Journal of Accounting Research| 2016年第5期目录摘要

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《Journal of Accounting Research》2016年第5期目录

1 Real Earnings Management in Sales

MICHAEL J. AHEARNE, JEFFREY P. BOICHUK, CRAIG J. CHAPMAN, THOMAS J. STEENBURGH

2 How Do Experienced Users Evaluate Hybrid Financial Instruments?

SHANA CLOR-PROELL, LISA KOONCE, BRIAN WHITE

3 Biases in Accounting and Nonaccounting Information: Substitutes or Complements?

XU JIANG

4 If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates

W. ROBERT KNECHEL, JUSTIN LEIBY

5 Voluntary Disclosure with Informed Trading in the IPO Market

PRAVEEN KUMAR, NISAN LANGBERG, K. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN

《Journal of Accounting Research》2016年第5期摘要

Real Earnings Management in Sales

MICHAEL J. AHEARNE, JEFFREY P. BOICHUK, CRAIG J. CHAPMAN, THOMAS J. STEENBURGH

       We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash-flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey-based research on REM throughout the paper.

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How Do Experienced Users Evaluate Hybrid Financial Instruments?

SHANA CLOR-PROELL, LISA KOONCE, BRIAN WHITE

       Hybrid financial instruments contain features of both liabilities and equity. Standard setters continue to struggle with “getting the classification right” for these complex instruments. In this paper, we experimentally test whether the features of hybrid instruments affect the credit-related judgments of experienced finance professionals, even when the hybrid instruments are already classified as liabilities or equity. Our results suggest that getting the classification right is not of primary importance for these experienced users, as they largely rely on the underlying features of the instrument to make their judgments. A second experiment shows that experienced users’ reliance on features generalizes to several features that often characterize hybrid instruments. However, we also find that experienced users vary in their beliefs about which individual features are most important in distinguishing between liabilities and equity. Together, our results highlight the importance of effective disclosure of hybrid instruments’ features.

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 Biases in Accounting and Nonaccounting Information: Substitutes or Complements?

XU JIANG

      This paper studies how bias in nonaccounting and in accounting information should be related. Bias in accounting information is modeled, as in some recent literature, as an alteration in the relative information content of accounting numbers. The optimal bias in one type of information is shown to be a complement of the bias in the other type. This result can be applied in various settings to explain a number of phenomena.

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 If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates

W. ROBERT KNECHEL, JUSTIN LEIBY

      Effective consultation is critical for improving the audit of estimates. In an experiment where audit managers acted as consultants to other auditors, we examine conditions in which consultants either recommend estimates that differ substantially from advice-seekers’ assessments (contrariness) or recommend narrower reasonable ranges of estimates (precision). Psychology theory argues that both of these attributes can improve estimates. We examine whether these attributes depend on consultants' status motives, that is, the desire to gain respect from or power over others. We find that active status motives lead consultants with higher specialized knowledge to provide recommendations that are less contrary, but more precise. However, consultants increase precision by tightening range bounds in a manner that is not counter to management's preference and thus unlikely to prompt the audit team to challenge the estimate. We also find that higher consultant decision authority constrains precision. Our findings suggest limits to consultation's potential effectiveness in improving estimates. For instance, our findings suggest that firms and standard setters direct consultants to focus scrutiny on the range bound that is most likely to constrain management opportunism.

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Voluntary Disclosure with Informed Trading in the IPO Market

PRAVEEN KUMAR, NISAN LANGBERG, K. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN

       We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming—and investment efficiency is lower—when a greater fraction of the investment community is already informed. Moreover, managers disclose more information when the likelihood of an information event is higher, more equity is issued, or the cost of information acquisition is lower. Investment efficiency and the expected level of underpricing are non-monotonic in the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.

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