学术视界｜Management Science：供应链竞争：一种市场博弈方法 （附下载链接）

Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach

供应链竞争：一种市场博弈方法

作者
C. Gizem Korpeoglu

Eindhoven University of Technology

Ersin Körpeoğlu

University College London

Soo-Haeng Cho

Carnegie Mellon University

摘要

我们研究多个供应商通过批发市场出售给多个零售商的供应链。在实践中，我们经常观察到供应商和零售商都倾向于影响零售商向供应商支付的批发市场价格。但是，现有的供应链竞争模型不能捕获零售商对批发价格的影响（即购买力），并表明批发价格和每个零售商的订购数量不会随着零售商数量的变化而变化。为了克服这一限制，我们基于市场博弈机制开发了一种竞争模型，其中批发价格是根据供应商和零售商的决定来确定的。考虑零售商的购买力时，我们得出的结果与观察到的做法是一致的：随着零售商数量的增加，每个零售商的购买力都会降低，并且每个零售商都愿意为自己的订单支付更多的费用，因此批发价增加。在这种情况下，就供应链效率而言，扩大供应链以包括更多的零售商（或供应商），这比现有文献中未考虑买方力量的情况更为有利。最后，我们分析了两个本地供应链的整合，结果表明，尽管整合的供应链的利润大于本地供应链的总利润之和，但整合可能会降低面向零售商的供应链中企业的总利润零售商比供应商更多。

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers' influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers' and retailers' decisions. When taking into account retailers' buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer's buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers.

文章来源：Korpeoglu, C. G., et al. (2020). "Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach." Management Science 66(12): 18.

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