顶刊 | CJAR两篇最新关于“独立董事”研究文章！

ABSTRACT:Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2008–2019 period, we explore the impact of concurrent independent directors in the same industry (hereafter CIDSI) on accounting information comparability. We find that CIDSI can effectively promote accounting information comparability and that this effect is realized mainly through inhibiting earnings management. We also find that CIDSI can provide broader industry perception of the company’s board reports. Variations in concurrent companies and internal and external environments have significant moderating effects on the relationship between CIDSI and accounting information comparability. This relationship contributes to reducing audit fees and the possibility of receiving non-standard unqualified audit opinions. Our findings have implications for companies by demonstrating the importance of recruiting independent directors.

独立董事同业兼任与会计信息可比性

摘要：本文以2008-2019年中国A股上市公司为样本，探讨了独立董事同行业兼任（以下简称CIDSI）对会计信息可比性的影响。研究发现，CIDSI能够有效地促进会计信息的可比性，并且这种效果主要是通过抑制盈余管理来实现的。我们还发现，CIDSI可以为公司的董事会报告提供更广泛的行业认知。企业内外部环境的变化对CIDSI与会计信息可比性之间的关系具有显著的调节作用。这种关系有助于降低审计费用和收到非标准无保留审计意见的可能性。我们的研究结果证明了招聘独立董事对公司具有重要意义。

原文：Liang S K, Fu R, Yang X. Concurrent independent directors in the same industry and accounting information comparability[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2022,15(4). doi:10.1016/J.CJAR.2022.100268.

2. Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China

ABSTRACT:This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery of tests. Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment, for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members. Moreover, we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension. Overall, our findings suggest that independent directors’ social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.

隐藏还是揭露？中国独立董事兼任与公司欺诈

摘要：本文探讨了独立董事的社会资本（以社交网络衡量）如何影响公司欺诈。我们发现，拥有丰富社会资本独立董事的公司不太可能实施欺诈，这支持了我们的揭露效应假说。进一步分析表明，对于法律环境相对较差的公司、独立董事面临强烈声誉激励的公司以及独立董事担任审计委员会成员的公司，这种影响更明显。此外，我们观察到具有丰富社会资本的独立董事与更少的缺勤和更多的异议有关。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，独立董事的社会资本在公司治理中发挥着重要作用。

原文：Xing J L, Zhang Y J, Xiong X, Li G Z. Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2022,15(4).doi:10.1016/J.CJAR.2022.100273.

期刊收集团队

穆靖昊郑州大学硕士研究生

张梦瑶河南财经政法大学硕士研究生

董艳秋长江大学硕士研究生

吴志凤中南财经政法大学硕士研究生

章发明东北财经大学本科生

赵怡雪兰州理工大学硕士研究生

隋昊洋东北财经大学本科生

王禹澎东北财经大学本科生

沙易东北财经大学本科生

郭旭衡阳师范学院本科生

陈浩填广东对外经贸大学硕士研究生