【讲座会议】海外会计审计学者报告会，申请截止1月21日17点
会计学术研究应从“统计显著性崇拜”中走出
2021 Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference
西南财经大学
中国政府审计研究中心双周论坛第162期
海外学者系列报告会
CCGAR Bi-weekly Online Seminar（162）
本期论坛主要内容及信息
会议议程
会议其他信息
主持人：梁子慧（西南财经大学中国政府审计研究中心博士生）
Host: Zihui Liang (PH.D. Candidate of CCGAR, SWUFE)
时间：2021年1月23日(周六) 8:50-12:05
Time: 8:50-12:05, Sat., Jan.,23，2021
平台：腾讯会议（软件）
Platform: Tencent Meeting（APP）
参会申请：动态邀请函填写回执（或点击阅读原文）
Participation Application: E-invitation Receipt
主办：中国政府审计研究中心
Sponsor: Center for China's Governmental Auditing Research (CCGAR)
网络会议温馨提醒
本期论坛将采用腾讯会议网络平台举行，因网络会议人数所限，本次会议为实名申请制会议，您可通过填写本期论坛动态邀请函回执信息申请。动态邀请函二维码见下方（长按并识别图中二维码填写申请信息）
请您于1月21日17:00点填写申请信息，我们将对收到申请信息进行筛选，并于1月22日下午17:00前通过您的联系方式向您发送会议号及密码。请确保您填写的邮箱地址正确并未设置拦截规则。如在1月22日下午17:00后仍未收到会议邮件烦请您先检查邮箱垃圾箱，若仍未收到会议邮件请您通过下述方式咨询。
联系邮箱：frankyueyue@163.com
电话：17624088672
联系人：王朋
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本次会议于1月23日8:50开始。请参会者于23日8:50分前进入会场，除主要参会嘉宾外，参会者入会后请保持摄像头和麦克风关闭，并听从主持人安排。
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主讲嘉宾简介
王硕，荷兰格罗宁根大学 (University of Groningen) 会计学助理教授。曾于英国布里斯托大学 (University of Bristol) 就读并获得会计与金融学博士学位。毕业后受英国布里斯托大学以及Smart Insider咨询公司资助完成全球内部人交易与投资效率的博士后课题研究。主要研究方向为企业会计信息质量与资本市场，具体涉及信用评级、内部人交易、企业会计政策选择等。近期的研究兴趣与工作论文集中在供应链金融、漂绿行为 (Green Washing)、以及公司财务报表可比性等。研究成果曾发表于Accounting and Business Research等刊物。目前担任Accounting and Business Research, Accounting and Finance, Journal of International Accounting Research等期刊的匿名审稿人。
Trust, but Verify:
High-Ability Managers’ and Conditional Accounting Conservatism
Abstract: High-ability managers can bring growth and wealth to their firms efficiently; however, it may be challenging for stakeholders to discipline them since they are attractive and competitive in the job market. Conditional accounting conservatism (CAC), on the other hand, can be used to discipline managers and mitigate agency problems. This paper examines the relationship between CAC and managerial ability (MA) of the firms. Using 18,855 S&P 1,500 firm-year observations between 1999-2016, we document a negative relation between CAC and MA and attribute our findings to the explanation that high-ability managers receive greater trust from capital providers and therefore confront fewer constraints by CAC. However, this trend reverses for high-ability managers who are either too risk-taking or work for low-integrity firms. In such cases, capital providers discipline high-ability managers by requiring greater conditional accounting conservatism, revealing their tolerance ceiling towards the accounting policy preference of the high-ability managers.
Joseph Zhang，会计学副教授，注册会计师，George Johnson 研究员，研究方向为资本市场（财务会计和审计）。从2013年开始陆续在Contemporary Accounting Research, Accounting Horizons, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Information Systems, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 等期刊发表30篇学术论文。多次指导博士学生毕业论文，现任 Asian Review of Accounting, Journal of Forensic Accounting Research, Managerial Auditing Journal 三个期刊的副主编，Journal of International Accounting Research 编委，并担任多个期刊的审稿人。
Do Chief Audit Executives Matter?
Evidence from Turnover Events
Abstract：We investigate the importance of the Chief Audit Executive’s (CAE) internal audit supervisory role by examining the change in internal audit quality following the turnover of CAEs. Using a sample of firms listed on the small and medium enterprise board of China’s stock market, we find that CAE turnover is accompanied by a reduction in internal audit quality and that the reduction is more pronounced for firms whose successor CAEs have lower financial expertise than their predecessors. Further analysis shows that the negative association with internal audit quality is stronger when the turnover is for personal reasons than when it is for internal transfer of the CAE. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including controlling for confounding turnover of other executives, assessing market reactions, using different turnover windows, and using alternative measures of internal audit quality. Our results highlight the importance of the CAE for a firm’s internal audit quality.
George Shan，西澳大利亚大学商学院会计与金融系副教授、博士生导师。拥有商务学士学位，应用金融学士学位，商务（会计）硕士学位，并获得了会计和公司治理博士学位。George是CA（澳大利亚特许会计师），CPA（澳大利亚注册会计师），MIPA（澳大利亚注册公共会计师）和CMA（注册管理会计师）。他曾在多所大学工作，包括南澳大学，巴拉瑞特大学，阿德莱德大学和罗马第二大学。他的研究领域和兴趣包括会计和金融领域的公司治理及其相关主题（即财务报告的重述，综合报告，会计信息系统，在线财务治理，收益管理，审计质量，公司社会责任和公司创新）。在过去的五年中，他发表了20多篇学术期刊和会议论文。
Carbon Risk Disclosure Tone and Stock Price Crash Risk:
An International Review
Abstract：This study explores the impacts of Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) tone management and risk-related disclosure on firm’s stock price crash risk. Using an international data covering 2010–2017, our results first show a positive association between the abnormal positive risk disclosure tone and stock price crash risk. The results further indicate that the participation of a CDP risk-related disclosure is positively related to crash risk. Last, our results reveal a partial effect of corporate governance mediating the relationship between CDP disclosure and crash risk. The exogenous shocks are considered in this study, including the Paris Agreement and the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and the results reveal a negative moderation effect for the Paris Agreement for the international sample, while a positive moderation effect for the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in the US sample.
Jenny Yang，悉尼新南威尔士大学会计学院讲师，教授审计课程。曾为新南威尔士大学博士后研究员，并在研究生阶段教授财务会计。她研究慈善组织中审计的信息价值，曾担任审计师，并在中国国家监管机构（包括国家税务总局）担任管理职务。主要研究兴趣包括审计质量差异在非营利部门中的作用、国际审计/鉴证问题以及非财务鉴证。
Auditors’ Propensity and Accuracy in Issuing Going-Concern Modified Audit Opinions for Charities
Abstract: This paper identifies the factors which impact auditors’ propensity to issue going concern modified audit opinions (GCOs) and examines their accuracy in issuing such opinions for charities by comparing with two outcomes, cancellation of ABN status and the revoking of operating status on the ACNC database. We find that GCOs are more likely for charities which are smaller, in greater financial distress, received a prior year GCO, had smaller proportion of donation income and had economic dependence on subsequent funding. Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue GCOs, but they do not show significant differences in GCO reporting misclassification.
诚邀各位老师和同学参加！
Your attendences are expected sincerely from us!
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