海外之声 | 日本央行前副行长：日本通胀加剧可能引发冲击（中英双语）
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观点速递
本文作者是佳能全球研究所特别顾问及董事会成员，2006-2010年日本央行副行长崛井昭成（Akinari Horii），原文选自2018年1月8日的国际货币金融机构官方论坛评论（OMFIF Commentary），OMFIF是位于伦敦一家金融智库。
作者在文章中指出目前全球经济处于复苏状态，但对日本来说有可能会受到通货膨胀的影响，因为工人要求更高的工资，同时国际大宗商品价格触底，还有日本的政治社会因素等。同在其他地方一样的情况是，劳动力市场的火热确实会导致通货膨胀，但评论员认为无需过于迷信菲尔普斯曲线。
中文译文如下：
日本通货膨胀加剧，可能引发冲击
劳动力市场的活跃有助于实现2%的价格目标
崛井昭成（Akinari Horii）
翻译：陈彦丰
审校：肖柏高
世界经济和金融界的情况似乎太好了，甚至好得有点不真实。增长强劲，通货膨胀受到抑制，金融市场表现出高估价和低波动性。过度宽松的货币政策和扩张性的财政政策缓解了2008年金融危机带来的资产负债表的压力。然而，金融市场存在流动性泛滥的问题，并且，许多发达国家政府和新兴经济体企业的过度借贷造成了过重的债务负担。
纠正这一持续十年的问题是必要的，这可能会引发市场震荡。在很大程度上被金融市场忽视的一个可能触发因素是通胀的死灰复燃，特别是在日本。尽管日本有着2.8%的低失业率，但其消费者物价指数年增长率低于1%。日本的通胀预期稳定在0左右，而美国为2%，欧元区为1%。但是，早在2018年秋冬，日本的通胀率就达到2%的长期目标水平，反映出50年来最为活跃的劳动力市场状况、商品价格上涨以及2018年底可能出现的大幅增长的消费支出。
由于长期2%通胀率的可能性一直被认为是很低的，所以有消息称通胀率即将达到2%时，不仅日本，连美国和欧洲的政府债券市场都会受到冲击。
一个好消息是包括美联储在内的国际货币当局只是逐步实行政策正常化。部分原因预期到其他因素的冲击，比如地缘政治（北韩）、中国债务危机或技术驱动引发的混乱（不受管制的金融科技产品或网络攻击）。
令人担忧的是，市场的抗冲击力似乎有所下降。由于巴塞尔协议III和多德—弗兰克法规，证券和外汇交易商的做市能力明显减弱。信贷风险在银行业被遏制，却在影子银行处积累。随着被动投资者和指数化产品的增多，缺乏主动的经理人使得市场容易出现羊群行为，而高频交易和其他基于算法的活动加深了这种危险。
在这种背景下，日本的通胀状况很重要。首先，得益于经济的改善，日本在2017年缩小了产量缺口，并正走向供应短缺和经济过热。虽然通缩思维一直扎根于工会和管理中，但是有改变的迹象。小包裹运费已经上涨，兼职工人的工资显著增加。首相安倍晋三的政府正向企业和工会施压，要求提高工资，这将在2018年春季提高工资和消费水平。
其次，国际大宗商品价格在2017年触底，2018年将保持坚挺。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）的财政政策保证了美国经济的强劲增长，美元兑日元将维持坚挺。
第三，定于2019年4月的明仁天皇退位的有关事件，加上2019年年中举办的传统成年仪式，将在消费税率从2019年10月的8%上升至10%前进一步刺激消费者的需求。
日本央行将在通胀率达到2%后耐心维持其货币政策框架，它要继续实施宽松的货币政策，而不是过早收紧。尽管如此，随着美国长期利率上升，日本央行将调整十年期国债零息率目标，可能上调至0.25%。另外，央行可能会将期限从10年缩短到5年，从而使十年期的收益率更高。
在日本，同在其他地方一样的情况是，劳动力市场的火热确实会导致通货膨胀。许多评论员强调，反映失业和通货膨胀的传统菲利普斯曲线已经崩溃，告诉我们不要担心价格上涨。但菲利普斯关系是一条曲线，而不是一条直线，它有拐点。在日本，失业率低于3%时曾出现过几次拐点。任何认为这一次情况不同的人展示的不是先知，而是短视。
崛井昭成（Akinari Horii）系佳能全球研究所特别顾问及董事会成员，并于2006年至2010年任日本央行副行长。
英文原文如下：
Rising Japan inflation: a possible shock
Labour tightness will help realise 2% price target
by Akinari Horii in Tokyo
Mon 8 Jan 2018
The world economic and financial scene appears too good to be true. Growth has strengthened. Inflation is subdued. Financial markets demonstrate rich valuations and low volatility. Extraordinary monetary easing and expansionary fiscal policy have eased balance sheet pressures stemming from the 2008 financial crisis. Yet abnormally high liquidity has built up on financial markets, together with a debt overhang from excessive borrowing by governments in many advanced countries and corporates in emerging economies.
Some adjustment to these decade-long excesses is inevitable, potentially setting off a market shock. One possible trigger largely dismissed by financial markets is a resurgence in inflation, particularly in Japan. The annual rise in Japanese consumer prices is running below 1%, despite the low unemployment rate of 2.8%. Japanese inflation expectations are anchored around zero, against 2% in the US and 1% in the euro area. However, as early as autumn/winter 2018, Japanese inflation could reach the long-targeted level of 2%, reflecting the tightest labour market in 50 years, higher commodity prices, and a probable late-2018 surge in consumer spending.
Because it has long been considered a most remote possibility, news that 2% inflation is imminent can shake government bond markets not just in Japan but also in the US and Europe.
A mitigating factor is that international monetary authorities, including the Federal Reserve, are normalising policies only gradually. This is partly because of expectations of a shock from other sources such as geopolitics (North Korea), a debt crisis in China, or a technology-driven upheaval (runs on unregulated fintech products or cyber attacks).
Worryingly, markets' shock-absorbing ability appears to have fallen. Securities and foreign exchange dealers' market-making capability has declined significantly because of Basel III and Dodd-Frank regulations. Credit risk-taking, restrained in the banking sector, has grown strongly in shadow banking. With the build-up of passive investors and indexed products, a dearth of active managers makes the market prone to herd behaviour, a danger exacerbated by high-frequency trading and other algorithm-based activities.
Against this background, Japanese inflation developments are important. First, thanks to the improved economy, Japan closed its output gap in 2017 and is moving towards supply-side shortages and overheating. Although the deflation mindset has persisted for trade unions and managements, there are signs of change. Freight costs for small package freights have risen. Part-time workers' pay has increased significantly. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration is putting pressure on businesses and unions for higher wage increases, which will prove effective in raising wages and consumption in spring 2018.
Second, international commodity prices bottomed in 2017 and will stay firm in 2018. Strong economic growth in the US, supported by President Donald Trump's fiscal policies, will sustain a firm dollar against the yen.
Third, events surrounding the planned April 2019 abdication of Emperor Akihito, amplifying the traditional coming-of-age ceremonies in mid-2019, will further stimulate consumer demand ahead of the consumption tax rate rise to 10% from 8% in October 2019.
The Bank of Japan will be patient in maintaining its monetary policy framework after the inflation rate reaches 2%. It will err on the easing side rather than embark on premature tightening. Nonetheless, the central bank will adjust the zero-yield target for 10-year government bonds, perhaps up to 0.25%, as US long-term interest rates rise. Alternatively, it may shorten the target maturity from 10 to five years, allowing 10-year yields to go higher.
In Japan, as elsewhere, labour market tightness does in fact lead to inflation. Many commentators have emphasised a breakdown in the traditional Phillips curve of unemployment and inflation, telling us we shouldn't worry about rising prices. But the Phillips relationship is a curve, not a straight line; there are inflection points. In Japan, the inflection point appeared on several past occasions when the unemployment rate was below 3%. Anyone who believes that this time is different is displaying not prescience, but myopia.
Akinari Horii is Special Adviser and Member of the Board of Directors at the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Between 2006-10, Horii was Assistant Governor of the Bank of Japan.
观点整理 叶祎然
图文编辑 叶祎然
审校 田雯
监制 朱霜霜
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