刊讯｜SSCI 期刊《心智与语言》2022年第1-2期

 Mind & Language

Volume 37, Issue 1-2, 2022

 Mind & Language（SSCI 一区，2021 IF：1.938）2022年第1期共发文7篇，论文涉及动物哲学、内隐偏见、刻板印象、感知界限等；2022年第2期共发文11篇，论文涉及感知体验、能力与证据透明度、语言表达等。

目录

Issue1

■ How to ascribe beliefs to animals, by Albert Newen & Tobias Starzak, Pages 3-21.

■ Language without information exchange, by Jessica Keiser, Pages 22-37.

■ Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing-as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason-recalcitrant behaviours, by Talia Morag, Pages 38–55.

■ Weather predicates, binding, and radical contextualism, by Paul Elbourne, Pages 56-72.

■ Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder, by Evan Taylor, Pages 73-93.

■ Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception, by Sam Clarke, Pages 94-113.

■ Why should syntactic islands exist, by Eran Asoulin, Pages 114-131.

Issue2

■ How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty, by Susanna Siegel, Pages 134-158.

■ Coming from a world without objects, by Frauke Hildebrandt, Ramiro Glauer & Gregor Kachel, Pages159-176.

■ Are psychopaths moral-psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion-theoretical explanations, by Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen, Pages 177–193.

■ Conditionals: Truth, safety, and success, by Hugh Mellor & Richard Bradley, Pages 194-207.

■ Susanna Schellenberg on perception, by Christopher S. Hill, Pages 208-218.

■ Capacitism and the transparency of evidence, by Ram Neta, Pages 219-226.

■ Content and phenomenology in The unity of perception, by Nico Orlandi, Pages 227-234.

■ The generality and particularity of perception, by Susanna Schellenberg, Pages 235–247.

■ What are linguistic representations, by David Adger, Pages 248-260.

■ Troubles with Rey's linguistic Eliminativism, by Robert J. Stainton & Christopher Viger, Pages 261-273.

■ The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger, by Georges Rey, Pages 274-282.

摘要

How to ascribe beliefs to animals

Albert Newen, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr- University, Bochum, Germany

Tobias Starzak, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr- University, Bochum, Germany

Abstract In this article, we analyze and reject two versions of the content-argument against animal beliefs, namely, the ontological argument from Davidson and the epistemological argument from Stich. One of the main defects of the strongest version of the argument is that it over-intellectualizes belief ascriptions in humans and thus sets the comparative bar for belief ascriptions in animals too high. In the second part of the article, we develop a gradualist notion of belief which captures basic beliefs as well as Davidsonian linguistic beliefs, and we specify the conditions under which belief ascriptions to nonlinguistic animals are justified.

Key words animal belief, animal philosophy, belief ascription, comparative psychology, other minds

Language without information exchange

Jessica Keiser, School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Abstract This paper attempts to revive a once-lively program in the philosophy of language—that of reducing linguistic phenomena to facts about mental states and actions. I argue that recent skepticism toward this project is generated by features of traditional implementations of the project, rather than the project itself. A picture of language as essentially a mechanism for cooperative information exchange attracted theorists to metasemantic accounts grounding language use in illocutionary action (roughly, using an utterance to elicit a propositional attitude). When this picture is rejected, a metasemantics grounding language in locutionary action (using an utterance to direct attention) emerges as a more viable proposal, dissolving an intractable issue for traditional theories: the metasemantics of subsentential expressions.

Key words convention, Grice, metasemantics, referential indeterminacy

Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing-as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason-recalcitrant behaviours

Talia Morag, School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

Abstract This paper examines the puzzling phenomenon of self-directed implicit bias in the form of gender “stereo- type threat” (ST). Bringing to light the empirical undecidability of which account of this phenomenon is best, whether a rational or an associationist explanation, the paper aims to strengthen the associationist approach by appeal to a new account of seeing-as experiences. I critically examine “alief” accounts of reason- recalcitrant ST by bringing to bear arguments from the philosophy of emotion. The new account builds on the insights and overcomes the weaknesses of “aliefs” by (a) employing associations that are imaginative and unreliable; and (b) proposing non-conceptual seeing-as experiences.

Key words alief, associations, implicit bias, reason, recalcitrant emotions, stereotype threat

Weather predicates, binding, and radical contextualism

Paul Elbourne, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Abstract The implicit content indicating location associated with “raining” and other weather predicates is a definite description meaning “the location occupied by x,” where the individual variable “x” can be referential or bound. This position has deleterious consequences for certain varieties of radical contextualism.

Key words weather predicates, contextualism, binding, donkey anaphora, implicit content, unarticulated constituents

Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder

Evan Taylor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Abstract This article discusses a puzzle arising from the phenomenon of insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder. “Insight” refers to an awareness or understanding of obsessive thoughts as false or irrational. I argue that a natural and plausible way of characterizing insight in OCD conflicts with several different possible explanations of the epistemic attitude underlying insight-directed obsessive thought. After laying out the puzzle for five proposed explanations of obsessive thought and then discussing several possible ways that the puzzle might be avoided, I close the article by arguing that we can avoid the puzzle by adopting a new positive view of insight-directed obsessive thought.

Key words obsessive–compulsive disorder, insight, obsessive thought, knowledge, rationality, discordancy

Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception

Sam Clarke, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Abstract This paper refines a controversial proposal: That core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they do not, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, and avoids otherwise troubling objections.

Key words analogue representation, Carey (Susan), core cognition, iconic representation, perception, representational format

Why should syntactic islands exist? 

Eran Asoulin, School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Abstract Sentences that are ungrammatical and yet intelligible are instances of what I call perfectly thinkable thoughts. I argue that the existence of perfectly thinkable thoughts is revealing in regard to the question of why syntactic islands should exist. If language is an instrument of thought as understood in the biolinguistics tradition, then a uniquely human subset of thoughts is generated in nar- row syntax, which suggests that island constraints cannot be rooted in narrow syntax alone and thus must reflect interface conditions imposed on the output of the compu- tational system and its mapping to external systems.

Key words islands, language as an instrument of thought, locality, narrow syntax, perfectly thinkable thoughts

How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?

Susanna Siegel, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Abstract Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they are generated, and the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet, it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this longstanding view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. I criticize a powerful line of reasoning that we should expect perceptual experience to be probabilistic, given their interfaces with unconscious probabilistic information, with behavior responsive to it, and with credences.

Key words Bayesianism, consciousness, credences, perception, prediction, probability

Coming from a world without objects

Frauke Hildebrandt, Department of Social and Educational Science, University of Applied Sciences, Potsdam, Germany

Ramiro Glauer, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Empirical School and Classroom Research, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

Gregor Kachel, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Empirical School and Classroom Research, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

Abstract Abstract While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature-based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal.

Key words demonstratives, infant cognition, kind-bias, object individuation, reference

Are psychopaths moral-psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion-theoretical explanations

Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen, Department of Philosophy and Forensic Science Program, University of Toronto Mississauga, North Mississauga, Ontario, Canada

Abstract Psychopathy has been theorized as a disorder of emotion, which impairs moral judgments. However, these theories are increasingly being abandoned as empirical studies show that psychopaths seem to make proper moral judgments. In this contribution, these findings are reassessed, and it is argued that prevalent emotion-theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the unjustified assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, which leads to the hypothesis that psychopaths are completely unable to make moral judgments. An alternative and novel explanation is proposed, theorizing psychopathy as a degree- specific emotional deficiency, which causes degree-specific differences in moral judgments.

Key words emotion, forensic psychology, moral psychology, moral sentimentalism, psychopathy

Conditionals: Truth, safety, and success

Hugh Mellor, Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

Richard Bradley, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Abstract Whether I take some action that aims at desired conse- quence C depends on whether or not I take it to be true that if I so act, I will bring C about and that if I do not, I will fail to. And the action will succeed if and only if my beliefs are true. We argue that two theses follow: (I) To believe a conditional is to be disposed to infer its consequent from the truth of its antecedent, and (II) The conditional is true iff the inference would not make a true belief in the antecedent cause a false belief in the consequent.

Key words conditionals, inferential dispositions, suppositions, actions, truth values

Susanna Schellenberg on perception

Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA

Abstract Schellenberg's book The unity of perception is full of innovative ideas and challenges to preconceptions. This discussion endorses several of Schellenberg's main con- tentions, but it also challenges her handling of several key topics, such as hallucinations and perceptual awareness of particulars, and it expresses doubts about the informativeness of her main analytic tool, the notion of a perceptual capacity.

Key words evidence, hallucinations, particularism, perceptual capacities, perceptual existentialism

Capacitism and the transparency of evidence

Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Abstract Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account— “capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of eviden- tial force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us.

Key words disjunctivism, evidence, hallucination, perception, Schellenberg

Content and phenomenology in The unity of perception

Nico Orlandi Philosophy, UC Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California, USA

Abstract Susanna Schellenberg's book is an ambitious project, providing a view of perception that makes sense of its content, its phenomenology, and its epistemic role. In these comments, I focus on her capacitist view and raise questions concerning this view's ability to offer an adequate account of the content and phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.

Key words adverbialism, content, function, hallucination, mode of presentation, phenomenology, relationalism

The generality and particularity of perception 

Susanna Schellenberg, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA

Abstract This paper responds to critical comments by Christo- pher Hill, Ram Neta, and Nico Orlandi on my book The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence (OUP 2018). It addresses questions about why analyzing mental states in terms of capacities is more explanatory powerful than analyzing them in terms of processes. It further develops my view of functions and their relation to mental capacities. It clarifies the internalist commitments of my externalist view of content, consciousness, and evidence. The topics addressed include further the many-properties problem, the relation between what is perceived and what is represented, as well as the evidential transparency principle.

Key words binding problem, capacities, consciousness, content, evidence, functions, perception, perceptual particularity, representations

What are linguistic representations? 

David Adger, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK

Abstract Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of something, specifically of standard linguistic entities (SLEs), such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases, and so forth. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they nevertheless connect to the systems that use them.

Key words ontology, phonology, representations, syntax, terminology

Troubles with Rey's linguistic Eliminativism 

Robert J. Stainton, Department of Philosophy, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

Christopher Viger, Department of Philosophy, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

Abstract We focus on Folieism, Rey's brand of Eliminativism about languages, according to which words, sentences, phonemes, and such, and consequently languages, do not exist; they are intentional inexistents, on a par with unicorns that speakers, under an ineluctable illusion, mistake as real. We present a simplified reconstruction of his argument, challenge what we take to be its presuppositions, and argue that its conclusion has unwanted social/ethical consequences and construes linguistics writ large in a strange light, as a kind of pretense, leading us to reject Folieism.

Key words Chomskyan linguistics, Eliminativism, Folieism, intentional inexistents, intentionality

The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger

Georges Rey, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA

Abstract I reply to Stainton and Viger by pointing out that my “folieist” claim—that standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words and phonemes are illusions— would not have the calamitous consequences for linguistics that they fear. Talk of “a language” need only be understood as talk of an I-language precisely as Chomskyans have proposed; and I reply to Adger by pointing out that, since SLEs are not generally describable as real, local physical phenomena, perception of them cannot be explained as any sort of “transduction.” An intentionalist understanding of “representation of” is needed where mere transduction fails.

Key words folieism, I-language, intentionality, SLEs, transduction

期刊简介

The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.

目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language 以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。

It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.

它是一个重要的论坛，学者可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。

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https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14680017

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