CSSCI前沿《外国经济与管理》2022年第3期三篇会计与财务类文章

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本期推文成员

跟踪：张雪纯 长春工业大学 大二

审核：邱品駪 台湾大学 研二

编辑：刘静侠 吉林工商学院  大三

监制：王建洋 长春工业大学 大二

策划：徐晓东 吉林财经大学 研一

# 《外国经济与管理》简介#

《外国经济与管理》创刊于1979年，由上海财经大学主办，主要发表反映管理学各领域（包括战略、组织行为、人力资源管理、营销、创业创新、公司治理、公司财务、跨国经营、东方管理等）前沿和热点的综述性评论文章，也发表具有原创性的理论研究、实证研究、案例研究成果。《外国经济与管理》是中国人文社会科学期刊经济学类核心期刊、北京大学、南京大学中文社会科学引文索引CSSCI来源期刊，曾获得 “上海社科期刊编校质量”优良奖，入选全国高校百强社科期刊、中国国际影响力优秀学术期刊。

《外国经济与管理》

2022年第03期

目录

特刊•数智化时代中国企业营销战略研究

◾服务机器人拟人化对消费者使用意愿的影响机理研究——社会阶层的调节作用

张仪、王永贵

◾服务智能化下的顾客行为：研究述评与展望

杜建刚、赵欢、苏九如、张宇          

◾数字经济视域下的产消者：研究述评与展望

项典典、包莹、焦冠哲              

◾明星代言还是主播“场外代言”？——两种代言类型对购买意愿的影响机制研究

韩召、杜刚、熊爱华、张涵

公司财务

◾并购双方CEO的老乡关系与并购行为

晏国菀、罗贝贝、陈帅弟、谢翊璇        

◾会计师事务所声誉损失与业绩预告质量——基于监管处罚的经验证据

毛志宏、李燕、金龙

公司治理

◾董事高管责任保险促进企业创新吗？——基于信贷寻租与融资约束的视角

赵国宇、梁慧萍

创业研究

◾竞合战略、双元能力与数字化新创企业成长

郭润萍、尹昊博、陆鹏  

◾什么样的高管团队能够做出商业模式创新？

韩炜、高宇

摘要与关键词

1.并购双方CEO的老乡关系与并购行为

Merger and Acquisition Behavior and Fellow-townsman Relationship between the CEOs of both Sides in Merger

作者（中）：晏国菀1, 罗贝贝1, 陈帅弟2, 谢翊璇3

作者（英）：Yan Guowan1, Luo Beibei1, Chen Shuaidi2, Xie Yixuan3

作者单位：1.重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院，重庆 400030 2.浙江大学 管理学院，浙江 杭州 310058 3.中石化广州工程有限公司 财务部，广东 广州 510630

摘要：本文以2009—2018年中国沪深A股上市公司并购事件为样本，考察了并购双方CEO的老乡关系对并购活动的影响。研究发现：当并购双方CEO为老乡时，并购事件和并购金额显著增加，且主并方CEO的家乡亲密度越高，并购活动中的老乡倾向越强。从主并方异质性的影响看，主并方为非国有企业、市值较低时老乡并购倾向更强；在产业结构转型背景下，相对于非战略性新兴产业企业，主并方对战略性新兴产业企业并购中的老乡倾向更强。进一步研究揭示，公司治理水平较低时，主并方表现出更强的CEO老乡并购倾向，代理问题在老乡并购中起主导作用；老乡并购虽然能使股东获得短期超额收益，但从长期来看，不能为主并方带来协同效应。研究结论深化了对并购交易中社会关系及其影响的理解，为监管部门和投资人更好地认识和监督管理层代理问题提供参考。

Summary: Mergers and acquisitions （M&As） have become an important micro-means for the high-quality economic development in China. The factors that affect corporate M&As and their economic effects have long been the subject of concern in the practical and academic circles. M&As require the board of directors and management to make complex decisions, and the social relationship between the executives of two sides in merger can promote the information exchange and may lead to better decisions. Especially in China’s major economic transformation, along with higher market transaction costs, market participants tend to rely more on informal system such as social relations. Previous studies have identified that executive political connection, director ties, and CEO network have important impacts on corporate M&As’ decision-making process or economic consequences. However, the fellow-townsman relationship with multiple social values in the Chinese context has not received enough attention. At present, only a small amount of literature starts from the phenomenon of “fellow-townsman huddling” among senior executives within companies to study its impact on corporate behaviors. However, the role of the fellow-townsman relationship in the decision-making of corporate M&As is still poorly known. Therefore, from the perspective of external stakeholders of the main merger party, it is an important issue worthy of study to discuss the value and function of the fellow-townsman relationship between the CEOs of both sides in merger.This paper takes the M&A events of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as research samples, constructs a merger transaction model and tries to answer: Will the main merger party tend to acquire the target company where the CEO fellow is located? Is the cause of fellow-townsman M&As an information advantage or an agency problem that? The empirical results indicate that when the CEOs of both sides in merger have a fellow-townsman relationship, the merger events and the amount of M&As have increased significantly. That is, the main merger party has shown a tendency for fellow-townsman M&As. In terms of hometown intimacy, the life and work of CEOs in their hometown during the key stage of life strengthen their cultural and psychological characteristics, form a higher degree of hometown identity, and show a stronger tendency for fellow-townsman M&As. From the heterogeneity of the main merger party, the fellow-townsman tendency in M&A activities is stronger when the main merger party is a non-state-owned company or the market value is low. From the impact of target companies’ industry characteristics, compared with target companies in non-strategic emerging industries, the main merger party shows a stronger tendency for those in strategic emerging industries. Further research reveals that when the level of corporate governance is low, the main merger party shows a stronger tendency for fellow-townsman M&As, and the agency problem plays a leading role in this process. Through the investigation of corporate performance after fellow-townsman M&As, it is found that although fellow-townsman M&As can provide shareholders with short-term excess returns, in the long run, they cannot bring synergies to the main merger party, which proves that fellow-townsman M&As are not derived from the information advantage.Regional identity is widespread throughout the world, but its research mainly focuses on place attachment and geographical complex, emphasizing on the attachment to geographical location and the interactions with surrounding neighborhood. There is also a little literature discussing the impact of fellow-townsman relationship on companies according to the phenomenon of “fellow-townsman huddling” among senior executives within companies. This paper starts from the perspective of external stakeholders and confirms that the geographical consensus of individual CEOs of both sides in merger will affect the behavior of M&As between companies, which deepens the understanding of the executive social relationship and its economic consequences in M&A transactions. At the same time, this paper explores the new performance of agency issues from the perspective of CEO individual preference through the study of the economic consequences of fellow-townsman M&As. It not only provides new evidence for the study of agency problems, but also provides reference for supervisory departments as well as investors to better understand and supervise management agency issues.

Key words: M&As; external stakeholders; fellow-townsman relationship; information asymmetry; agency problems

关键词：企业并购; 外部关系人; 老乡关系; 信息不对称; 代理问题

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2.会计师事务所声誉损失与业绩预告质量——基于监管处罚的经验证据

Reputation Loss of Accounting Firms and Quality of Earnings Forecast: Evidence from Regulator Sanction

作者（中）：毛志宏, 李燕, 金龙

作者（英）：Mao Zhihong, Li Yan, Jin Long

作者单位：1.吉林大学 商学院，吉林 长春 130012

摘要：以2007—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本，采用会计师事务所被监管层处罚作为会计师事务所声誉损失的外生事件，考察了会计师事务所声誉损失对上市公司业绩预告质量的影响。研究发现，会计师事务所声誉损失后，上市公司业绩预告质量显著提升，这说明上市公司会通过提高业绩预告质量，以挽回会计师事务所声誉损失给其带来的负面影响。进一步研究发现，当公司内外部治理水平较高、对信息披露质量较重视以及会计师事务所声誉受损较严重时，会计师事务所声誉损失导致上市公司业绩预告质量的提升更为明显。本文的研究结论不仅丰富了业绩预告质量影响因素和会计师事务所声誉损失经济后果的相关文献，也为建立健全声誉评价机制、加强对中介机构的监管提供了政策依据。

Summary: With the implementation of the registration system, the government has decentralized and the responsibility for information disclosure in the process of listing has transferred more to issuers and financial intermediaries, which makes investors rely more on intermediaries. As the final “gatekeeper” of the accounting information quality of listed companies, the reputation of accounting firms is very important. However, in recent years, the occurrence of financial fraud in some domestic listed companies has caused accounting firms to be severely punished by regulatory authorities, and caused serious damage to their reputation. Companies choose accounting firms with good reputation to eliminate investors’ doubts about accounting information, and they can also disclose more accurate earnings forecast to build their reputation and eliminate information asymmetry. Therefore, listed companies are able to reduce the impact due to the reputation loss of accounting firms by improving the quality of earnings forecast.Based on the background, this paper examines whether listed companies redeem the negative impact of the reputation loss of accounting firms on their companies by improving the quality of earnings forecast, using a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2019 and the punishment of accounting firms by the regulator as an exogenous event of their reputation loss. The study finds that companies significantly improve the quality of earnings forecasts after the reputation loss of accounting firms, and this finding still holds after a series of robustness tests. Further, it is found that companies improve the quality of earnings forecast more significantly after the reputation loss of accounting firms when the level of internal and external governance is higher, when information asymmetry is more important, and when the damage to the reputation of accounting firms is more severe.The contributions of this paper are as follows: （1） Previous literature has mainly studied the consequences of the reputation loss of accounting firms due to regulatory penalties from the perspectives of the passing of audit committees, the deterrent effect on auditors, and client loss. This paper innovatively examines whether companies value the assurance provided by the reputation of accounting firms from the perspective of company disclosure, extending the research related to the reputation loss of accounting firms. （2） This paper verifies that earnings forecast is an important tool for managers to manage information disclosure, and managers proactively uses earnings forecast to reduce information asymmetry when the external environment changes. （3） The findings of this paper have strong practical implications. By examining whether companies react to the damage of intermediaries’ reputation, we can understand the importance of intermediaries’ reputation in the capital market and the extent to which companies rely on intermediaries’ reputation, which provides an important theoretical basis for the regulatory issues in the implementation of the registration system. That is, we can rely less on administrative control and more on the market-based reputation mechanism to restrain intermediaries and protect investors.

关键词：会计师事务所; 声誉损失; 监管处罚; 业绩预告质量

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3.董事高管责任保险促进企业创新吗？——基于信贷寻租与融资约束的视角

Does D&O Insurance Promote Enterprise Innovation? Based on the Perspective of Credit Rent-seeking and Financing Constraints

作者（中）：赵国宇, 梁慧萍

作者（英）：Zhao Guoyu, Liang Huiping

作者单位：1.广东财经大学 会计学院，广东 广州 510320

摘要：董事高管责任保险于2002年引入中国市场，主要针对董事或高管在正常履职过程中，因被指控工作疏忽或行为不当而被追究其个人赔偿责任时，由保险机构代付。通过采用中国A股上市公司数据，本文基于“外部投资者”视角探究董责险对企业创新的作用及路径。研究发现：董责险能够正向影响企业创新，且可通过降低融资约束和信贷寻租来促进企业创新，这说明了融资约束和信贷寻租具有中介效应。进一步研究发现，认购董责险提高了企业的信贷资源获取能力，具体表现为银行会主动提供更多的长期贷款和减少短期贷款的供给，且上述关系在民营企业中更明显。认购董责险提高了信息披露质量，进一步降低了信息不对称程度和加大了对公司内部的监管力度，进而更大程度地促进了企业创新。本文弥补了从外部投资者视角探究董责险影响企业创新投资的不足，验证了“董责险机制具有信号传递功能”的观点，即董责险通过引入第三监督机构改善公司治理效果，向外界投资者传递积极的信号，从而提高了投资者的信心。Summary: Innovation cannot be achieved without external financialsupport. However, innovation activities are often trapped in the predicament offinancing constraints and credit rent-seeking, which makes the innovationeffect far deviate from the optimal value. External financing constraints andcredit rent-seeking seriously hinder innovation input from both capital andmotivation, resulting in obvious dual resource allocation problems ofinsufficient investment and financing difficulties in enterprise innovation.Information asymmetry and agency problems are the key factors that lead toexternal financing constraints and credit rent-seeking. Therefore, thefundamental way to solve the dual problems of financing constraints and creditrent-seeking is to reduce the information asymmetry and agency problemsassociated with the process of enterprise management. As an emerging externalgovernance mechanism, D&O insurance aims to protect managers from personalliability in the event of litigation brought by shareholders or other stakeholders（such as creditors）alleging misconduct in the performance of their duties. Existing studies on therelationship between D&O insurance and enterprise innovation are mainlybased on the managers’ income incentive and tolerancefor innovation failure. Few studies pay attention to the impact of D&Oinsurance on the introduction of enterprise innovation funds from theperspective of external investors. Thus, in this paper, we attempt to fill thisgap by exploring the impact of the relationship between D&O insurance,financing constraints and credit rent-seeking on enterprise innovation.In theempirical section, we collect data on D&O insurance for Chinese publicenterprises from the CNRDS database and other variables’ data are derived from the CSMAR database over the 2009-2019 period.Through empirical results, we find that D&O insurance can positively affectenterprise innovation, and it can promote enterprise innovation by reducingfinancing constraints and credit rent-seeking, which indicates that financingconstraints and credit rent-seeking have a mediating effect. To address thepossible endogeneity, we use the Heckman’s two-stagemethod, alternative explanatory variables and adding missing variables, andthen perform additional tests to examine the underlying economic mechanism ofour findings. We find that: （1）D&O insurance improves enterprises’ ability toobtain credit resources, which is embodied in the fact that banks activelyprovide more long-term loans to enterprises and reduce short-term loans, andthe above relationship is more obvious in private enterprises. （2） D&O insurance improves the quality ofinformation disclosure, further reduces the degree of information asymmetry andstrengthens the internal supervision of enterprises, thus promoting enterpriseinnovation to a greater extent.This paper makes the following contributions:First, it makes up for the lack of exploring the impact of D&O insurance onenterprise innovation investment from the perspective of external investors,verifying the point of “D&O insurance has thesignal transfer function”, namely, by introducing thethird supervision institution to improve the corporate governance effect, itcan send positive signals to outside investors, thus improving the confidenceof investors. Second, the theory of signal transmission is used to explain theinfluence mechanism of D&O insurance. The existing literature mainly usesthe principal-agent theory to analyze the governance effect of D&Oinsurance on enterprise innovation. Third, through the two paths of financingconstraints and credit rent-seeking, the influence mechanism of D&Oinsurance on enterprise innovation is deeply analyzed, which enriches therelevant researches in the field of financing constraints and credit rent-seeking.Tosome extent, this paper shows the governance effect of D&O insurance inChinese enterprises, which is of great policy significance for promotingenterprise innovation and promoting D&O insurance in the Chinese insurancemarket.
关键词：董责险; 企业创新; 融资约束; 信贷寻租

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