刊讯｜SSCI 期刊《心智与语言》2024年第1-3期
2024-07-09
Mind & Language
Volume 39, Issue1-3, 2024
MIND & LANGUAGE（SSCI一区，2024 IF：1.8, 排名60/194）2024年第1-3期共刊文31篇。其中2024年第1期共发文13篇，论文涉及感知模拟、语言理解、强化学习、人工代理、远程语义学、希尔论、认知本体论等；2024年第2期共发文9篇，论文涉及一词多义、预测处理、概念工程、大型语言模型、习惯性行为、斯塔纳克式对话等；2024年第3期共发文9篇，论文涉及情感体验、语言干预、意义修正、诽谤和侮辱性言语、意识科学等。欢迎转发扩散！
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目录
ISSUE1
SUBMITTED ARTICLES
■ Mental simulation and language comprehension: The case of copredication, by Michelle Liu, Pages 2-21.
■Reinforcement learning and artificial agency, by Patrick Butlin, Pages 22-38.
■ Losing the light at the end of the tunnel: Depression, future thinking, and hope, by Juliette Vazard, Pages 39-51.
■Teleosemantics and the frogs, by Ruth Garrett Millikan, Pages 52-60.
■ Vividness and content, by Peter Fazekas, Pages 61-79.
REVIEW ARTICLES
■Hill on perceptual relativity and perceptual error, by E. J. Green E·J·, Pages 80-88.
■Perception's objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience, by Zoe Jenkin, Pages 89-95.
■Hill on perceptual contents, Thouless properties, and representational pluralism, by Jack C. Lyons, Pages 96-101.
■Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology，by Sarah K. Robins, Pages 109-115.
■Who's in and who's out of the cognitive kinding game? Comments on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology: Taxonomic practices in the mind-brain sciences, by Jacqueline A. Sullivan, Pages 116-122.
■Computation as the boundary of the cognitive, by Daniel Weiskopf, Pages 123-128.
REPLY
■Replies to E. J. Green, Zoe Jenkin, and Jack Lyons, by Christopher S. Hill, Pages 102-108.
■ Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins, by Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Pages 129-140.
ISSUE2
ORIGINAL ARTICLES
■Underdeterminacy without ostension: A blind spot in the prevailing models of communication, by Constant Bonard, Pages 142-161.
■Interpersonal connection, by James Laing, Pages 162-178.
■Polysemy does not exist, at least not in the relevant sense，by Gabor Brody, Roman Feiman, Pages 179-200.
■Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem, by Guido Löhr, Christian Michel, Pages 201-219.
■Motivating empathy，by Shannon Spaulding, Pages 220-236.
■Why the performance of habit requires attention，by Laura Bickel, Pages 260-270.
■Pluralism about introspection, by Kateryna Samoilova Franco, Pages 293-309.
SUBMITTED ARTICLE
■Creating a large language model of a philosopher，by Eric Schwitzgebel, David Schwitzgebel, Anna Strasser, Pages 237-259.
■The rejection gameLuca Incurvati, by Giorgio Sbardolini, Pages 271-292.
ISSUE3
ORIGINAL ARTICLES
REVIEW ARTICLE■Confusion and explanation, by Rachel Goodman, Pages 434-444.
REPLY ■Inference and identity, by Elmar Unnsteinsson, Pages 445-452.
摘要
Mental simulation and language comprehension: The case of copredication
Michelle Liu, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia
Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that perceptual-motor simulations are often constitutively involved in language comprehension. Call this “the simulation view of language comprehension”. This article applies the simulation view to illuminate the much-discussed phenomenon of copredication, where a noun permits multiple predications which seem to select different senses of the noun simultaneously. On the proposed account, the (in) felicitousness of a copredicational sentence is closely associated with the perceptual simulations that the language user deploys in comprehending the sentence.
Reinforcement learning and artificial agency
Patrick Butlin, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Abstract There is an apparent connection between reinforcement learning and agency. Artificial entities controlled by reinforcement learning algorithms are standardly referred to as agents, and the mainstream view in the psychology and neuroscience of agency is that humans and other animals are reinforcement learners. This article examines this connection, focusing on artificial reinforcement learning systems and assuming that there are various forms of agency. Artificial reinforcement learning systems satisfy plausible conditions for minimal agency, and those which use models of the environment to perform forward search are capable of a form of agency which may reasonably be called action for reasons.
Losing the light at the end of the tunnel: Depression, future thinking, and hope
Juliette Vazard, Graduate Centre, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA
Abstract Is the capacity to experience hope central to our ability to entertain desirable future possibilities in thought? The ability to project oneself forward in time, or to entertain vivid positive episodic future thoughts, is impaired in patients with clinical depression. In this article, I consider the causal relation between, on the one hand, the loss of the affective experience of hope in depressed patients, and on the other hand, the reduced ability to generate and entertain positive episodic future thinking. I suggest that findings in the philosophy of emotion may shed light on this causal relation.
Teleosemantics and the frogs
Ruth Garrett Millikan, University of Connecticut, Mansfield Center, Connecticut, USA
Abstract Some have thought that the plausibility of teleosemantics requires that it yield a determinate answer to the question of what the semantic “content” is of the “representation” triggered in the optic nerve of a frog that spots a fly. An outsize literature has resulted in which, unfortunately, a number of serious confusions and omissions that concern the way teleosemantics would have to work have appeared and been passed on uncorrected leaving a distorted and simplistic picture of the teleosemantic position. I will speak to a half dozen of the worst of these misunderstandings and then say just a word about the frog question itself.
Vividness and content
Peter Fazekas, Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
Abstract The notion of subjective vividness plays a fundamental role in comparing different conscious experiences, yet it is poorly understood and lacks proper definition. Philosophical reflection on this topic is especially scarce. This article proposes a novel account of vividness arguing that its standard operationalisation in psychology conflates two major modality-general dimensions along which experiences vary—subjective intensity and subjective specificity—which themselves are determined by further modality-specific factors. The article identifies the neural underpinnings of these factors in the visual domain, demonstrates the unificatory power of the account, and argues that vividness is part of the content of perception.
Hill on perceptual relativity and perceptual error
E. J. Green E·J·, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
Abstract Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience is a must-read for philosophers of mind and cognitive science. Here I consider Hill's representationalist account of spatial perception. I distinguish two theses defended in the book. The first is that perceptual experience does not represent the enduring, intrinsic properties of objects, such as intrinsic shape or size. The second is that perceptual experience does represent certain viewpoint-dependent properties of objects—namely, Thouless properties. I argue that Hill's arguments do not establish the first thesis, and then I raise questions about the Thouless-property view and its role in Hill's defense of representationalism.
Perception's objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience
Zoe Jenkin, Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
Abstract Christopher Hill's book Perceptual experience argues for a representational theory of mind that is grounded in empirical psychology. I focus here on three aspects of Hill's picture: The objects of visual awareness, the perception/cognition border, and the epistemic role of perceptual experience. I introduce challenges to Hill's account and consider ways these challenges may be overcome.
Hill on perceptual contents, Thouless properties, and representational pluralism
Jack C. Lyons, Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
Abstract Part of a symposium on Christopher Hill's book, Perceptual experience. Hill argues that perceptual experiences typically represent objects as having exotic properties that he calls Thouless properties. This and his representational pluralism allow him to attribute less perceptual error than the view that experiences represent simple relational properties (only). However, I think it is plausible that perceptual systems do make these sorts of errors, which although pervasive and systematic, are relatively subtle and perfectly explicable. I also express some concerns about representational pluralism, especially in the context of a representationalist view of the phenomenal character of experience.
Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology
Sarah K. Robins, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA
Abstract My commentary focuses on Khalidi's defense of episodic memory as a cognitive kind. His argument relies on merging two distinct accounts of episodic memory—the phenomenal and the etiological. I suggest that Khalidi's framework can be used to carve the contemporary memory literature differently. On this view, the phenomenal account supports constructive episodic simulation as a cognitive kind, the etiological account supports event memory as a cognitive kind, and episodic memory ceases to be. The question for Khalidi is, then, how to evaluate this alternative proposal—and more broadly how to adjudicate between competing and overlapping accounts of cognitive kinds.
Who's in and who's out of the cognitive kinding game? Comments on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology: Taxonomic practices in the mind-brain sciences
Jacqueline A. Sullivan, Department of Philosophy, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
Abstract Muhammad Ali Khalidi contends that because cognitive science casts a wider net than neuroscience in searching for the causes of cognition, it is in the superior position to discover “real” cognitive kinds. I argue that while Khalidi identifies appropriate norms for individuating cognitive kinds, these norms ground his characterization of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, rather than the other way around. If we instead treat Khalidi's norms not as descriptively accurate characterizations of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, but as a set of best practices for kinding cognition, is cognitive science in and neuroscience definitively out of the cognitive kinding game?
Computation as the boundary of the cognitive
Daniel Weiskopf, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Abstract Khalidi identifies cognition with Marrian computation. He further argues that Marrian levels of inquiry should be interpreted ontologically as corresponding to distinct semi-closed causal domains. But this counterintuitively places the causal domain of representations outside of cognition proper. A closer look at Khalidi's account of concepts shows that these allegedly separate Marrian domains are more tightly integrated than he allows. Theories of concepts converge on algorithmic-representational models rather than computational ones. This suggests that we should reject the wholesale identification of cognition with computation.
Replies to E. J. Green, Zoe Jenkin, and Jack Lyons
Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
Abstract I argue for three claims. (1) The phenomenology of visual experience is exhausted by awareness of appearance properties (i.e., certain constantly changing characteristics of external objects that are relational and viewpoint-dependent). (2) Cognition differs from perception in that it has a purely discursive or linguistic dimension, whereas perception is pervasively analog and iconic; but this does not determine a border between the two domains, for cognition also has a massive iconic dimension. And (3) certain raging debates in teleosemantics can be resolved by acknowledging that perceptual representations in more primitive organisms tend to have dual contents (e.g., both small, moving black object, and food).
Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins
Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Philosophy Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA
Abstract In this response to three critiques of my book, Cognitive ontology, I expand on some of its main themes. First, I demarcate the domain of cognition to support my claim that it is properly investigated from Marr's computational level. Then, I defend the claim that cognitive kinds ought to be individuated externalistically, by contrast with neural kinds, which are often individuated internalistically. This implies that the relationship between the cognitive sciences is one of delivering mutual constraints, which is a more productive research strategy than the search for “neural correlates” of cognitive constructs.
Underdeterminacy without ostension: A blind spot in the prevailing models of communication
Constant Bonard, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS-PSL, Paris, France
Abstract Together, the code and inferential models of communication are often thought to range over all cases of communication. However, their prevailing versions seem unable to fully explain what I call underdeterminacy without ostension. The latter is constituted by communication where stimuli that are not (nor appear to be) produced with communicative or informative intentions nevertheless communicate information underdetermined by the relevant codes. Though the prevailing accounts of communication cannot fully explain how communication works in such cases, I suggest that some version of the inferential model can—if we allow it to extend to non-ostensive, non-intentional behaviors.
Interpersonal connection
James Laing, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Abstract We are social animals that seek to connect with others of our kind. However, this common thought stands in need of elaboration. In this article, I argue for three theses. First, that we pursue certain forms of communicative interaction for their own sake insofar as they are ways of connecting with another. Second, that interpersonal connection is a metaphysically primitive emotional relation which resists reductive analysis in terms of the states of individuals. And finally, that our desire for interpersonal connection has a strong claim to being explanatorily and normatively prior to our desires for mutual-attachment, interpersonal belonging and approbation.
Polysemy does not exist, at least not in the relevant sense
Gabor Brody, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
Roman Feiman, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
Abstract Based on the existence of polysemy (e.g., lunch can refer to both food and events), it is argued that central tenets of externalist semantics and Fodorian concept atomism, an externalist theory on which words lack semantic structure, are unsound. We evaluate the premise that these arguments rely on—that polysemous words have separate, finer-grained senses. We survey the evidence across psychology and linguistics and argue that it shows that polysemy does not exist, at least not in this “sense”. The upshot is that if polysemy does not exist, it cannot pose a problem for atomism or externalism.
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem
Guido Löhr, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, Netherlands
Christian Michel, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Abstract According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.
Motivating empathy
Shannon Spaulding, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA
Abstract Critics of empathy argue that empathy is exhausting, easily manipulated, exacerbates rather than relieves conflict, and is too focused on individual experiences. Apparently, empathy not only fails to stop negative acts like sadism, bullying, and terrorism, it motivates and promotes such acts. These scholars argue that empathy will not save us from partisanship and division. In fact, it might make us worse off. I will argue that empathy exhibits bias in the ways critics describe because empathy is motivated. Conceiving of empathy as motivated leads to surprising conclusions about our tools for moral decision-making.
Why the performance of habit requires attention
Laura Bickel, Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Abstract This article argues that every performance of habit-driven action requires attention. I begin by revisiting the conception of habit-driven actions as reducible to automatically performed responses to stimuli. On this conception, habitual actions are a counterexample to Wayne Wu's action-centered theory of attention. Using the biased competition model of attention, and building on findings from affective cognitive neuroscience, I challenge this position. I claim that the performance of a habitual action requires experiential history to be exerting an influence that is best understood as implicit selection-biasing. It follows from this that habit-driven action is compatible with Wu's theory.
Pluralism about introspection
Kateryna Samoilova Franco, California State University, Chico, California, USA
Abstract If we can and do have some self-knowledge, how do we acquire it? By examining the ways in which we acquire self-knowledge—by introspection—we can try shedding some light onto the nature and the breadth of self-knowledge, as others have tried to do with other forms of knowledge. My aim is to show that introspection involves multiple (that is, at least two) distinct processes, a view I call “pluralism about introspection”. One of the virtues of pluralism is that it explains how we can have such a wide variety of self-knowledge despite our cognitive limitations.
Creating a large language model of a philosopher
Eric Schwitzgebel, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, California, USA
David Schwitzgebel, Institut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure, Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, Paris, France
Abstract Together, the code and inferential models of communication are often thought to range over all cases of communication. However, their prevailing versions seem unable to fully explain what I call underdeterminacy without ostension. The latter is constituted by communication where stimuli that are not (nor appear to be) produced with communicative or informative intentions nevertheless communicate information underdetermined by the relevant codes. Though the prevailing accounts of communication cannot fully explain how communication works in such cases, I suggest that some version of the inferential model can—if we allow it to extend to non-ostensive, non-intentional behaviors.
The rejection game
Luca Incurvati, ILLC and Philosophy Department, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Giorgio Sbardolini, MCMP, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany
Abstract We introduce the rejection game, designed to formalize the interaction between interlocutors in a Stalnakerian conversation: a speaker who asserts something and a listener who may accept or reject. The rejection game is similar to other signalling games known to the literature in economics and biology. We point out similarities and differences, and propose an application in linguistics. We uncover basic conditions under which the Gricean maxim of quality emerges from incentives among the players, providing evidence for a functionalist understanding of the Gricean program.
Design and syntax in pictures
Robert Hopkins, Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, New York, USA
Abstract Many attempts to define depiction appeal to viewers' perceptual responses. Such accounts are liable to give a central role in determining depictive content to picture features responsible for the response, design. A different project is to give a compositional semantics for depictive content. Such attempts identify syntax: picture features systematically responsible for the content of the whole. Design and syntax are competitors. But syntax requires system, in how picture features contribute to content, that design does not. By examining John Kulvicki's semantics for basic depictive content, I argue that the relevant systematicity is absent from the pictorial realm.
Names are not (always) predicates
Laura Delgado, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract A main selling point of predicativism is that, in addition to accounting for predicative uses of proper names, it can successfully account for their referential uses while treating them as predicates, thus providing a uniform semantics for proper names. The strategy is to postulate an unpronounced determiner that is realised with names when they appear to function as singular terms, making them effectively a concealed determiner phrase. I argue against the thesis that names are really predicates in referential uses. I discuss four different environments where names do not behave like the determiner phrases that are thought to embed them.
Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology
Kris Goffin, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Gerardo Viera, Department of Philosophy and the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Abstract According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal-temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal-causal order of the world.
How words matter: A psycholinguistic argument for meaning revision
Steffen Koch, Philosophy Department, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
Abstract Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement.
Slurs in quarantine
Bianca Cepollaro, Bianca Cepollaro, Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
Simone Sulpizio, Simone Sulpizio, Department of Psychology, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
Claudia Bianchi, Claudia Bianchi, Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
Isidora Stojanovic, Isidora Stojanovic，CNRS, PSL, ENS, DEC, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France
Abstract We investigate experimentally whether the perceived offensiveness of slurs survives when they are reported, by comparing Italian slurs and insults in base utterances (Y is an S), direct speech (X said: “Y is an S”), mixed quotation (X said that Y is “an S”), and indirect speech (X said that Y is an S). For all strategies, reporting decreases the perceived offensiveness without removing it. For slurs, but not insults, indirect speech is perceived as more offensive than direct speech. Our hypothesis is that, because slurs constitute hate speech, speakers employ quotation marks to signal their dissociation from slur use.
Hunger, homeostasis, and desire
Mohan Matthen, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Abstract Hunger is a psychological state that serves physiological energy homeostasis. I argue that it is a pure underived desire to eat and examine its role in homeostasis. After scene-setting explanations of homeostasis and desire, I argue that hunger is a close phenomenological match with underived desire. Then, I show why desire is an apt instrument for energy homeostasis. Finally, I argue that energy homeostasis is a multi-factorial future-regarding behavioural strategy. Hunger is a special purpose sensory state that serves only to implement the strategy. Thus, it is a sensory desire. I conclude by reflecting on the credibility of this desire.
“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
Kristin Andrews, Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Abstract The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?
Confusion and explanation
Rachel Goodman, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Abstract In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well-known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows.
Inference and identity
Elmar Unnsteinsson, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract I argue that beliefs about the identity or distinctness of objects are necessary to explain some normal inferential transitions between thoughts in humans. Worries about vicious regress are not powerful enough to dismantle such an argument. As an upshot, the idea that thinkers “trade on” identity without any corresponding belief remains somewhat mysterious.
期刊简介
The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.
目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。
It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.
它是一个重要的论坛，学者们可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。
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