吴士存：中美应为双边关系划定一条底线
回顾建交40多年来中美关系的跌宕起伏，美国对中国的认知和心态始终是一个有迹可循的线索。改革开放以来中国人民生活水平稳步并且显著提高，美国最初忽视了这一点，但随着中国军事实力和经济实力的进一步增强，尤其是在美国遭受2008年金融危机重创之后，美国政府再也无法将中国置于其政策的次要位置。
美国2011年提出“重返亚太”以及后续的“亚太再平衡”战略，2017年进一步发展成为“印太战略”。无论名字如何变迁，本质上都是针对中国，都是为牵制或遏制中国发展。
美国和一些欧洲国家正试图按照意识形态重新定义与中国的关系。这是因为西方不接受或仍然对一个非西方国家的崛起感到不安。这里的“西方”是指美国及其盟友和伙伴。本质上讲，它不是基于历史或种族的国家集团，而是一种意识形态标签，因为它包括像日本这样的国家。总的来说，它们视中国为意识形态的“他者”，并试图通过贬低和削弱中国来证明自己的价值观更优越。
美国战略重心东移并提出从“重返亚太”到现在“印太战略”的部分理由，就是美国一些政治精英口中的应对中国军事崛起。而这所谓的“军事崛起”，实际只是伴随经济和国家的发展而相应提高的军事能力。
一些西方国家习惯了一个“打不还手、骂不还口”的中国，对中国在国际舞台上从经济、技术进步到社会发展、军事实力增强等各个方面的影响力增强感到“不舒服、不适应”。但从世界历史发展及当前国际体系演变趋势来看，中国适度发展军事力量不仅有其内在逻辑而且十分必要。
世界全球化程度越高，对全球公共产品的需求就越大。这包括海上航道安全，以及人、财、物免受恐怖主义威胁。大国必须担负提供这种全球公共服务的责任，这样包括它们自己在内的所有国家都能受益。作为世界第二大经济体和联合国安理会常任理事国，中国理应成为一个能够提供全球公共服务的负责任大国。
国际上对中国军力的发展有两种反应。一种是西方国家根据自身经验和逻辑，将“国强必霸”的帽子扣到中国头上，夸大其词、故意渲染中国军力，认为中国军力发展必然导致对外扩张。另一种是出于各种原因难以接受中国的崛起和军力发展。它们寻找一切机会宣扬“来自中国的威胁”，并鼓动进行破坏性对抗的政治意愿。
可以预见，这两种情况在一定时期内还将继续存在，我们不能奢望整个国际社会都对中国综合实力也包括军力的发展叫好甚至感到欣喜。
现实情况是，中国的军事实力与美国相比仍有巨大差距。指责中国在国际上构成所谓“威胁”的声音忽视了这样一个事实：中国的军费支出占GDP的比重低于世界平均水平，与美国也差距甚大。西方没有理由担心中国的军力发展。
中国永远不会寻求挑战西方，也不希望世界因意识形态而分裂。中国无意事实上也无法取代美国在全球的重要作用，美国也无法阻止或扼杀中国的发展。因此，中美共存是历史的必然，也是宿命，不论中国还是美国都无法选择，只能接受和面对。
在我们拥有能够毁灭全人类而且技术越来越精湛的核武器的今天，老牌大国和新兴大国之间爆发以阻止对方崛起或试图消灭对方为目的的全面战争是难以想象的。在一个比以往任何时候都更加全球化的世界里，即使是一场重大的非核战争，对每个国家甚至旁观者来说都是一场灾难。
因此，中美需要从历史中汲取如何相处的教训，设法为双边关系划定一个底线或制定共同行为准则。必须确保无论两者之间的竞争变得多么激烈，都不会再次发生大的悲剧。为此，美国应该尊重中国基于自己独特道路的社会制度和主权、安全、发展的合理利益诉求。同时，作为正在崛起的新兴大国，中国应该进一步学会如何成为国际公共产品的提供者，同时认识到，随着其全球地位的变化，中国也需要调整自身的国际姿态。
中美两国可以竞争，但不应仅以此来定义两国关系。1979年中美建交以来的短暂历史告诫我们，“合作与包容”而非“竞争与对抗”才是中美交往的应有之道。现在需要两国拿出真正的智慧，为中美和整个世界的发展确定前进道路。
中文首发于2021年9月6日环球网
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China and the US must find ways to get along, no matter how fierce the competition
Since the implementation of its “reform and opening up”, China has overseen a spectacular rise in the living standards of its citizens.
This was initially overlooked by the United States. But as Chinese military power and economic strength increased, and especially after the US suffered a major setback in the form of the 2008 financial crisis, it could no longer put China on the policy back burner.
In this context, the US proposed the “pivot to Asia” in 2011 which evolved into the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017. Both the Asia-Pacific strategy and the Indo-Pacific strategy, which are essentially aimed at China, fit into America’s broader strategy to contain China’s development.
The US and some European countries are trying to redefine their relationship with China along ideological lines. This is because the West does not accept, or remains uncomfortable with, the rise of a non-Western country.
“The West” here refers to the US and its allies and partners. It is not, in essence, a historical or ethnically based grouping of nations. It is an ideological labelling, as it includes countries such as Japan. Collectively, they view China as the ideological “other” and seek to diminish it to prove that their own values are superior.
Part of the justification the US provides for its pivot to Asia is China’s military rise, which is actually just an improvement of military capacity, in tandem with a growing economy and country.
It appears that some in the West are used to a China that does not strike back, or have not come to terms with China’s new-found influence on the international stage on every front, from the economy and technological advancement to social progress and an increase in its military strength.
In fact, given the current trends in the evolution of the international system, the development of China’s military power is not only logical but absolutely necessary. The more the world becomes globalised, the greater the demand for global public goods becomes. This includes the security of sea lanes and protection of people, property and goods from the threat of terrorism.
Major powers must assume responsibility for providing such global public services so that all nations, including themselves, can benefit. As the world’s second-largest economy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China should become a responsible power capable of providing global public services.
There are two kinds of response to China’s military development. Some Western countries claim China will seek hegemony when it becomes stronger. They hype up China’s military power in the belief that its military development will inevitably lead to external expansion. While based on incorrect assumptions, those who hold this view are at least acting in good faith.
Other voices simply find it difficult to accept China’s rise and military development for various reasons. They look for every opportunity to proclaim the “threat from China” and drum up political will for a destructive confrontation.
These two responses are probably here to stay. It is unreasonable to expect that, one day, the entire international community will applaud China’s military development.
China’s military power is still not comparable to that of the US. China’s defence budget in 2018 was 1.1 trillion yuan (US$170 billion). Voices arguing that China poses a threat internationally ignore that the ratio of China’s military spending to its GDP is below the world average and lower than that of the US. There is no reason for the West to be concerned about China’s military.
China will never seek to challenge the West. However, should its success as a country that does not share the same values pose a challenge to the West, there is nothing China can or should reasonably be expected to do. China is not a superpower and does not wish for the world to be divided by ideology.
China has no intention to, and in fact cannot, replace the important global role the US plays but, at the same time, the US cannot stop China’s development. Therefore, it is inevitable that China and the US will coexist. Both need to come to grips with this reality in their own ways.
Today, when there are nuclear weapons with increasingly sophisticated technology capable of destroying all of humanity, it is hard to imagine an all-out war between the established and emerging powers. In a world that is more globalised than ever, even a major non-nuclear war would be a catastrophe for every country, even bystanders.
Therefore, China and the US need to learn from the lessons of history on how to get along and find ways to define a baseline or common code of conduct for bilateral relations. They must ensure that, no matter how fierce the competition between the two becomes, a seminal tragedy will not occur again.
To do this, the US needs to respect China’s social institutions, interests and aspirations for sovereignty, security and development based on their own unique pathways. At the same time, China should learn how to become a provider of international public goods while understanding that, as its global position changes, it must make adjustments to its international posture.
China and the US can compete, but their relations cannot be defined by competition alone. The short history since the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1979 reminds us that cooperation and accommodation, rather than competition and confrontation, is the way forwards for normal interactions between the two nations.
The time calls for true wisdom from leaders of both countries to determine the way forwards for them and the entire world.
Wu Shicun is president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies and a China Forum Expert
英文首发于2021年9月2日《南华早报》
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