后,我还给优步的车打上了市内拼车服务的标签呢,惊喜之余我的第一反应就是我真该给优步重新估值。这些类似的小反应也真是让我困扰了很久呢!
精译求精系列之一:顶级大师霍华德马克斯谈投资秘诀:敢于成就伟大
精译求精系列之二:卡尔伊坎卖出苹果,巴菲特买入苹果,你左右为难了吗?
精译求精系列之三:科技公司的生命周期被压缩—投资者的一大挑战(下)
精译求精系列之五:华尔街如何对优步(Uber)进行估值(上)?
利益声明:本文内容和意见仅代表作者个人观点,作者未持有该公司股票,作者提供的信息和分析仅供投资者参考,据此入市,风险自担!
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