国际顶刊 |《国际组织评论》第17卷（2022年）第1-3期
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了Review of International Organization（RIO，《国际组织评论》）2022年第17卷第1-3期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
Review of International Organizations（RIO，《国际组织评论》）发表整个政治经济学领域的原始科学贡献，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构，如世贸组织、世界银行、北约、世界卫生组织、欧洲人权法院和联合国。该刊文章基于现代经济、政治经济和国际关系理论，采用定量或定性的方法。值得注意的是，该刊欢迎提交编制数据集的研究文章。与普通文章相比，数据文章对理论的关注较少，应提供高质量的、重要的、相关的数据，可望被研究界广泛使用。该刊在《科睿唯安2021年期刊引用报告》（Clarivate JCR2021）中JIF=7.833，在96种国际关系类（International Relations-SSCI）期刊中排名第1（Q1）。
PART 2
期刊目录
Volume 17 - Issue 1 - January 2022
Screening for losers: Trade institutions and information
筛选失败者：贸易机构和信息
Settle or litigate? Consequences of institutional design in the Inter-American system of human rights protection
和解还是诉讼？美洲人权保护体系中制度设计的后果
Incentivizing embedded investment: Evidence from patterns of foreign direct investment in Latin America
激励嵌入式投资：来自拉丁美洲外国直接投资模式的证据
Instrumental or intrinsic? Human rights alignment in intergovernmental organizations
工具性的还是内在的？政府间组织中的人权协调
Social ties and the political participation of firms
社会关系与企业的政治参与
Statistical capacity and corrupt bureaucracies
统计能力与腐败的官僚机构
Volume 17 - Issue 2 - April 2022
Issue Topic: Institutional Complexity in Global Governance
Hybrid institutional complexes in global governance
全球治理中的混合制度复合体
Ordering global governance complexes: The evolution of the governance complex for international civil aviation
全球治理复合体的排序：国际民用航空治理复合体的演变
Measuring institutional overlap in global governance
衡量全球治理中的制度重叠
Bargaining strategies for governance complex games
复合治理博弈的谈判策略
Volume 17 - Issue 3 - July 2022
Power, ideas, and World Bank conditionality
权力、思想和世界银行贷款条件
From grievances to civil war: The impact of geopolitics
从不满到内战：地缘政治环境的影响
Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?
贸易协定中的劳工条款：隐藏的保护主义？
Clubs of autocrats: Regional organizations and authoritarian survival
独裁者俱乐部：区域组织与威权主义存续
Behind the screen: Understanding national support for a foreign investment screening mechanism in the European Union
深入幕后：对欧盟外商投资筛选机制的国家支持
Closing time: Reputational constraints on capital account policy in emerging markets
截止时间：新兴市场资本账户政策的声誉限制
Investment with insecure property rights: Capital outflow openness under dictatorship
无保障性产权的投资：独裁统治下的资本外流开放性
PART 3
精选译文
Volume 17 - Issue 1 - January 2022
01 筛选失败者：贸易机构和信息
【题目】
Screening for losers: Trade institutions and information
【作者】
Jason S. Davis
【摘要】
贸易法学者通常认为，国际机构可以通过对国内的保护要求提供约束而发挥有益的国内政治作用。在本文中，我确定了这种机构及其特殊性对政府有价值的一种新方式：即它们可以提供关于国内政治团体的有用信息。虽然政府负责管理大多数与贸易有关的合法行动，但政府在决定采取哪些行动时所需要的信息往往是为这些行动进行游说的公司和利益集团的私人信息，而且这些集团有很大的动机来歪曲这些信息。本文使用一个正式的模型来证明，政府可以利用众多法律选择，在国内团体间筛选出那些最有力的案例；这个选择过程可以帮助解释，除其他外，为什么贸易救济往往是围绕着满足标准而构建的，而不是需要赔偿的 “有效违反”，以及为什么通过WTO寻求的争端有如此高的成功率（对于进入小组阶段的案件，大约90%）。
Trade law scholars have often argued that international institutions can serve a useful domestic political role by providing a constraint against domestic demands for protection. In this paper, I identify a new way in which such institutions and their particular features can be valuable to governments: namely, that they can provide useful information about domestic political groups. While governments are responsible for the administration of most legal trade-related actions, the information that governments need to determine which actions to pursue is often the private information of the firms and interest groups that are lobbying for these actions, and there are significant incentives for such groups to misrepresent this information. This paper uses a formal model to demonstrate that governments can use the multitude of legal options available to them to screen between domestic groups for those with the strongest cases; a selection process which can help to explain, amongst other things, why trade remedies tend to be structured around meeting criteria instead of as “efficient breaches” requiring compensation and why disputes pursued via the WTO have such a high rate of success (approximately 90% for cases that reach the panel stage).
02 和解还是诉讼？美洲人权保护体系中制度设计的后果
【题目】
Settle or litigate? Consequences of institutional design in the Inter-American system of human rights protection
【作者】
Francesca Parente
【摘要】
为什么各国与侵犯人权行为的受害者建立定居点？尽管自1992年以来，友好解决程序就在美洲人权委员会（Inter-American Commission on Human Rights）的账簿上，但各国直到近十年后才开始认真使用该程序——为什么？我认为，在美洲委员会，国家行为——和解或诉讼的选择——在一定程度上是由该机构设计的两个特征驱动的：（1）美洲法院的可选管辖权，（2）2001年的规则变更降低了向法院提交案件的自由裁量权水平。我使用美洲委员会请愿书的原始数据集表明，各国为应对诉讼费用的增加而进行了更多的和解，但这些变化仅限于美洲法院管辖下的国家。此外，作为一个积极的、也许是无意的结果，在规则改变后，各国遵守委员会不具约束力的建议的程度也有所提高。我的研究结果表明，通过改变游戏规则，机构有可能获得更理想或更有效的结果。
Why do states engage in settlements with victims of human rights violations? Although the friendly settlement procedure has been on the books at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since 1992, states did not begin utilizing the procedure in earnest until nearly ten years later – why? I argue that state behavior – the choice to settle or litigate – at the Inter-American Commission is driven in part by two features of the institution’s design: (1) optional jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court and (2) a 2001 rule change that reduced the level of discretion over submission of cases to the court. Using an original dataset of petitions at the Inter-American Commission, I show that states engaged in more settlements in response to the increased cost of litigation, but that these changes are limited to states under the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, as a positive, perhaps unintended, consequence, states’ levels of compliance with the Commission’s non-binding recommendations also increased after the rule change. My findings indicate that it is possible for institutions to achieve more desirable or efficient outcomes by changing the rules of the game.
03 激励嵌入式投资：来自拉丁美洲外国直接投资模式的证据
【题目】
Incentivizing embedded investment: Evidence from patterns of foreign direct investment in Latin America
【作者】
Sarah Bauerle Danzman, Alexander Slaski
【摘要】
政府经常提供税收激励以吸引本地化投资。这是令人费解的，因为之前的研究发现税收激励很少是企业区位决策的决定性因素。一些人认为，激励反映了超资本流动性，这加强了跨国企业相对于希望吸引投资的政府的讨价还价杠杆。其他人则强调国内政治机构和选举考虑，这些因素激励政客公开向投资者示好。我们认为，企业对政府的杠杆作用源于与政府更广泛的发展目标相关的投资特征。我们在2010年至2017年拉丁美洲投资激励的交易层面数据上检验了我们的论点。我们的结果表明，当企业已经融入当地市场，并且表现出与事后流动性低相关的特征时，它们更有可能获得激励。这些结果挑战了在全球化时代为企业提供政治权力的普遍信念，并表明政府主要是为了实现其经济和政治目标，而不是因为全球化破坏了国家对流动资本征税的能力。
Governments frequently offer tax incentives to induce localized investments. This is puzzling because previous research finds tax incentives are rarely decisive factors in firms’ locational decision-making. Some argue incentives reflect hyper capital mobility, which strengthens multinational enterprises’ bargaining leverage vis-à-vis governments that wish to attract investment. Others emphasize the domestic political institutions and electoral considerations that incentivize politicians to publicly court investors. We argue that firms’ leverage over governments stems from investment characteristics associated with governments’ broader development objectives. We test our argument on deal-level data on investment incentives in Latin America from 2010 to 2017. Our results indicate firms are more likely to receive incentives when they are already embedded in local markets and when they exhibit characteristics associated with low ex post mobility. These results challenge widely held beliefs over what provides firms political power in an age of globalization, and suggest that governments use incentives primarily to fulfill their economic and political objectives rather than because globalization destroys states’ capacity to tax mobile capital.
04 工具性的还是内在的？政府间组织中的人权协调
【题目】
Instrumental or intrinsic? Human rights alignment in intergovernmental organizations
【作者】
David Benjamin Weyrauch, Christoph Valentin Steinert
【摘要】
为什么国家的人权记录与政府间组织的共同成员趋同？这项研究提供了新的见解，即政府间组织中的互动是否有能力真正改变国家的偏好，或者规范的扩散是否是工具性过程的结果。我们利用有关人权协调的时间信息来区分内在动机和工具性动机。我们假设，工具性动机体现在加入前的一致性和退出政府间组织后恢复到原来的规范性标准。内在动机在加入政府间组织期间会导致逐渐的一致性，并在政府间组织退出后导致稳定的规范性变化。我们使用变化斜率、变化截距模型，研究了个别国家与政府间组织手段之间在人权指数上的距离。虽然我们发现在加入政府间组织期间有系统性收敛的证据，但在加入政府间组织之前和之后没有发生明显的变化。在测试不同身体完整性权利的一致性时，我们没有发现证据表明在加入政府间组织期间有工具性的转变为秘密镇压。总的来说，这些结果表明，政府间组织的规范调整至少不完全是工具性的。我们的研究结果支持关于国家利益的建构主义论点，并表明政府间组织能够改变国家的人权相关偏好。
Why do states’ human rights records converge with co-members in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? This study provides new insights on whether interactions in IGOs have the capacity to genuinely transform state preferences or whether norm diffusion is a consequence of instrumental processes. We leverage information about the timing of human rights alignment to disentangle intrinsic from instrumental motives. We hypothesize that instrumental motives find expression in pre-membership alignment and reversions to original normative standards after IGO exits. Intrinsic motives lead to gradual alignment during IGO membership and result in stable normative changes beyond IGO exits. Using varying-slopes, varying intercepts models, we investigate the distance on human rights indices between individual states and IGO means. While we find evidence for systematic convergence during IGO membership, no significant changes occur before and after IGO membership. Testing alignment of different physical integrity rights, we find no evidence for instrumental shifts to clandestine repression during IGO membership. Overall, the results suggest that norm alignment in IGOs is at least not exclusively instrumentally motivated. Our findings support constructivist arguments on state interests and suggest that IGOs are capable of transforming states’ human rights related preferences.
05 社会关系与企业的政治参与
【题目】
Social ties and the political participation of firms
【作者】
Cesi Cruz, Benjamin A. T. Graham
【摘要】
人们普遍认为，关系更好的公司具有更大的政治影响力。然而，由于社会关系和政治影响都很难观察到，因此人们对不同类型的关系如何影响不同类型的政治行动知之甚少。我们发展了一种新的理论，将与同行业其他公司的关系（同侪关系）与民选官员和官僚的关系（政府关系）进行对比。我们认为，同侪关系有助于促进集体行动，而集体行动最常用于寻求对影响许多公司的广泛政策问题的影响。相比之下，虽然政府关系更具多样性，但这些关系也应主要允许企业追求狭窄、特殊的问题，而这些问题只会让一家或少数企业受益。通过对在菲律宾运营的外资企业的一项新调查，我们证明了同侪关系在企业影响国家层面政策的努力中发挥着重要作用，而在国家层面，问题更可能影响大量企业。政府关系也很有价值，尽管主要是在地方层面，因为地方层面的问题更可能影响到少数公司。
It is widely accepted that better-connected firms exercise more political influence. However, because both social ties and political influence are difficult to observe, it remains little understood how different types of ties affect different types of political action. We develop new theory that contrasts the effects of ties to other firms in the same industry (peer ties) with ties to elected officials and bureaucrats (government ties). We argue that peer ties are useful for facilitating collective action, which is most often used to seek influence over broad policy issues that affect many firms. In contrast, while government ties are more versatile, these should primarily also allow firms to pursue narrow, particularistic issues that benefit only one or a small number of firms. Using a new survey of foreign-owned firms operating in the Philippines, we demonstrate that peer ties play an important role in firms’ efforts to influence policy at the national level, where issues are more likely to affect large numbers of firms. Government ties are also valuable, though primarily at the local level, where issues are more likely to affect a smaller number of firms.
06 统计能力与腐败的官僚机构
【题目】
Statistical capacity and corrupt bureaucracies
【作者】
Manuel Oechslin, Elias Steiner
【摘要】
在许多发展中国家，经济统计数据（如GDP增长率）不精确，难以评估经济改革和了解“什么有效”。因此，改进经济统计已成为国际组织的一个优先事项。在本文中，我们分离出一种潜在的机制——一种观察者效应，通过这种效应，推动更精确的统计数据可以让情况变得更糟。精确的统计需要从大量公司收集数据。如果公司怀疑通过官僚机构传播的详细信息被滥用来收受贿赂，那么他们的投资动机就会减弱。因此，改革的效果很弱，更难发现“什么有效”。为了抑制这一机制，改善经济统计的努力应该是全面的，还应包括体制方面。
In many developing countries, economic statistics (such as the growth rate of GDP) are imprecise, making it difficult to evaluate economic reforms and learn “what works”. Improving economic statistics has thus become a priority of international organizations. In this paper, we isolate an insidious mechanism—a type of observer effect—by which a push for better statistics can make matters worse. Precise statistics require the collection of data from a large number of firms. If firms suspect that detailed information, when spreading through the bureaucracy, is misused to collect bribes, they have weaker incentives to invest. As a result, the effects of reforms are muted, making it even harder to discover “what works”. To suppress this mechanism, efforts to improve economic statistics should be comprehensive and also include institutional aspects.
Volume 17 - Issue 2 - April 2022
Issue Topic: Institutional Complexity in Global Governance
01 全球治理中的混合制度复合体
【题目】
Hybrid institutional complexes in global governance
【作者】
Kenneth W. Abbott, Benjamin Faude
【摘要】
当今世界政治中大部分议题领域不由个体制度主导，也不由正式的国家间制度组成的机制复合体所主导，而是由“混合制度复合体”（hybrid institutional complexes, HIC）占据，后者包括异质的国家间、国家内、公私混合和私营跨国的正式和非正式制度。我们将HIC这一概念拓展为描述和分析当代全球治理的一个新视角。HIC和机制复合体的核心结构差异在于，HIC内部的制度形式更多样化。基于此，HIC与机制复合体在运作方式上存在两项显著差异：（1）HIC的组成制度之间表现出相对较大的功能差异，因此权威主张重叠的情形相对较少；（2）HIC的组成制度之间具有更显著的非正式等级，因此受益于更强的排序。这两点均为系统性特征。HIC具有独特的治理优势：如为多样化治理问题提供良好的“实质契合”，为不同成员偏好提供良好的“政治契合”；限制冲突的交叉制度战略；并有助于建立协调机制以加强实质的一致性。然而，HIC也带来了特殊的治理风险：个体制度可能会承担不适合的问题；多重制度可能会造成混乱；可能会加剧而非限制冲突和争论；其内部的“软”制度可能会淡化现有条约和政府间组织的焦点，并阻止新条约的建立。本文概述了一项持续探索HIC的结构、运作和治理影响的研究议程。
Most issue areas in world politics today are governed neither by individual institutions nor by regime complexes composed of formal interstate institutions. Rather, they are governed by “hybrid institutional complexes” (HICs) comprising heterogeneous interstate, infra-state, public–private and private transnational institutions, formal and informal. We develop the concept of the HIC as a novel descriptive and analytical lens for the study of contemporary global governance. The core structural difference between HICs and regime complexes is the greater diversity of institutional forms within HICs. Because of that diversity, HICs operate differently than regime complexes in two significant ways: (1) HICs exhibit relatively greater functional differentiation among their component institutions, and hence suffer from relatively fewer overlapping claims to authority; and (2) HICs exhibit greater informal hierarchy among their component institutions, and hence benefit from greater ordering. Both are systemic features. HICs have characteristic governance benefits: they offer good “substantive fit” for multi-faceted governance problems and good “political fit” for the preferences of diverse constituents; constrain conflictive cross-institutional strategies; and are conducive to mechanisms of coordination, which enhance substantive coherence. Yet HICs also pose characteristic governance risks: individual institutions may take on aspects of problems for which they are ill-suited; multiple institutions may create confusion; HICs can amplify conflict and contestation rather than constraining them; and the “soft” institutions within HICs can reduce the focality of incumbent treaties and intergovernmental organizations and forestall the establishment of new ones. We outline a continuing research agenda for exploring the structures, operations and governance implications of HICs.
02 全球治理复合体的排序：国际民用航空治理复合体的演变
【题目】
Ordering global governance complexes: The evolution of the governance complex for international civil aviation
【作者】
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
【摘要】
许多观察家担心，越来越多作用重叠的国际制度会因重复、矛盾和冲突而削弱治理的有效性。这一悲观评价可能低估了国家及其他政治代理人可用于减少冲突性重叠和加强制度间协作的机制。作者借助历史数据，研究了各国如何通过解散或合并现有制度或重新配置职权来缓解全球治理复合体（Global Governance Complexes, GGC）的内部冲突。作者进一步探讨了“复杂性秩序”如何通过自下而上的适应过程来代替国家主导的改革。作者的分析支持了三项理论主张：（1）国家经常“自上而下”地重塑治理复合体以减少冲突性重叠；（2）“自上而下”的重组和“自下而上”的适应为GGC组成制度之间的关系排序提供了替代机制；（3）该双重机制确保GGC趋于在一段时间内（重新）产生秩序要素——尽管往往是暂时的。因此，复杂的治理系统并非朝着越来越大的碎片化和无序发展，而是趋于在或大或小的整合和（无）秩序之间波动。
Many observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how “order in complexity” can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes “top-down” in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) “top-down” restructuring and “bottom-up” adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order.
03 衡量全球治理中的制度重叠
【题目】
Measuring institutional overlap in global governance
【作者】
Yoram Z. Haftel, Tobias Lenz
【摘要】
在过去十年，一类日渐成熟的文献尝试捕捉世界政治中关于“全球治理的日益复杂”这一新经验现象的性质、起源和结果。但这些文献对测量问题的关注有限，而测量问题是更全面了解跨时空全球治理复杂性的先决条件。为了在这方向迈出第一步，本文做出了两个贡献。首先，提出了衡量全球治理复杂度的新量化标准，并将其概念化为全球治理制度的重叠程度。二元、加权、定向二元和一元量化指标有助于人们对世界政治中的这一重要发展有多方面的理解。其次，作者通过将上述标准应用于政府间组织 (IGO) 设计的最全面数据集——国际权威标准（MIA）的最新版本来加以阐释。进而有助于作者确定重要的政府间组织的重叠程度的横断面和时间模式，这些组织往往构成了众多问题领域中庞杂的机制复合体的核心。最后，作者概述了这些标准在制度设计和演变、合法性和合法化，以及有效性和绩效研究方面的显著影响和潜在应用。这一讨论强调了所提出的测量标准的实用性——它们既是因变量，也是独立变量，可供研究人员研究全球治理及其他方面制度重叠的起源和结果。
Over the past decade, an increasingly sophisticated literature has sought to capture the nature, sources, and consequences of a novel empirical phenomenon in world politics: the growing complexity of global governance. However, this literature has paid only limited attention to questions of measurement, which is a prerequisite for a more comprehensive understanding of global governance complexity across space and time. In taking a first step in this direction, we make two contributions in the article. First, we propose new quantitative measures that gauge the extent of complexity in global governance, which we conceptualize as the degree to which global governance institutions overlap. Dyadic, weighted, directed-dyadic, and monadic measures enable a multifaceted understanding of this important development in world politics. Second, we illustrate these measures by applying them to an updated version of the most comprehensive data set on the design of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs): the Measure of International Authority (MIA). This allows us to identify cross-sectional and temporal patterns in the extent to which important IGOs, which tend to form the core of sprawling regime complexes in many issue areas, overlap. We conclude by outlining notable implications for, and potential applications of, our measures for research on institutional design and evolution, legitimacy, and legitimation, as well as effectiveness and performance. This discussion underscores the utility of the proposed measures, as both dependent and independent variables, to researchers examining the sources and consequences of institutional overlap in global governance and beyond.
04 复合治理博弈的谈判策略
【题目】
Bargaining strategies for governance complex games
【作者】
Daniel Verdier
【摘要】
全球治理复合体为成员国提供了“机制转移”（regime shifting）的机会：以改善一国的相对谈判地位为目标，在不同机构论坛之间展开较量。作者探究了这一策略的内在有效性。该模型为治理复合体文献做出了两项贡献。首先，从形式上讲，该分析超越了当前机制转移的“外部选择”模式，包括谈判的永久中断，转向了“内部选择”模式（包括暂时的分歧）。其次，从实质上讲，本文模拟了两种机制转移的情景，一种对弱者有效，另一种对强者有效，然后“测试”了一些文献中的说法，即强国比弱国更有可能利用机制转移。本文的结论是，机制转移更有可能对弱者而非强者有利。
Global governance complexes offer member states opportunities for “regime shifting”: playing off an institutional forum against another with the goal of improving one’s relative bargaining position. I probe the internal validity of this strategy. The model makes two contributions to the governance complex literature. Formally, first, the analysis goes beyond current “outside-option” models of regime shifting, involving a permanent break of negotiations, to “inside-option” models, involving temporary disagreements. Substantively, second, the article models two scenarios of regime shifting, one that works for the weak and another that works for the powerful, and then “tests” the claim held by some in the literature that powerful countries are more likely to avail themselves of the possibility of regime shifting than weaker countries. I conclude that regime shifting is more likely to work for the weak than for the strong.
Volume 17 - Issue 3 - July 2022
01 权力、思想和世界银行贷款条件
【题目】
Power, ideas, and World Bank conditionality
【作者】
Ben Cormier, Mark S. Manger
【摘要】
在何种情况下，世界银行贷款条件所涵盖的政策领域会随着时间和借款人的不同而发生变化？本文假设，即使在控制了国家特征和国际政治因素之后，世界银行经济研究和政策重点的转变也会相应影响世行的贷款条件。为了验证这一假说，作者借助关键字辅助式主题模型对1985年至2014年间发表的13,000多份世界银行政策性贷款条件和近35,000篇世界银行研究论文进行分析。与针对世界银行的批评相反，研究和政策重点的变化多为言论性，对世界银行贷款并未造成实质性影响。本文认为内部研究和政策要务的转变至少能够帮助解读世行贷款条件的变化以及传统的针对贷款人或借款人的特定措施，这些措施对构建世界银行贷款的国际政治经济学（IPE,International Political Economy）模型至关重要。
How and why do the policy areas covered in World Bank loan conditions change over time and across borrowers? We hypothesize that shifts in the Bank’s economic research and policy priorities influence Bank loan conditions, even after controlling for country characteristics and international political aspects. To test this claim we apply keyword-assisted topic models to the analysis of over 13,000 World Bank policy loan conditions and close to 35,000 World Bank research papers published between 1985 and 2014. Contrary to the criticism levelled against the Bank that changes in research and policy priorities are mostly rhetorical and have little substantive effect on Bank lending, we find that internal research and policy priority shifts explain the conditions in a Bank loan at least as well as more traditional donor or borrower-specific measures central to IPE models of Bank lending.
02 从不满到内战：地缘政治环境的影响
【题目】
From grievances to civil war: The impact of geopolitics
【作者】
Faisal Z. Ahmed
【摘要】
针对冷战并未对1990年后的内战造成任何重要影响的这一说法，本文通过探究其经验真实性对其进行了重新审视。作者论证并采用了巴蒂克式的双重差分识别法，以表明在冷战期间有更为强烈的政治不满情绪的国家更倾向于在冷战后经历国家内战。研究证据显示，对政府和叛乱分子的外部支持可信度的变化导致了受害国家冲突爆发的上升。这表明，地缘政治和先前存在的不满在冷战后的内战中起到了因果关系作用。
I revisit claims that the Cold War had no meaningful effect on civil war after 1990 by probing its empirical veracity. I argue and employ a Bartik-style difference-in-differences identification strategy to show that countries with greater political grievances during the Cold War were more likely to experience civil war after the Cold War. I provide evidence suggesting that changes in the credibility of external support to both governments and rebels affected this uptick in conflict onset in aggrieved countries. These findings suggest the confluence of geopolitics and preexisting grievances played a causal role in civil war after the Cold War.
03 贸易协定中的劳工条款：隐藏的保护主义？
【题目】
Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?
【作者】
Céline Carrère, Marcelo Olarreaga, Damian Raess
【摘要】
本文探讨了1990-2014年期间在特惠贸易协定(PTA)中引入和设计劳工条款 (LC) 对双边贸易流动的影响。虽然将劳工条款纳入特惠贸易协定(PTA)是否会减少或增加双边贸易尚不明确，但贸易方向很重要，也就是说，作者预计观察劳工条款在南北贸易配置中的（积极或消极）影响。除此之外，在这种配置中，作者假设更为完善的劳工条款将对双边贸易流动产生更大的（负面或正面）影响。借助关于特惠贸易协定中劳动条款内容的新型数据集，研究结果印证了此前假设，即虽然引入劳工条款对双边贸易流动的平均值没有影响，但它增加了南北贸易协定中劳工条款薄弱的中低收入国家的出口量。与第二项假设相一致，这种积极影响主要由具备制度化合作基础的劳工条款所推动。相比之下，具有强效执行机制的劳工条款对发展中国家在南北特惠贸易协定中的出口量没有统计学意义上的显著影响。研究结果表明劳工条款的设计并非是出于保护主义原因或具有保护主义效果，本文进而对众多发展中国家不愿将劳工条款纳入其贸易协定的逻辑提出质疑。
We explore the impact of the introduction and design of labor clauses (LCs) in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on bilateral trade flows over the period 1990–2014. While it is not a priori clear if the inclusion of LCs in PTAs will decrease or increase bilateral trade, we expect the direction of trade to matter, that is, we expect to observe the (negative or positive) impact of LCs in the South-North trade configuration. We also expect, in that configuration, stronger LCs to yield stronger (negative or positive) effects on bilateral trade flows. Using a novel dataset on the content of labor provisions in PTAs, we find in line with our first expectation that while the introduction of LCs has on average no impact on bilateral trade flows, it increases exports of low and middle-income countries with weaker labor standards in North–South trade agreements. Consistent with our second expectation, this positive impact is mostly driven by LCs with institutionalized cooperation provisions. In contrast, LCs with strong enforcement mechanisms do not have a statistically significant impact on exports of developing countries in North–South PTAs. The results are inconsistent with the ideas that LCs are set for protectionist reasons or have protectionist effects, casting doubt on the logic for the reluctance of many developing countries to include LCs in their trade agreements.
04 独裁者俱乐部：区域组织与威权主义存续
【题目】
Clubs of autocrats: Regional organizations and authoritarian survival
【作者】
Maria J. Debre
【摘要】
尽管学界认为区域组织(Regional organizations)的成员身份可以增加民主化的可能性，但我们看到许多独裁政权仍然幸存并继续掌权，虽然它们拥有多个区域组织的成员身份。本文提出这种现象的原因在于此类政权往往是“独裁者俱乐部”的成员，他们提供物质和思想资源以加强国内生存政治，并在政治动荡时期保护成员免受外部干扰。该论点得到了生存分析的支持，该分析测试了1946年至2010年间独裁性区域组织的成员身份对政权生存的影响。研究结果表明，由更多专制政权组成的独裁性区域组织实际上确实通过保护现任者免受民主挑战，例如内乱或政治异议，而提高了政权生存的可能性。然而，独裁性区域组织的成员身份无益于防止政权因军事政变等非民主型挑战而崩溃，这可能是因为这些类型的威胁不太可能扩散到其他成员国。因此，本文加深了对民主化局限性和国际合作的潜在消极影响的理解，并有助于研究专制政权中国际和国内政治的相互依存关系。
While scholars have argued that membership in Regional Organizations (ROs) can increase the likelihood of democratization, we see many autocratic regimes surviving in power albeit being members of several ROs. This article argues that this is the case because these regimes are often members in “Clubs of Autocrats” that supply material and ideational resources to strengthen domestic survival politics and shield members from external interference during moments of political turmoil. The argument is supported by survival analysis testing the effect of membership in autocratic ROs on regime survival between 1946 to 2010. It finds that membership in ROs composed of more autocratic member states does in fact raise the likelihood of regime survival by protecting incumbents against democratic challenges such as civil unrest or political dissent. However, autocratic RO membership does not help to prevent regime breakdown due to autocratic challenges like military coups, potentially because these types of threats are less likely to diffuse to other member states. The article thereby adds to our understanding of the limits of democratization and potential reverse effects of international cooperation, and contributes to the literature addressing interdependences of international and domestic politics in autocratic regimes.
05 深入幕后：对欧盟外商投资筛选机制的国家支持
【题目】
Behind the screen: Understanding national support for a foreign investment screening mechanism in the European Union
【作者】
Zenobia T. Chan, Sophie Meunier
【摘要】
是何种因素导致了国家对外国直接投资(FDI：Foreign Direct Investment)筛选制度化的偏好？在过去十年中，全球发达经济体都收紧了其国家投资审查机制(ISM：Investment Screening Mechanism)。2019年3月，欧盟采用了第一个共同的外国直接投资审查框架。本文探讨了成员国对泛欧筛查框架的创建和性质的偏好变化。基于对参与谈判过程的欧盟和国家高级官员的广泛访谈，并使用通过首次就此主题进行的精英调查创建的欧盟范围内的投资审查机制国家支持的独特衡量标准，本文发现由于担心无回报的技术转让，具有较高技术水平的国家更支持对外国直接投资进行审查。除此之外，作者还研究了来自中国的外国直接投资数额在国家层面对外国直接投资审查部门的支持的影响。但研究结果表明来自中国的外国直接投资总额并不能够预测投资审查制度的偏好。而在战略领域中，来自中国的外国直接投资水平较高的国家则更愿意支持外资审查机制。与之相比，来自中国的外国直接投资主要集中在低技术领域的国家倾向于反对外资审查机制。调查结果表明，欧盟投资审查以及总体上国家层面的外资审查机制在未来将会变得更加严格，特别是在全球新冠疫情持续肆虐的情况下。
What determines national preferences for institutionalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) screening? Over the past decade, advanced economies worldwide have tightened their national investment screening mechanisms (ISMs). In March 2019, the European Union (EU) adopted its first common FDI screening framework. This article explores variations in Member State preferences for the creation and nature of a pan-European screening framework. Based on extensive interviews with high-level EU and country officials involved in the negotiation process, and using a unique measure of national support for the EU-wide ISM created through the first-ever elite survey on this subject matter, we find that countries with higher technological levels were more supportive of FDI screening due to concerns over unreciprocated technological transfer. We also show the effects of Chinese FDI on country-level support for FDI screening sector-dependent. We found no evidence that total Chinese FDI predicts preferences for ISM. Instead, countries with high levels of Chinese FDI in strategic sectors are more likely to support the ISM, while those with high levels of Chinese investment in low-tech sectors tend to oppose screening. Our overall findings suggest that EU investment screening, and national-level screening in general, might become more restrictive in the future, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
06 截止时间：新兴市场资本账户政策的声誉限制
【题目】
Closing time: Reputational constraints on capital account policy in emerging markets
【作者】
Steven Liao，Daniel McDowell
【摘要】
国际声誉问题是否限制了政府的经济政策选择？本文通过分析新兴市场收紧资本外流限制的政策来进行评估。尽管随着资本流动波动性（CFV：Capital Flow Volatility）的强化，政策制定者应该更倾向于收紧限制以保护其经济，但投资者将流出控制视为违反投资合同的非正统政策。本文认为资本流动波动性对流出控制的影响取决于在对等市场中管制措施的使用。当同行者开放时，政府预计资本管制措施将以其市场声誉为代价，因为非正统举措向自由主义国家行列中的投资者发出负面信号。相反，当同行者封闭时，采取管控措施对经济体声誉的损害应该较小。基于对1995年至2015年的25个新兴市场研究，本文指出资本流动波动性与流出控制相关，但仅当市场同行已经封闭时，这表明声誉问题可能会限制政策自主权。
Do international reputational concerns constrain governments’ economic policy choices? We assess this question by analyzing emerging market decisions to tighten restrictions on capital outflows. While policymakers should be more likely to tighten restrictions to protect their economies as capital flow volatility (CFV) increases, investors view outflow controls as heterodox policies that violate investment contracts. We argue that the effect of CFV on outflow controls depends on the use of controls in peer markets. When peers are open, governments anticipate that controls will come at a high cost to their market reputations as heterodox measures send a negative signal to investors among a crowd of liberal peers. Conversely, when peers are closed, using controls should do less damage to an economy’s reputation. For 25 emerging markets from 1995–2015, we show that CFV is associated with outflow controls, but only when market peers are already closed, suggesting reputational concerns can limit policy autonomy.
07 无保障性产权的投资：独裁统治下的资本外流开放性
【题目】
Investment with insecure property rights: Capital outflow openness under dictatorship
【作者】
Jacque Gao
【摘要】
政府有两种途径来保障投资者的权利：产权保障和允许资本流动。本文建立了一个正式的理论框架，探讨了独裁者如何利用资本流出的开放性来代替薄弱的产权保护来吸引更多的投资。之所以如此，原因有二：首先，更高的资本流出开放度扩大了独裁者可以占用的资金储备。其次，更多的资本外流开放提高了国内工资水平，从而防止工人阶级的反抗。在工人阶级力量有限的情况下，独裁者仅靠资本外流的开放性就能保留工人的支持。但是，当工人阶级力量壮大时，独裁者将被迫改善产权保护体制以防止工人阶级起义，从而限制了独裁者未来的征用能力。
Governments have two mechanisms through which to secure the rights of investors: protecting property rights and allowing capital mobility. This article develops a formal theoretic framework that demonstrates how dictators use capital outflow openness as a substitute for poor property rights protection to attract more investment. They do so for two related reasons. First, more capital outflow openness increases the pool of capital dictators can expropriate from. Second, more capital outflow openness increases domestic wages, preventing working class revolts. When the working class is not too strong, the dictator would be able to retain workers’ support by relying on capital outflow openness alone. However, when the working class is strong, the dictator would be forced to improve property rights protection to prevent a working-class revolt, constraining the dictator’s ability to expropriate in the future.
翻 译：郭见田、马丝妮、李征宇、郝若雯
校 对：冯天卓、李征宇、马丝妮、郭见田
相关阅读：
编辑：焦 磊
一审：李璐雅
二审：郭见田