执行在调解中达成的和解协议——论《新加坡公约》的优劣｜跨境顾释

栏目主持人顾嘉按：《联合国关于调解所产生的国际和解协议公约》将在2019年8月1日开放供各国签署。这部公约的产生为国际商事调解的发展留下了浓墨重彩的一笔。随着该公约的开放签署，国际商事调解作为“多元化争议解决机制”的重要一环，将很可能成为国际商事诉讼、仲裁之外，具有可执行性的“第三类争议解决方式”。在本期“跨境顾释”（中英双语）中，我们很荣幸地收到全球知名的国际商事调解员，Bill Marsh先生（www.billmarsh.co.uk）的投稿。Bill作为全职调解员从业近30年。他是英国伦敦最为知名的“独立调解员”事务所（Independent Mediators, 由英国最为著名的九名商事调解员组成）的成员。在2014-2015年度，Bill被Who’s Who Legal 评选为当年的“全球最佳调解员”。Bill在包括中国在内的亚洲地区具有丰富的调解工作经验，并曾为多国政府就调解相关问题提供咨询，为来自世界各地的调解员提供培训和指导。

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Enforcing agreements reached in mediation - Pros and cons of the Singapore Convention

This year sees one of the most significant legal developments in the history of international commercial mediation – the coming into force of the "United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation"（ the "Convention"）, to be known more colloquially as the "Singapore Convention".   

This document brings a level of formalisation and legal framework to international commercial mediations which far out-strips anything that has preceded it. For a process generally regarded as relatively informal, this is a new departure. The real question, however, is what will happen in practice? Will the Convention add value, or will it create greater scope for challenge?

1. What is the Convention?

The focus of this article is not a detailed analysis of the Convention's own terms.  Essentially, however, the Convention (approved at the 51st Session of UNCITRAL on 26th June 2018), provides for a system through which settlement agreements reached in mediation can become enforceable instruments, without the need for approval by a court.  Ratifying states (a minimum of three being required to bring the Convention into force) will have to establish their own relevant procedures, subject to the general principles of the Convention (Art. 3).

Certain conditions will apply to those agreements seeking enforceability (Art. 1).  In particular, they will have:

a. to relate to commercial disputes and be "international" (as defined);

b. to have been concluded as a result of a mediation process; and

c. to not be agreements which are otherwise approved by and enforceable through the courts or as an arbitral award.

In other words, the Convention seeks to create a genuinely new framework for enforcement.

Understandably, and appropriately, the Convention also contains grounds on which enforcement may be resisted (Art.5). These include, for example:

a. the incapacity of a party to the agreement;

b. where the settlement agreement itself is either null and void/inoperable under its applicable law, or not binding on its own terms, or contrary to public policy;

c. where there was a serious breach by the mediator of mediator standards, or a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties' circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the impartiality and independence of the mediator.

2. Will it add value to international commercial mediation?

The purpose and focus of the Convention is a laudable one. The very informality of mediation is often cited as aweakness in its appeal. There is comparatively little formal legal provision for it (compared for example to arbitration), though this is unsurprising given the very nature of mediation. There is little doubt that, on the face of it, the mere existence of an international enforcement convention will add credibility and perhaps "status" to the mediation process, and the claims it makes to be taken seriously as a forum for resolving international commercial disputes.

Furthermore, anecdotally one hears many proponents of the Convention (and of mediation generally) give numerous examples of their commercial counterparts refusing to use mediation on the grounds that the outcome "is not enforceable".  These objectors, one presumes, will now be more willing to use mediation.

So the big advantages of the Convention appear to be the removal of a common objection to using mediation, and the consequent enhancement of its credibility. One pauses, however, to enquire whether that apparent lack of credibility and grounds for refusal is anything more than anecdotal. There appears to be very little statistically-grounded research to substantiate the point either way. This is perhaps symptomatic of a wider problem surrounding commercial mediation, which is the lack of hard statistical evidence regarding levels of use, success rates, corporate attitudes towards it, and the like - but that is for another article!

3. What challenges will the Convention present?

At this stage, of course, no one knows the answer to this question. However, it is important to remember the context in which the procedures established by ratifying states under the Convention will operate - namely that one party to an agreement concluded in mediation will be seeking enforcement of its terms, which must by definition mean that the other party (ies) is/are resisting enforcement. It is fair to assume therefore that any application for enforcement will be resisted, otherwise there would be no need for the application.

It is in that context that the resisting party will seek to find grounds for resistance, including by criticism of the mediator. This raises numerous questions. For example:

a. How can a mediator's conduct best be judged? What if a mediator is seeking to break an impasse between parties by adopting an approach which some mediators would find acceptable and others would not? Are commercial parties (presumably without training in mediation) able to make informed judgment calls about mediator conduct? Are judges able to? Since the disputes in question will by definition be international, it is likely that parties will have different cultural norms and practices for mediation. What if the mediator's conduct might be regarded as unacceptable in one party's culture, and acceptable in the other's? Rigorous "reality-testing" by a mediator would be a likely example of this. It might easily be construed as entirely normal in one culture, and inimical to the mediator's role in another.

b. Who will give evidence concerning mediator conduct? Presumably only those present at the mediation. What impact will that have on confidentiality? And what impact will it have on mediator's performance and conduct? Will mediators become more cautious in an attempt to fend off any possible attempt by parties to use their conduct as a basis to upset an agreement reached? If they do, will this reduce their effectiveness? Sadly, one can see considerable scope for satellite litigation on these points. This would be a tragedy indeed for mediation.

4. The bigger question

Underlying all this is a much more fundamental question - to what extent should mediation be formalised at all? One sees this issue at play in many areas, including training and accreditation of mediators, the requirement to carry professional indemnity insurance, and so forth.

This short article is not the place for a detailed analysis of this wider question. However, it is worth remembering that commercial mediation as expressed and practiced in the last 40 or so years began as a largely unregulated response to the demands of the business community to "find a better way" of dealing with their disputes. That is not per se an argument against regulation, but rather a reminder that regulation itself is not axiomatic to creating processes which are trusted and widely used.  

I have had the privilege to practice full-time as a commercial mediator for nearly 30 years. As part of that I have been retained by a wide range of governments to advise on the introduction of mediation into their legal systems. Each engagement has thrown up the same question - what is the right balance between regulating mediation, and leaving it to thrive as a largely self-regulating process? In each case, I have found that states instinctively veer towards regulation and defined legal frameworks. This is to be expected, of course, but the issue remains as to how appropriate it is for mediation.

5. Other approaches

As a mediator, I have had the privilege to mediate thousands of disputes, many of them international commercial disputes. One of the joys of mediating is to see creativity being applied to the settlement discussions, and this is certainly true of enforcement concerns. In practice, therefore, I have found that parties seek to make their settlement agreements largely self-enforcing – e.g. through the use of escrow arrangements, the timing of payments, and so forth. Given that mediation is intended to offer the chance for outcomes which are specifically tailored to the parties' commercial concerns, needs and priorities, this will always in my view remain the most effective enforcement procedure. Advisers to parties in mediation will always want to find the most effective self-enforcing mechanisms before resorting to external enforcement procedures of any kind.

6. Conclusion

The best contracts are those which, once signed, never need to be consulted again because the parties simply implement them. So it is with mediated settlement agreements, and hence with the Convention. Once it is in place, my passionate hope is that parties will not need to rely on the procedures established under it too often, because the agreements they reach in mediation will be implemented without challenge - not least because the agreements reached are largely self-enforcing. If so, the Convention will have been a resounding success, lending credibility to commercial mediation without creating even more litigation.

执行在调解中达成的和解协议——论《新加坡公约》的优劣

《联合国关于调解所产生的国际和解协议公约》（下称“《公约》”），即通常所称的《新加坡公约》预计将在今年生效，这在国际商事调解的历史上具有里程碑式的意义。

该文件使国际商事调解具有了超越以往的、一定程度的正式性并将其置于法律框架内。这对一项通常被认为相对非正式的程序来说，将是一个新的起点。然而，真正的问题是，相关实践将会发生如何的变化？该《公约》将会对国际商事调解起到好的促进作用，还是会对其造成更多的挑战呢？

1.《公约》是什么？

本文的重点并不是对《公约》的条文进行具体分析。《公约》（于2018年6月26日在联合国国际贸易法委员会（贸法会）第51届大会上审议通过）提供了一个使调解中达成的协议可不经法院的确认而成为可执行文件的体系。批准《公约》的国家（至少须有三个国家批准方能使《公约》生效）将必须根据《公约》的基本原则设立本国的相关程序（第3条）。

相关协议如果想要通过《公约》获得可执行性须满足一定的条件（第1条），特别是需要：

a. 与商事纠纷有关且具有“国际性”（如定义所述）；

b. 通过调解程序达成；及

c. 非经法院或仲裁裁决确认并获得执行的协议。

换言之，《公约》寻求创立一个全新的执行框架体系。《公约》还规定了可拒绝执行由调解达成的和解协议的若干理由（第5条），例如：

a. 协议一方当事人无行为能力；

b. 和解协议根据适用的法律本身无效、失效或无法履行，或和解协议条款不具有约束力或有悖公共政策；

c. 调解员严重违反适用于调解员的行为准则，或调解员未向各方当事人披露可能对调解员公正性或独立性产生正当怀疑的情形。

2.《公约》是否会对国际商事调解产生积极的影响？

《公约》的目的和关注点，值得赞赏。非正式性（Informality）经常被认为是调解的一项弱点。相较而言（比如,相对于仲裁），对调解的正式法律规制很少，当然从调解本身的性质理解这一点，并不令人惊讶。从表面上看，毋庸置疑的是，仅仅是由于国际执行公约（即本《公约》）的出现这一事实，调解程序的可信度甚至其“地位”就会得到大幅提升，当事人也将认真考虑把调解选为一种解决国际商事纠纷的平台。

另外，有人曾从《公约》（及调解程序）的支持者那里了解到很多商业对手方拒绝使用调解的事例，理由是调解的结果具有“不可执行性”。可以想见，这些反对者现在可能会比从前更加乐意使用调解程序。

因此，《公约》的一大贡献似乎是摒除了反对使用调解的声音，并进而增加了调解的可信度。然而，值得思考的是，这种表面上的缺乏可信度及被反对的种种理由，是否仅是未经确认的种种轶事。不论是正方还是反方的观点，似乎都只有非常少的以数据为基础的研究支持。这或许代表商事调解的一个更普遍性的问题，即在使用程度、成功率、企业态度及类似方面缺乏可信的以数据为基础的证据。当然这就不是本文意图讨论的问题了。

3.《公约》将提出怎样的挑战？

当然，目前没人知道这一问题的答案。但需要注意到，批准《公约》的国家确立《公约》运行程序的背景是，调解中达成的协议的一方当事人会寻求执行其和解条款，就意味着另一方将必然阻挠其执行。可以说，任何一个执行申请都必然遭到反对，否则该申请从一开始就不会出现。

正是在这一背景下，反对方将为拒绝执行寻找理由，包括对调解员的挑战。这将产生一系列问题，例如：

a. 如何对调解员的行为作出最佳的判断？如果一个调解员为了打破当事人之间的僵局而采取某种方法，而这种方法在某些调解员看来可以接受，而对另一些来说不可接受的话，又当如何呢？商事当事人（假设没有受过调解方面的训练）或者法官，是否有能力对调解员的行为作出判断？鉴于争议从性质上来说必须是国际争议，当事人很有可能在调解方面有不同的文化习惯和作法。如果一名调解员的行为在一方当事人的文化中是可接受的，而在另一方的文化中是不可接受的话又该如何？例如，调解员采取严格的“实践性检验”的操作方式—— 在一种文化中这种方法可能是完全正常的，而在另外一种文化中，这可能会被认为是与调解员的角色不相符合。

b. 就调解员的行为而言，应当由谁提出证据？一般来说，应当仅仅是在调解过程中在场的人员。这将对调解的保密性及调解员的表现和行为产生怎样的影响？调解员是否会表现得更为谨慎，以避免当事人将他们的行为作为挑战和解协议的基础？若果真如此，是否可能会降低他们的工作效率？遗憾的是，我们可以预见到这些问题将导致大量的派生诉讼，而这对调解来说绝对不是一个福音。

4. 更大的问题

在这些问题之下的一个更为根本性的问题是，调解究竟应当在何种程度上被正式化？这是一个在很多领域都已发生的问题，包括对调解员的培训和资格的授予，及购买职业保险的要求等。

这篇短文并不会着力讨论这一普遍性问题。然而，值得关注的是，过去约40年间被提及和实践的商事调解，发端于商事主体对“寻求更好的方法”以解决他们之间的纠纷这项需求的回应，且这项机制总体来说“未受到规制”。这本身并不是反对对调解进行规范，而是提醒我们形式化并不是创立具有公信力和能被普遍使用的纠纷解决机制的必然内涵。

我有幸以全职商事调解员的身份从业将近30年。在这一过程中，我曾受邀为许多政府在将调解引入其法律制度方面提供咨询意见。每次总有同样的问题出现，即如何在对调解进行规范和使其作为一个自我规制的程序蓬勃发展之间取得最佳的平衡？每一次我都发现，政府总是倾向于对调解进行规制及为此设定一个法律框架。这当然可以理解，但问题是，这种方法对调解程序来说是否适当？

5. 其他路径

作为调解员，我有幸调解过数以千计的争议案件，其中很多属于国际商事纠纷。调解谈判程序中的创新是调解的乐趣之一，当然这也确实可能产生执行方面的问题。因此，在实践中，我发现当事人往往会想办法使他们的和解协议大体上得以自行执行，例如通过使用第三方账户安排、设定付款时点等机制。在我看来，由于调解的目的永远是为当事人的特殊商业需求和考虑量体裁衣，这种自行执行方式也是最为有效的。在向任何的外部执行程序寻求救济之前，当事人的律师和顾问通常首先想要在调解程序当中寻找最为有效的自行执行机制。

6. 结论

最好的合同是那些一旦签订后便无须再行协商的合同，因为当事人可以直接履行。调解中达成的和解协议及《公约》本身也是如此。我希望，在《公约》生效之后，当事人将无须过多地依赖其下设的诸多程序，因为这意味着他们在调解中达成的协议不会被挑战——特别是因为他们达成的协议大体上可以自行执行。果当如此，则《公约》将为商事调解提供更多的公信力，同时也不会招致更多的诉讼，而《公约》也将因此大获成功。

“跨境顾释”栏目由顾嘉律师主笔/主持，每周五与“巡回观旨”栏目交替发布。我们希望借助这个栏目，关注中国法下重大涉外法律问题，分享跨境争议解决的实务经验，介绍外国先进司法区内的最新法律发展和动态以及搭建一个中外法律界和商界的互动平台。如您有任何想法、意见、建议，欢迎点击文末留言，或长按下方二维码添加顾嘉律师的微信。

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