美国高校的比较政治制度课程在读些什么?②| 学人编译
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一、本期编译
译者简介
翻译:政治学人编译局郑静
二、编译内容
回顾上期内容:美国高校的比较政治制度课程在读什么?①| 学人编译
UCSD:比较政治学制度
授课教师:Kaare Strom教授
一、目标:
课程围绕者9个主题展开:
1、介绍:制度和制度分析
2、民主制和威权主义
3、联邦制、协商民主和权力分享
4、总统制和行政机关
5、议会制和立法机关
6、官僚制、代表和法律
7、选举和立法机关
8、政党发展和组织
9、制度和经济绩效
二、阅读书目:
(1)介绍:制度和制度分析
必读:
James G.March and Johan P. Olsen,”Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions.” Governance 9, 3 (July 1996), 247-64.
Kenneth A.Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2 (April 1989), 131-147.
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics:Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, ch. 1.
Adam Przeworski, “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition 39, 2004: 527-540.
(2) 民主制和威权主义
必读:
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, chs. 1-3.
Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997, ch. 1.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, ch. 1.
JuanJ. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, chs. 3-4.
Barry R.Weingast, “Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law,” American Political Science Review, 91 (2), June 1997: 245-263.
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, chs. 1 and 2.
(3) 联邦制、协商民主和权力分享
必读:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 2-3 and 10
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, chs. 1-2, and 10.
Philip G.Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds. Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, chs. 2-3.
Richard Rose, “The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland.” Journal of Democracy11, 2 (April 2000), 26-40.
George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, ch. 6.
(4) 总统制和行政机关
必读:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, ch. 7.
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, chs. 1-2, 5-7.
Juan J. Linzand Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz), 3(Sartori), and 4 (Stepan and Skach).
Matthew S.Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1-2, 5, and 13.
GeorgeTsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, Introduction and chs. 1-3.
(5)议会制和立法机关
必读:
Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch.6.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 6-7, 11.
Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government,"American Political Science Review 84, 3 (September 1990), 873-90.
Kaare Strøm,Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: chs. 3 and 22.
Kaare Strøm,Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: chs. 1 and 6.
George Tsebelis, Veto Players. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002; chs. 4 and 9.
(6)官僚制、代表和法律
必读:
John D.Huber and Charles Shipan, Deliberate Discretion. Cambridge: Cambridge UnivPress, 2002, chs. 2 and 4.
Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988,chs. 1-2.
J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace. Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1997, chs. 1-5, 10.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999, chs. 1, 3, 7, 11.
George Tsebelis. Veto Players. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, ch. 10.
(7)选举和政党政治
必读:
Carles Boix,“Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in AdvancedDemocracies.” American Political Science Review 93, 3 (September 1999), 609-24.
Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 8,and 15.
Thomas R.Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Economic Interests and the Originsof Electoral Systems.” American Political Science Review 101, 3 (August 2007),373-91.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 5 and 8.
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments:Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.
(8)政党发展和组织
必读:
John Careyand Matthew Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote.” Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-39.
Gary W. Cox,Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 10 and12.
Russell J.Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Parties without Partisans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, chs. 2-3.
Richard S.Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and PartyDemocracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1,1(January1995), 5-28.
Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics.”Comparative Political Studies 33, 6/7 (2000).
Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. eds., Patrons, Clients, and Politics:Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007, ch. 1.
Wolfgang C.Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Partiesin Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999, ch. 1.
(9)制度和经济绩效
必读:
Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87(3), September 1993: 567-576.
Bruce Buenode Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Diverson, and Alastair Smith. “PoliticalCompetition and Economic Growth.” Journal of Democracy 12(1), January 2001.
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ch. 3.
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. The Economic Effect of Constitutions. MIT Press,2003. Ch. 6.
Daron Acemoglu,Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography andInstitutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 : 1231-94.
本期编辑:林 健
本期校对:莫志敏
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