学术视界｜Management Science：技术兼容性的合谋投资:19世纪末美国铁路的教训（附下载链接)

Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: 

Lessons from US Railroads in the Late 19th Century

技术兼容性的合谋投资:

19世纪末美国铁路的教训

作者

Daniel P. Gross

Harvard Business School

摘要
共谋对消费者福利和市场效率产生负面影响，因此受到广泛谴责。在本文中，我证明了合谋在某些情况下也可能有助于创造意想不到的新价值来源。我通过19世纪一个历史情节的镜头来聚焦这种可能性，当时在1886年的两天内，美国南部的铁路勾结，将13,000英里的铁轨转换为标准轨距，将南部纳入了全国交通运输网络。路线级别的货运数据显示，轨距的变化导致市场份额从轮船转向铁路，但并未影响这些路线的总货运量或价格。在这些结果的指导下，我建立了一个合谋市场中的兼容性选择模型，并认为合谋可能使规格发生变化，同时也减轻了对价格和总出货量的影响。

Collusion is widely condemned for its negative effects on consumer welfare and market efficiency. In this paper, I show that collusion may also in some cases facilitate the creation of unexpected new sources of value. I bring this possibility into focus through the lens of a historical episode from the 19th century, when colluding railroads in the U.S. South converted 13,000 miles of railroad track to standard gauge over the course of two days in 1886, integrating the South into the national transportation network. Route-level freight traffic data reveal that the gauge change caused a large shift in market share from steamships to railroads, but did not affect total shipments or prices on these routes. Guided by these results, I develop a model of compatibility choice in a collusive market and argue that collusion may have enabled the gauge change to take place as it did, while also tempering the effects on prices and total shipments.

文章来源：Gross, D. P. (2020). Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from US Railroads in the Late 19th Century. Management Science, 66(12), 5683-5700.

点击文末“阅读原文”，查看论文原文。

。END 。

点击下方链接，查看更多往期文章