刊讯｜SSCI 期刊《心智与语言》2022年第3-5期

Mind & Language

Volume 37, Issue 3-5, 2022

Mind & Language（SSCI一区，2021 IF：1.938）2022年第3-5期共刊文42篇，欢迎转发扩散！

2022年第3期共发文11篇，论文涉及自闭症、主动推理、空间表征等；2022年第4期共发文15篇，论文涉及时间感知、语境、孤独知觉等；2022年第5期共发文16篇，论文涉及识别与感知、色盲、参照、人际信任等。（2022年已更完）

往期推荐：

目录

Issue 3

■ Cumulative culture and complex cultural traditions, by Andrew Buskell, Pages 284-303.

■Semantics without semantic content, by Daniel W. Harris, Pages 304-328.

■ Against neuroclassicism: On the perils of armchair neuroscience, by Alex Morgan, Pages 329-355.

■Self-consciousness in autism: A third-person perspective on the self, by Sarah Arnaud, Pages 356-372.

■ Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls, by Axel Constant, Andy Clark, Michael Kirchhoff, Karl J. Friston, Pages 373-394.

■Rainbow's end: The structure, character, and content of conscious experience, by Brandon Ashby, Pages 395-413.

■That-clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudes, by Robert J. Matthews, Pages 414-431.

■Can the mind wander intentionally? by Samuel Murray, Kristina Krasich, Pages 432-443.

■ A tribal mind: Beliefs that signal group identity or commitment, by Eric Funkhouser, Pages 444-464.

■ Enhancing thoughts: Culture, technology, and the evolution of human cognitive uniqueness, by Armin W. Schulz, Pages 465-484.

■ Spatial representations in sensory modalities, by Tony Cheng, Pages 485-500.

Issue 4

■ Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me, by Francesca Bonalumi, John Michael, Christophe Heintz, Pages 502-524.

■ Normative folk psychology and decision theory, by Joe Dewhurst, Christopher Burr, Pages 525-542.

■ Context as knowledge, by Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes, Andreas Stokke, Pages 543-563.

■Normative inferentialism on linguistic understanding, by Matej Drobňák, Pages 564-585.

■ The theory theory of metalinguistic disputes, by Erich Rast, Pages 586-604.

■ Weak neo-Whorfianism and the philosophy of time, by Heather Dyke, Pages 605-618.

■ Experiential holism in time, by Philippe Chuard, Pages 619-637.

■ The perceived unity of time, by Gerardo Viera, Pages 638-658.

■Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory, by Richard Heersmink, Pages 659-673.

■ Do we see facts? by Alfredo Vernazzani, Pages 674-693.

■ Representing shape in sight and touch, by E. J. Green, Pages 694-714.

■ Spatial experience and olfaction: A role for naïve topology, by Bartek Chomanski, Pages 715-733.

■ Solipsistic sentience, by Jordan C. V. Taylor, Pages 734-750.

■ How we got stuck: The origins of hierarchy and inequality, by Jonathan Birch, Andrew Buskell, Pages 751-759.

■Further thoughts on hierarchy and inequality, by Kim Sterelny, Pages 760-768.

Issue 5

■ Recognition and the perception–cognition divide, by Greyson Abid, Pages 770-789.

■ Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher-order theories of consciousness, by Benjamin Kozuch, Pages 790-813.

■ What is it like to be colour-blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience, by Keith Allen, Philip Quinlan, James Andow, Eugen Fischer, by Pages 814-839.

■ A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness, by Matthias Michel, Adrien Doerig, Pages 840-855.

■ Speaker's reference, semantic reference, sneaky reference, by Eliot Michaelson, Pages 856-875.

■ Going on as one ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the normativity of meaning, by Hannah Ginsborg, Pages 876-892.

■ Determiners are phrases, by Francesco Pupa, Pages 893-913.

■ Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics, by Andrew Peet, Pages 914-932.

■ Missing persons: Young children's talk about absent members of their social network, by Qianru Tiffany Yang, Kathryn A. Leech, Paul L. Harris, Pages 933-954.

■ Interpersonal trust in children's testimonial learning, by Melissa A. Koenig, Pearl Han Li, Benjamin McMyler, Pages 955-974.

■ Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children, by Uwe Peters, Pages 975-992.

■ Disgust and the logic of contamination: Biology, culture, and the evolution of norm (over)compliance, by Isaac Wiegman, Bob Fischer, Pages 993-1010.

■ Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities, by Daniel Williams, Pages 1011-1029.

■ Entitativity and implicit measures of social cognition, by Ben Phillips, Pages 1030-1047.

■ Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science, by Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Pages 1048-1066.

■ Experiments on causal exclusion, by Thomas Blanchard, Dylan Murray, Tania Lombrozo, Pages 1067-1089.

摘要

Cumulative culture and complex cultural traditions

Andrew Buskell, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Abstract Cumulative cultural evolution is often claimed to be distinctive of human culture. Such claims are typically supported with examples of complex and historically late-appearing technologies. Yet by taking these as paradigm cases, researchers unhelpfully lump together different ways that culture accumulates. This article has two aims: (a) to distinguish four types of cultural accumulation: adaptiveness, complexity, efficiency, and disparity and (b) to highlight the epistemic implications of taking complex hominin technologies as paradigmatic instances of cumulative culture. Addressing these issues both clarifies the cumulative culture concept and demonstrates the importance of further cumulative culture research into non-human animals and ancestral hominins.

Key words comparative cognition, cultural evolution, cumulative culture, hominin cognitive evolution

Semantics without semantic content

Daniel W. Harris, Department of Philosophy, Hunter College, CUNY, New York City, New York, USA

Abstract I argue that semantics is the study of the proprietary database of a centrally inaccessible and informationally encapsulated input–output system. This system's role is to encode and decode partial and defeasible evidence of what speakers are saying. Since information about nonlinguistic context is therefore outside the purview of semantic processing, a sentence's semantic value is not its content but a partial and defeasible constraint on what it can be used to say. I show how to translate this thesis into a detailed compositional-semantic theory based on the influential framework of Heim and Kratzer. This approach situates semantics within an independently motivated account of human cognitive architecture and reveals the semantics–pragmatics interface to be grounded in the underlying interface between modular and central systems.

Key words cognitive architecture, compositional semantics, constraint semantics, modularity, semantic values

Against neuroclassicism: On the perils of armchair neuroscience

Alex Morgan, Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA

Abstract Neuroclassicism is the view that cognition is explained by “classical” computing mechanisms in the nervous system that exhibit a clear demarcation between processing machinery and read–write memory. The psychologist C. R. Gallistel has mounted a sophisticated defense of neuroclassicism by drawing from ethology and computability theory to argue that animal brains necessarily contain read–write memory mechanisms. This argument threatens to undermine the “connectionist” orthodoxy in contemporary neuroscience, which does not seem to recognize any such mechanisms. In this paper I argue that the neuroclassicist critique rests on a misunderstanding of how computability theory constrains theorizing about natural computing mechanisms.

Key words computational theory of mind, connectionism, mechanistic explanation, memory, neural computation, theory of computation

Self-consciousness in autism: A third-person perspective on the self

Sarah Arnaud, Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Abstract This paper suggests that autistic people relate to themselves via a third-person perspective, an objective and explicit mode of access, while neurotypical people tend to access the different dimensions of their self through a first-person perspective. This approach sheds light on autistic traits involving interactions with others, usage of narratives, sensitivity and interoception, and emotional consciousness. Autistic people seem to access these dimensions through comparatively indirect and effortful processes, while neurotypical development enables a more intuitive sense of self.

Key words autism, emotions, interoception, narrative self, self-consciousness, social interactions

Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls

Axel Constant, Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK

Andy Clark, Department of Philosophy, The University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Department of Informatics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Michael Kirchhoff, Department of Philosophy, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

Karl J. Friston, Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Abstract Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause–effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e., generative) models of the world optimized by standard cognitive functions (e.g., perception, action, learning). This paper presents an active inference formulation that views cognitive niche construction as a cognitive function aimed at optimizing organisms' generative models. We call that process of optimization extended active inference.

Key words active inference, affordances, cognitive niche construction, ecological psychology, extended mind, predictive processing

Rainbow's end: The structure, character, and content of conscious experience

Brandon Ashby, Philosophy Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

Abstract Separatism, representationalism, and phenomenal intentionalism are the primary views on the relationship between the phenomenality and intentionality of experience. I defend a novel position that is incompatible with separatism, can enrich representationalism and phenomenal intentionalism, but can also be accepted independently of those views. I call it phenomenal schematics: The phenomenal characters of our experiences have structures that place a priori, formal, and sometimes semantic constraints on our experience's possible intentional contents. Phenomenal structures are like the grammar of a language (or the compositional rules governing maps, models, and diagrams). Unlike words, however, phenomenal characters possess their “grammatical properties” essentially.

Key words experiential content, phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal schematics, phenomenal structure, representationalism, separatism

That-clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudes

Robert J. Matthews, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA

Abstract Propositional relationalists about the attitudes claim to find support for their view in what they assume to be the dyadic relational logical form of the predicates by which we canonically attribute propositional attitudes. In this paper I argue that the considerations that they adduce in support of this assumption, specifically for the assumption that the that-clauses that figure in these predicates are singular terms, are suspect on linguistic grounds. Propositional relationalism may nonetheless be true, but the logical form of attitude predicates provides no grounds for thinking this to be so.

Key words belief, belief predicates, propositional attitude predicates, propositional attitudes, propositional relationalism, that-clauses

Can the mind wander intentionally?

Samuel Murray, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North California, USA

Kristina Krasich, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North California, USA

Abstract Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering.

Key words cognitive psychology, intentional action, mind wandering, task switching, task-unrelated thought

A tribal mind: Beliefs that signal group identity or commitment

Eric Funkhouser, Philosophy Department, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, USA

Abstract People are biased toward beliefs that are welcomed by their in-group. Some beliefs produced by these biases—such as climate change denial and religious belief—can be fruitfully modeled by signaling theory. The idea is that the beliefs function so as to be detected by others and manipulate their behavior, primarily for the benefits that accrue from favorable tribal self-presentation. Signaling theory can explain the etiology, distinctive form, proper function, and alterability of these beliefs.

Key words belief, climate change denial, cooperation, group identity, religious belief, signaling

Enhancing thoughts: Culture, technology, and the evolution of human cognitive uniqueness

Armin W. Schulz, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA

Abstract Three facts are widely thought to be key to the characterization of human cognitive uniqueness (though a number of other factors are often cited as well): (a) humans are sophisticated cultural learners; (b) humans often rely on mental states with rich representational contents; and (c) humans have the ability and disposition to make and use tools. This article argues that (a)–(c) create a positive feedback loop: Sophisticated cultural learning makes possible the manufacture of tools that increase the sophistication of representational decision-making, which in turn allows for yet further increases in the sophistication of cultural learning and tool manufacture.

Key words cultural learning, evolutionary psychology, human uniqueness, mental representation, situated cognition, tool use

Spatial representations in sensory modalities

Tony Cheng, Department of Philosophy/Research Center for Mind, Brain and Learning, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract Some sensory modalities, such as sight, touch and audition, are arguably spatial, and one way to understand these spatial senses is to investigate spatial representations in them. Here I focus on a specific element in this area—the interplay between perspectival variation and spatial constancy—and discuss recent interdisciplinary works on this topic. With these relevant experimental works, we will see clearly how traditional controversies in philosophy, for example, whether we perceive perspectival shapes as well as objective shapes, and whether any sensory field should be postulated in senses other than vision, can benefit from considerations in empirical sciences.

Key words Molyneux's question, perspectival variation, perspectivalism, sensory modalities, spatial constancy, spatial representations, tactile fields

Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me

Francesca Bonalumi, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

John Michael, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary; Division of Psychology, University of Stirling & Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, HungaryChristophe Heintz, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

Abstract Can commitments be generated without promises or gestures conventionally interpreted as such? We hypothesized that people believe that commitments are in place when one agent has led a recipient to rely on her to do something, even without a commissive speech act or any action conventionalized as such, and this is mutual knowledge. To probe this, we presented participants with online vignettes describing everyday situations in which a recipient's expectations were frustrated by one's behavior. Our results show that moral judgments differed significantly according to whether the recipient's reliance was mutually known, irrespective of whether this was verbally acknowledged.

Key words commitment, expectations, moral judgment, mutual knowledge, reliance

Normative folk psychology and decision theory

Joe Dewhurst, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Bayern, Germany

Christopher Burr, The Alan Turing Institute, London, UK

Abstract Our aim in this paper is to explore two possible directions of interaction between normative folk psychology and decision theory. In one direction, folk psychology plays a regulative role that constrains practical decision-making. In the other direction, decision theory provides novel tools and norms that shape folk psychology. We argue that these interactions could lead to the emergence of an iterative “decision theoretic spiral," where folk psychology influences decision-making, decision-making is studied by decision theory, and decision theory influences folk psychology. Understanding these interactions is important both for the theoretical study of social cognition and decision theory, and also for thinking about how to implement practical interventions into real-world decision-making.

Key words decision theory, folk psychology, normative

Context as knowledge

Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes, Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden

Andreas Stokke, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communication.

Key words common ground, context, demonstratives, indexicals, knowledge

Normative inferentialism on linguistic understanding

Matej Drobňák, Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czechia

Abstract The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context-dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.

Key words linguistic understanding, normative inferentialism, overspecification account of meaning, polysemy, pragmatics

The theory theory of metalinguistic disputes

Erich Rast, Nova Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

Abstract According to the theory theory of metalinguistic disputes, disagreements in metalinguistic disputes are based on diverging underlying theories, opinions, or world views. An adequate description of metalinguistic disagreement needs to consider the compatibility and topics of such theories. Although topic continuity can be spelled out in terms of measurement operations, it is argued that even metalinguistic disputes about a term used in different, mutually compatible theories can be substantive because the dispute is indirectly about the virtues of the underlying theories. The account is defended against externalist and holist objections.

Key words adequacy of definition, metalinguistic negotiations, theoretical virtues, theory comparison, theory-contextualism, verbal disputes

Weak neo-Whorfianism and the philosophy of time

Heather Dyke, Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

Abstract According to a thesis I call the linguistic assumption, the structure of language is a guide to the fundamental nature of reality. It is deployed in the metaphysical debate over the nature of time. In that debate, it is more radical than the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, and should be rejected. A weak interpretation of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis makes the empirical claim that speakers of different languages experience, perceive, or think about aspects of the world differently. I survey recent experimental evidence that supports this hypothesis which, I argue, gives us further reason to reject the linguistic assumption.

Key words A-theory, B-theory, linguistic relativity, time, Whorf

Experiential holism in time

Philippe Chuard, Philosophy Department, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas

Abstract Temporally extended experiences, experiential holists have it, are not reducible to successions of their temporal parts because some whole experiences determine their parts (in some way). This paper suggests, first, that some forms of experiential holism are in fact consistent with the rival atomist view (that experiences are successions of their parts) and, second, that the main reasons advanced for experiential holism are compatible with atomism too. The paper then looks at how holistic determination of its parts by a whole experience might take place in time, arguing that it is either inconsistent or undermines widespread assumptions regarding the mechanisms underlying experiences.

Key words atomism, Gestalten, holism, mereology of experience, structure of consciousness in time, temporal experience

The perceived unity of time

Gerardo Viera, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

Abstract While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time.

Key words format of representation, mental representation, multimodal perception, sensory integration, temporal perception

Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory

Richard Heersmink, Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

Abstract In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed.

Key words autobiographical memory, cognitive integration, distributed memory, evocative objects, extended mind

Do we see facts?

Alfredo Vernazzani, Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, Bochum, 44780 Germany

Abstract Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.

Key words binding problem, facts, metaphysics of perception, object perception, seeing, sensory individuals

Representing shape in sight and touch

E. J. Green, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Abstract We represent shape in both sight and touch, but how do these abilities relate to one another? This issue has been discussed in the context of Molyneux's question of whether someone born blind could, upon being granted sight, identify shapes visually. Some have suggested that we might look to real-world cases of sight restoration to illuminate the relation between visual and tactual shape representations. Here, I argue that newly sighted perceivers should not be relied on in this way because they are unlikely to form the kinds of shape representations responsible for cross-modal recognition in normally sighted perceivers. I then argue that the available evidence makes a compelling case for the type identity view, on which the visual and tactual representations responsible for cross-modal recognition are type-identical.

Key words multisensory perception, Molyneux's question, perception, shape perception, tactile perception

Spatial experience and olfaction: A role for naïve topology

Bartek Chomanski, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

Abstract In this paper, I provide an account of the spatiality of olfactory experiences in terms of topological properties. I argue that thinking of olfactory experiences as making the subject aware of topological properties enables us to address popular objections against the spatiality of smells, and it makes sense of everyday spatial olfactory phenomenology better than its competitors. I argue for this latter claim on the basis of reflection on thought experiments familiar from the philosophical literature on olfaction, as well as on the basis of some empirical data about the localization of smells. I conclude by suggesting how the naïve-topology framework could be applied in debates about the spatiality of other types of experiences.

Key words naïve topology, olfactory experience, spatial experience, spatial representation

Solipsistic sentience

Jordan C. V. Taylor, Marks Family Center for Excellence in Writing, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Abstract This article examines the nature of affective states across biological taxa. It argues that affect constitutes a primary form of consciousness. Creatures capable of affect are sentient of their bodily states and can behave in ways intended to maintain or restore them to a homeostatic range. After reviewing and critiquing neurobiological and philosophical theories of the evolution of consciousness, this article argues that some possible creatures are limited to self-directed affective states, even if those creatures are capable of exteroception. Such creatures enjoy solipsistic sentience: awareness of their own selves and bodily demands, but unawareness of their exogenous environments.

Key words affect, exteroception, interoception, perception, phenomenal consciousness, solipsistic sentience

How we got stuck: The origins of hierarchy and inequality

Jonathan Birch, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Andrew Buskell, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Abstract Kim Sterelny's book The Pleistocene social contract provides an exceptionally well-informed and credible narrative explanation of the origins of inequality and hierarchy. In this essay review, we reflect on the role of rational choice theory in Sterelny's project, before turning to Sterelny's reasons for doubting the importance of cultural group selection. In the final section, we compare Sterelny's big picture with an alternative from David Wengrow and David Graeber.

Key words cooperation, culture, hierarchy, human evolution, inequality

Further thoughts on hierarchy and inequality

Kim Sterelny, School of Philosophy, Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia

Abstract This paper responds to Birch and Buskell's thoughtful critique. In it, I defend my use of behavioural ecology. I argue, contra Birch and Buskell, that I can give a principled defence of the emergence of conventions for respecting property, modelling as a network of pairwise iterated PDs between incipient farmers. Second, I defend my scepticism about the power of cultural group selection to optimise community normative packages. Finally, I located my views, as requested, against those of The dawn of everything. I argue that the more complex “original position” envisaged in Dawn depends on special conditions rarely found on Pleistocene Africa.

Key words constraints on cultural group selection, Dawn of everything, human behavioural ecology, origins of property norms

Recognition and the perception–cognition divide

Greyson Abid, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, California

Abstract Recent discussions have fixated on the distinction between perception and cognition. How should recognition be understood in light of this distinction? The relevant sense of recognition involves a sensitivity to particulars from one's past. Recognizing the face of a familiar friend is one instance of this phenomenon, as is recognizing an object or place that one has viewed before. In this article, I argue that recognition is an interface capacity that straddles the border between perception and cognition.

Key words recognition, dual aspect perception, familiarity, informational encapsulation, long-term memory, perception–cognition divide

Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher-order theories of consciousness

Benjamin Kozuch, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama

Abstract Proponents of the higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state-producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the studies to which HO theorists appeal. The article also develops an apparatus that can be used to evaluate whether other lesion evidence confirms or disconfirms HO theory.

Key words brain lesions, consciousness, higher-order theories of consciousness, prefrontal cortex, vision

What is it like to be colour-blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience

Keith Allen, Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, UK

Philip Quinlan, Department of Psychology, University of York, York, UK

James Andow, School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

Eugen Fischer, School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

Abstract What is the experience of someone who is “colour-blind” like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of a variety of coloured stimuli, both with and without EnChroma glasses—glasses which, the manufacturers claim, enhance the experience of people with common forms of colour blindness. More generally, the paper provides a case study in the nascent field of experimental philosophy of experience.

Key words colour, colour blindness, EnChroma, experimental philosophy (x-phi), perception, qualitative methods

A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness

Matthias Michel, Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium; Mind, Brain and Consciousness Center, New York University, New York, New York, USA

Adrien Doerig, Laboratory of Psychophysics, Brain Mind Institute, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

Abstract Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, localists cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that they cannot report. We also discuss alternative explanations that localists could offer.

Key words consciousness, local recurrence theory, neural correlates of consciousness, postdiction, theories of consciousness

Speaker's reference, semantic reference, sneaky reference

Eliot Michaelson, Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK

Abstract According to what is perhaps the dominant picture of reference, what a referential term refers to in a context is determined by what the speaker intends for her audience to identify as the referent. I argue that this sort of broadly Gricean view entails, counterintuitively, that it is impossible to knowingly use referential terms in ways that one expects or intends to be misunderstood. Then I sketch an alternative which can better account for such opaque uses of language, or what I call “sneaky reference.” I close by reflecting on the ramifications of these arguments for the theory of meaning more broadly.

Key words demonstratives, meaning, names, reference ,speaker's meaning

Going on as one ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the normativity of meaning

Hannah Ginsborg, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California

Abstract Kripke's thesis that meaning is normative is typically interpreted, following Boghossian, as the thesis that meaningful expressions allow of true or warranted use. I argue for an alternative interpretation centered on Wittgenstein's conception of the normativity involved in “knowing how to go on” in one's use of an expression. Meaning is normative for Kripke because it justifies claims, not to be saying something true, but to be going on as one ought from previous uses of the expression. I argue that this represents a distortion of Wittgenstein's conception of the normativity of meaning, and that Wittgenstein's conception is preferable.

Key words Boghossian, Kripke, meaning, normativity, rule-following, Wittgenstein

Determiners are phrases

Francesco Pupa, Nassau Community College, Garden City, New York

Abstract It is generally thought that definite determiners exclusively mark nouns as definite. In several languages, however, definite determiners may modify both nouns and verbs. As I will argue, the existence of these “multi-functional” elements suggests that determiners are in fact phrases. This syntactic move has a philosophical payoff. Among other things, it allows us to cast Donnellan's distinction as an ordinary consequence of the context-invariant compositional semantics of natural language, not as a matter of contextual manipulation or lexical ambiguity. Multi-functional determiners show us that Donnellan's distinction is, contra Donnellan, a matter of grammar.

Key words categorical specification, definite descriptions, Donnellan's distinction, event determiners, multi-functionality

Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics

Andrew Peet, The School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Abstract I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? I answer the first question by developing a novel responsibility based metasemantics. I answer the second by reference to the conflicting pressures governing the resources we have available for appraising speech.

Key words assertion, commitment, communication, content, context sensitivity, metasemantics

Missing persons: Young children's talk about absent members of their social network

Qianru Tiffany Yang, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Kathryn A. Leech, School of Education, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

Paul L. Harris, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Abstract Little is known about young children's ability to talk about absent members of their social network. We analyzed the speech of four children from 2 to 5 years. References to absent caregivers were relatively frequent, even when children were 2 years old. Such references were often generated spontaneously rather than being repetitions of a name produced by the child's interlocutor. Children's comments about absent family members occasionally expressed concern about contact with them but were predominantly neutral or reflective. By implication, children can maintain a representation of the various members of their social network from an early age, despite separation.

Key words absent persons, displaced speech, social network

Interpersonal trust in children's testimonial learning

Melissa A. Koenig, Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Pearl Han Li, Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Benjamin McMyler, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Abstract Within the growing developmental literature on children's testimonial learning, the emphasis placed on children's evaluations of testimonial evidence has shielded from view some of the more collaborative dimensions of testimonial learning. Drawing on recent philosophical work on testimony and interpersonal trust, we argue for an alternative way of conceptualizing the social nature of testimonial learning. On this alternative, some testimonial learning is the result of a jointly collaborative epistemic activity, an activity that aims at the epistemic goal of true belief, but that does so by means of an irreducibly social process.

Key words epistemic trust, interpersonal trust, shared intentionality, social learning, testimony

Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children

Uwe Peters, Center for Science and Thought, University of Bonn, Germany; Department of Psychology, King's College London, London; Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, UK

Abstract an young children such as 3-year-olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists—such as Perner and Tomasello—assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3-year-olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual constancy, I provide a response to this objection and motivate a distinction between three different kinds of objectivity. This distinction helps advance current research on both objectivity and teleological action explanations in young children.

Key words development, objectivity, perceptual, constancy representation, teleology

Disgust and the logic of contamination: Biology, culture, and the evolution of norm (over)compliance

Isaac Wiegman, Department of Philosophy, Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas

Bob Fischer, Department of Philosophy, Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas

Abstract Many people feel compelled to disassociate themselves from wrongdoing. We call judgments to the effect “disassociation intuitions.” Do disassociation intuitions have a common cause? Why do they seem so obvious and resistant to countervailing reasons? How did they become so widespread? Here, we argue that disassociation intuitions are a natural product of gene-culture co-evolution. We also consider the mechanism that gene-culture co-evolution employed to achieve this result, arguing that a plausible candidate is disgust and its cultural echoes. This theory of disassociation intuitions suggests a promising research program in the philosophy of psychology, which provides new ways of thinking about higher cognitive emotions, and biologically constrained cognitive capacities generally.

Key words consumer ethics, cultural evolution, disassociation intuitions, disgust, gene-culture co-evolution, norm psychology

Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities

Daniel Williams, Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Abstract Why do well-functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game-theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be used to distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs.

Key words absurd belief, irrationality, motivated reasoning, self-deception, signalling ,socially adaptive belief

Entitativity and implicit measures of social cognition

Ben Phillips, School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona

Abstract I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank versus a tight-knit group of friends: The latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by arguing that entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. I then argue that recognizing this modulatory role will help researchers to address concerns surrounding the validity and reliability of implicit measures.

Key words entitativity, implicit bias, implicit measures, racial bias, stereotyping

Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science

Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Exzellenzcluster Science of Intelligence & Berlin School of Mind and Brain & Institut für Philosophie, Berlin, Germany

Abstract Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, while keeping allegiance to realism.

Key words cognitive representation, deflationary realism, idealization, indeterminacy of content, naturalising intentionality, scientific models

Experiments on causal exclusion

Thomas Blanchard, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany

Dylan Murray, University of California, Berkeley

Tania Lombrozo, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Abstract Intuitions play an important role in the debate on the causal status of high-level properties. For instance, Kim has claimed that his “exclusion argument” relies on “a perfectly intuitive … understanding of the causal relation.” We report the results of three experiments examining whether laypeople really have the relevant intuitions. We find little support for Kim's view and the principles on which it relies. Instead, we find that laypeople are willing to count both a multiply realized property and its realizers as causes, and regard the systematic overdetermination implied by this view as unproblematic.

Key words causation, exclusion problem, experimental philosophy, multiple realization, proportionality

期刊简介

The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.

目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language 以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。

It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.

它是一个重要的论坛，学者可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。

官网地址：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14680017

本文来源：Mind & Language官网

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