顶刊《Journal of Accounting Research》最新刊发九篇文章！

出品@会计学术联盟(ID：KJXSLM)，顶刊推送管理部、案例研究专栏；信息来源：wiley、金蓓科研；

Volume 60, Issue 5;Pages: 1647-2027;December 2022

Journal of Accounting Research（简称JAR），由芝加哥大学发行的会计学术期刊，为会计国际TOP六大期刊之一(另五本是TAR、JAE、CAR、RAST、AOS)，该出版具原创性之论文，包含分析性（analytical）、实证（empirical）、实验（experimental）及田野（field study）研究等不同之研究方法运用于会计研究。主题涵盖会计各领域之议题，例如：财务会计、管理会计、审计、税等。自1963年创刊，JAR系由芝加哥大学之专业会计学会（Institute of Professional Accounting，简称IPA）所出版；从2001年六月起，则由芝加哥大学与出版商Blackwell Publishers共同合作出版。JAR每年出版五期（三月、五月、六月、九月及十二月）

目录

• Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership
• The Roles of Data Providers and Analysts in the Production, Dissemination, and Pricing of Street Earnings
• Do Borrowers Intentionally Avoid Covenant Violations? A Reexamination of the Debt Covenant Hypothesis
• How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’Judgments?
• The Costs of Waiving Audit Adjustments
• Relative Performance Evaluation and Competitive Aggressiveness
• The Relationship Between Non-GAAP Earnings and Aggressive Estimates in Reported GAAP Numbers
• Audit Implications of Non-GAAP Reporting
• Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting

1

     Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

ANDREA PAWLICZEK（University of Colorado） 

A. NICOLE SKINNER（University of Georgia）

SARAH L. C. ZECHMAN（University of Colorado）

 Abstract  

We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilitate tacit collusion and that this association is stronger in industries where collusion is easier. Our study expands the literature on disclosure and competition among firms by showing that public disclosure is positively associated with incentives for tacit collusion. This finding is consistent with managers facilitating anticompetitive outcomes using voluntary disclosure.

2

   The Roles of Data Providers and Analysts in the Production, Dissemination, and Pricing of Street Earnings

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

KHRYSTYNA BOCHKAY (University of Miami)

STAN MARKOV (University of Texas at Dallas）

MUSA SUBASI (University of Maryland）

ERIC WEISBROD (University of Kansas）

 Abstract  

In September 2009, Thomson Reuters (TR) discontinued its practice of relying on analysts to determine the treatment of unexpected charges and gains in favor of their immediate exclusion from GAAP earnings. Adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we show that this plausibly exogenous change in TR's methodology resulted in street earnings that are more predictive of future performance; and timelier, more accurate, and less dispersed analyst forecasts of future earnings, consistent with TR enhancing the properties of street earnings and analyst forecasts. Finally, using path analysis we show that a significant portion of TR's effect on price discovery is through its effect on analysts; and that the change in TR's treatment of unexpected items increased (decreased) the relative influence of TR (analysts) on the pricing of street earnings. We conclude that forecast data providers like TR are more than a conduit of information from analysts to investors.

3

  Do Borrowers Intentionally Avoid Covenant Violations? A Reexamination of the Debt Covenant Hypothesis 

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

ADAM BORDEMAN (Cal Poly San Luis Obispo)

PETER DEMERJIAN (Georgia State University)

 Abstract  

In this study, we replicate and extend the Dichev and Skinner [DS: 2002] study on the debt covenant hypothesis (DCH). We start by replicating DS and find results consistent with theirs. We then extend their work by changing three aspects of the research design: histogram bin width, calculation of slack, and statistical test of discontinuity. We find that the inference from DS is generally robust to varying these choices, although sensitive to different bin widths, during their sample period. We extend our analysis to the period 2000–2019 and find that support for DCH remains robust. We do, however, find a lack of support for DCH when examining the most common financial covenant, debt-to-EBITDA. These findings suggest a more nuanced perspective on DCH, whereby different types of financial covenants provide different incentives and abilities to avoid technical default.

4
  How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments?

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

NERISSA C. BROWN (NERISSA C. BROWN)

BRIAN T. GALE (University of Washington)

STEPHANIE M. GRANT (University of Washington)

 Abstract  

Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increases investors’ processing of repeated information, consistent with the informational role of repetition documented in prior research. In contrast, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, nonrepeated information when the filing is less interactive. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value-relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of nonrepeated information. Further, more interactive disclosures lead to deeper overall processing of both repeated and nonrepeated information, rather than more interactive disclosures redirecting investors’ attention and processing away from repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of nonrepeated information, while preserving repetition's informational role.

5

    The Costs of Waiving Audit Adjustments

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

PREETI CHOUDHARY (University of Arizona)

KENNETH MERKLEY (Indiana University)

KATHERINE SCHIPPER (Duke University)

 Abstract  

We analyze the disposition of auditor-proposed adjustments to financial statements. Our analyses address concerns, expressed by regulators and others, that auditors and their clients fixate on quantitative thresholds and overlook qualitative factors in assessing the materiality of discovered misstatements. Using a large sample of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)-inspected audits, we examine the frequency with which management records versus waives auditor-proposed adjustments and whether waiving-proposed adjustments ha consequences for reporting reliability and the audit process. We find waived adjustments are linked to lower financial reporting quality measured by material misstatements, to incentives to meet/beat earnings targets, and to the audit process, as measured by higher next-period audit effort and fees and higher next-period proposed adjustments. These effects on the audit process are consistent with auditors responding to the increased risk associated with waived adjustments. In an exploratory analysis, we find that controlling for the amount of proposed adjustments, auditor resignations are negatively associated with waived adjustments.

6

     Relative Performance Evaluation and Competitive Aggressiveness

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

CHRISTOPH FEICHTER (Vienna University of Economics and Business)

FRANK MOERS (Maastricht University)

OSCAR TIMMERMANS (London School of Economics)

 Abstract  

We examine the relation between incentive plans based on relative performance and competitive aggressiveness. Using data on executive incentive-compensation contracts in large U.S. firms, we find a positive association between competitive aggressiveness and peer group overlap—that is, the extent to which two firms select each other as peers in these incentive plans. Our findings indicate that managers of such firms take more frequent as well as more complex competitive actions, relative to managers evaluated on relative performance without peer group overlap. Moreover, we show that these competitive tactics are more pronounced when managers compete against: (1) peers with similar grant sizes, (2) peers on similar performance metrics, and (3) peers in the same industry. Collectively, our findings provide evidence on how widely used incentive-compensation practices relate to strategic firm decisions.

7

     The Relationship Between Non-GAAP Earnings and Aggressive Estimates in Reported GAAP Numbers

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

RYAN D. GUGGENMOS (Cornell University)

KRISTINA RENNEKAMP (Cornell University)

KATHY RUPAR (Georgia Institute of Technology)

SEAN WANG (Southern Methodist University)

 Abstract  

This study uses a controlled experiment to examine the trade-off between managers’ use of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings to satisfy market expectations and how this relationship can be moderated by both formal and informal regulatory attention to non-GAAP earnings. Our key takeaway is that allowing financial reporting discretion in an alternative disclosure channel, that is, non-GAAP earnings, can reduce firms’ opportunistic GAAP reporting. However, statements by regulators about increased attention to non-GAAP earnings constrain this channel, and this can result in more aggressive GAAP earnings management and reduced GAAP earnings quality. We triangulate these findings with a survey and archival analyses and find results that are consistent with this primary message. Our study provides evidence relevant to standard setters and regulators that non-GAAP measures may serve an important role even if they can be used opportunistically.

8

      Audit Implications of Non-GAAP Reporting

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

NICHOLAS J. HALLMAN (University of Texas at Austin)

JAIME J. SCHMIDT (University of Texas at Austin)

ANNE M. THOMPSON (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

 Abstract  

We investigate whether non-GAAP reporting affects the audit process and thereby the quality of the related financial statements. First, we provide evidence that auditors in numerous countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, rely to varying degrees on non-GAAP profit before tax as a benchmark for determining quantitative materiality. Then, using Premium Listed companies on the London Stock Exchange, we document that U.K. auditor reliance on non-GAAP materiality benchmarks often results in a higher quantitative materiality amount and can lower audit quality. Although U.K. auditors appear skeptical of managers’ more aggressive non-GAAP adjustments, auditors adopt more of management's low-quality adjustments when auditor independence is weaker. In sum, our results suggest that non-GAAP reporting can indirectly affect investors by reducing the rigor of the financial statement audit.

9

    Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting

Journal of Accounting Research

 Authors  

JINZHI LU (City University of Hong Kong)

 Abstract  

I develop a theory to study the consequences of providing more detailed information to rationally inattentive investors. I first consider a simple data-provision problem and show that adding more data or detail in financial statements can make it more difficult for investors to extract information. Consequently, investors who have limited information-processing capacity may prefer less detailed information. I also show that when investors' decisions are complements, providing details in addition to a summary may reduce investors' welfare. More specifically, because of increased disclosure of details, a coordination failure could occur in investors' attention-allocation decisions. By showing that adding more detail in financial statements can lead to an information overload problem for investors, this study yields valuable insights for accounting standard setters.

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