顶级会计期刊-Accounting Review-2020第1期目录及摘要
The Accounting Review is a peer-reviewed academic journal published by the American Accounting Association (AAA). First published in 1926, it is one of the oldest accounting journals, and includes abstracts, articles and book reviews that promote accounting education, research and practice.
The Accounting Review has become known for its quantitative articles, and rigorous mathematical models, covering subjects like accounting information systems, auditing and assurance services, financial accounting, management accounting and taxation.
The American Accounting Association is a voluntary organization comprised of individuals interested in accounting education and research. The overarching goal of The Accounting Review is to attract and publish the highest quality accounting research, aimed at an audience of academicians and graduate students. Its team of academic editors, who are experts in the field, select high-quality articles that report the results of accounting research and explain and illustrate the research methodology.点击阅读原文，浏览最新发表在AR上的文章！
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Accounting Review
Volume 95, No.1
（January 2020）
目录
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[1].Compensation Consultants and the Level, Composition, and Complexity of CEO Pay
Kevin J. Murphy，Tatiana Sandino
[2].Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts’ Information Production
Matthew Driskill.Marcus P. Kirk.Jennifer Wu Tucker
[3].Firm Risk and Disclosures about Dispersion of Asset Values:Evidence from Oil and Gas Reserves
Marc Badia.Mary E. Barth.Miguel Duro.Gaizka Ormazabal
[4].Public Disclosures and Information Asymmetry: A Theory of the Mosaic
Edwige Cheynel；Carolyn B. Levine
[5].Selection Benefits of Below-Market Pay in Social-Mission Organizations: Effects on Individual Performance and Team Cooperation
Clara Xiaoling Chen；Heather L. Pesch；Laura W. Wang
[6].When are Firms Sued for Qualitative Disclosures?Implications of the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
Richard A. Cazier.Kenneth J. Merkley.John S. Treu
[7].Customer-Base Concentration, Investment, and Profitability: The U.S. Government as a Major Customer.
Daniel A. Cohen；Bin Li
[8].Private Equity Net Asset Values and Future Cash Flows
Tim Jenkinson.Wayne R. Landsman.Brian R. Rountree.Kazbi Soonawalla.
[9].Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and Its Relation to Firm Performance
Ethan Rouen
[10].Seeking Out Non-Public Information: Sell-Side Analysts and the Freedom of Information Act
Carlo D’Augusta.Matthew D. DeAngelis
[11].Sell-Side Analysts’ Benchmarks
Ohad Kadan.Leonardo Madureira.Rong Wang.Tzachi Zach
[12].The Effect of Voluntary Clawback Adoptions on Corporate Tax Policy
Thomas R. Kubick.Thomas C. Omer.Zac Wiebe
[13].The Information Provision in the Corporate Acquisition Process: Why Target Firms Obtain Multiple Fairness Opinions
Tingting Liu
[14].Tone Concavity around Expected Earnings
Carlo D’Augusta.Matthew D. DeAngelis
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01
Compensation Consultants and the Level, Composition, and Complexity of CEO Pay
Kevin J. Murphy
University of Southern California
Tatiana Sandino
Harvard University
Abstract：We provide fresh evidence regarding the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay.First, firms that employ consultants have higher-paid CEOs—this result is robust to firm fixed effects and matching on economic and governance variables. Second, while this relation is partly due to consultant conflicts of interest, it islargely explained by the impact consultants have on the composition and complexity of CEO pay plans; notably, thisimpact fully mediates the consultant-CEO pay relation. Third, firms with higher-paid CEOs and more complex payplans are more likely to hire a consultant. Last, Say-on-Pay voting patterns suggest shareholders view positively theadvice consultants provide, but only when consultants provide no other services. We also find suggestive evidenceof boards ‘‘layering’’ new equity incentive plans over existing ones, thereby increasing the impact of composition andcomplexity on CEO pay beyond the premium the CEO would demand for bearing additional compensation risk.
Keywords:consultants; benchmarking; incentive pay; governance; executive compensation.
02
Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts’ Information Production
Matthew Driskill
California State University, Fullerton
Marcus P. Kirk
Jennifer Wu Tucker
University of Florida
Abstract：We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analystshave another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a ‘‘concurrentannouncement’’), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm’s subsequent quarter thananalysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, thethoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analystsare more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference callsas their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements,they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behindfirms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as informationspecialists, are subject to limited attention.
Keywords:limited attention; analyst forecasts; earnings announcements; clustering.
03
Firm Risk and Disclosures about Dispersion of Asset Values:
Evidence from Oil and Gas Reserves
Marc Badia
University of Navarra
Mary E. Barth
Stanford University
Miguel Duro
University of Navarra
Gaizka Ormazabal
University of Navarra
Center for Economic and Policy Research
European Corporate Governance Institute
Abstract：The question we address is whether mandated disclosure about dispersion of nonfinancial asset valuescan provide information relevant to assessing firm risk. Using a sample of Canadian oil and gas (O&G) firms between2004 and 2011, we find that the difference between the disclosed 10th and 50th percentiles from the O&G reservesdistribution, which measures dispersion of the distribution, is positively associated with future total and idiosyncratic equityreturn volatility, systematic risk, and credit risk. We also find that disclosure of increased reserves dispersion is associatedwith weaker stock price reactions to increases in reserves and with increases in bid-ask spreads, both of which indicatethe disclosures convey information about risk associated with reserves. Additional tests reveal little evidence ofmanagerial opportunism in the reserves disclosures. Taken together, our evidence suggests that quantitative disclosuresabout the dispersion of nonfinancial asset values can provide information relevant to assessing firm risk.
Keywords:risk-relevant information; risk disclosure; oil and gas reserves; fair value accounting.
04
Public Disclosures and Information Asymmetry: A Theory of the Mosaic
Edwige Cheynel
University of California, San Diego
Carolyn B. Levine
University of Delaware
Abstract：We model an information mosaic in which multiple signals—one gathered by an informed trader andthe other publicly disclosed by the manager of the firm—are combined to estimate firm value. Under testableconditions, voluntary disclosures lead to higher ex ante information asymmetry and expected profits for the informedtrader by allowing him to refine his trading strategy and complete his information mosaic. The informed trader’s abilityto combine information and enhance his advantage is more prevalent when there is more uncertainty about whetherthe news is favorable or unfavorable, the manager is more likely to be informed, and the manager’s information isprecise (i.e., disclosure quality is high).
Keywords: mosaic; informed trading; disclosure; information asymmetry
05
Selection Benefits of Below-Market Pay in Social-Mission Organizations: Effects on Individual Performance and Team Cooperation
Clara Xiaoling Chen
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
Heather L. Pesch
Oregon State University
Laura W. Wang
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
Abstract：Many organizations whose core purpose is to advance a social mission pay employees below-marketwages. We investigate two under-appreciated benefits of below-market pay in these social-mission organizations. Ina series of experiments, we predict and find that, holding employees’ outside opportunities constant, those attractedto social-mission organizations that pay below-market wages perform better individually and cooperate moreeffectively in teams than those attracted to social-mission organizations that pay higher wages. The individualperformance effect arises because below-market pay facilitates the selection of value-congruent employees who arenaturally inclined to work hard for the organizational mission. The team cooperation effect arises because employeesexpect team members who have selected a social-mission job that pays below market to be more value-congruentand, therefore, more cooperative than those who have selected a social-mission job that pays higher wages.Collectively, we demonstrate that in social-mission organizations, offering below-market pay can yield selectionbenefits.
Keywords:below-market pay; pay level; employee selection; value congruence; social mission; cooperation
06
When are Firms Sued for Qualitative Disclosures? Implications of the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
Richard A. Cazier
University of North Texas
Kenneth J. Merkley
Indiana University
John S. Treu
West Virginia University
Abstract：Prior research finds that positive tone in firms’ qualitative disclosures increases the risk of shareholderlawsuits. However, federal securities laws provide a safe harbor intended to shield firms’ forward-looking statementsfrom legal liability. One implication of this safe harbor is that litigation risk potentially varies between qualitativeforward- and non-forward-looking statements. Consistent with this implication, we find that positive tone in forwardlooking qualitative statements is significantly less related to the likelihood of subsequent litigation than is positive tonein non-forward-looking qualitative statements. On average, we fail to find a significant association between qualitativeforward-looking statements and subsequent litigation. We do find evidence, however, that positive tone in qualitativeforward-looking statements relates positively to subsequent litigation in two U.S. circuits in which court rulingsreduced safe harbor protections for forward-looking statements. Overall, our results are consistent with the safeharbor effectively shielding firms’ qualitative forward-looking statements from litigation risk.
Keywords:litigation risk; PSLRA; safe harbor; foward-looking statements; textual analysis
07
Customer-Base Concentration, Investment, and Profitability: The U.S. Government as a Major Custome
Daniel A. Cohen
Texas A&M University
Bin Li
The University of Oklahoma
Abstract：
We examine whether customer-base concentration has a differential impact on profitability for firmscontracting with major government customers versus firms contracting with major corporate customers. Wedocument that firm profitability increases with the concentration of major government customers, but decreases withthe concentration of major corporate customers. We attribute the contrasting results to the differential impact ofmajor government and corporate customers on demand uncertainty. Specifically, firms contracting with major government customers face lower demand uncertainty that enables them to realize more efficiency gains from
customer-specific investments, whereas firms contracting with major corporate customers are exposed to higherdemand uncertainty that reduces the efficiency of customer-specific investments. Overall, our study suggests that major government customers are unique and important in the composition of customer base, and they impact firm outcomes in a significantly different way than major corporate customers.
Keywords:customer concentration; major government customers; major corporate customers; customer-specific investment; firm profitability.
08
Private Equity Net Asset Values and Future Cash Flows
Tim Jenkinson
University of Oxford
Wayne R. Landsman
The University of North Carolina
Brian R. Rountree
Rice University
Kazbi Soonawalla
University of Oxford
Abstract：This study analyzes whether fair value estimates of fund net asset values (NAVs) produced by private equity managers are accurate and unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows (DCFs). We exploit the fact that private equity funds have finite lives to compare reported NAVs to DCFs based on realized cash flows for 384 Venture Capital (VC) funds and 195 Buyout funds spanning 1988–2016. Findings reveal that Buyout funds’ NAVs display little systematic bias, but VC funds’ NAVs are relatively aggressively biased compared to Buyout funds, especially since 2000. Accuracy is worse in the first half of the sample period even though NAV estimates generally are more conservative. Overall, the results reveal significant differences in the association between NAVs and DCFs for Buyout versus VC funds, which is particularly important for private equity fund investors in their consideration of the relevance and reliability of NAV estimates provided by fund managers
Keywords:private equity; asset valuation; fair value.
09
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and Its Relation to Firm Performance
Ethan Rouen
Harvard University
Abstract：I develop measures of firm-level pay disparity and examine their relation to firm performance. Using comprehensive compensation data for a large sample of firms, I find no statistically significant relation between the ratio of CEO-to-mean employee compensation and performance. I next create empirical models that allow me to separate the components of CEO and employee compensation explained by economic factors from those that are not, and use these models to estimate explained and unexplained pay disparity. After validating my estimate of unexplained pay disparity as a proxy for pay fairness, I find robust evidence of a negative (positive) relation between unexplained (explained) pay disparity and future firm performance.
Keywords:disclosure; CEO pay ratio; pay disparity; corporate culture; compensation.
10
Seeking Out Non-Public Information: Sell-Side Analysts and the Freedom of Information Act
April Klein
New York University
University of Warwick
Tao Li
University of Florida
Bobo Zhang
NEOMA Business School
Abstract：A number of sell-side healthcare analysts gain access to information outside the purview of management through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Food and Drug Administration for records on factory inspections, complaints, and drug and medical device applications. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that buy (sell) recommendations and upgrades (downgrades) earn higher (lower) stock returns over the year following the receipt of FDA records. We also examine the type of information revealed in FDA factory inspection reports, and find that analysts are less likely to downgrade and are less pessimistic in their recommendations than the consensus recommendation when the information contained in the FDA report is not particularly severe. Our findings are consistent with a subset of analysts utilizing non-public information channels independent of management to gain value-relevant information about their covered firms.
Keywords:sell-side analysts; Freedom of Information Act; stock recommendations; equity analysts; analysts’recommendations; non-public information.
11
Sell-Side Analysts’ Benchmarks
Ohad Kadan
Washington University in St. Louis
Leonardo Madureira
Case Western Reserve University
Rong Wang
Singapore Management University
Tzachi Zach
The Ohio State University
Abstract：Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their recommendations. A buy for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its industry, while for other brokers, it means the stock is expected to outperform the market or some return threshold. We show that these stated benchmarks have implications for the distribution of recommendations, price reactions to recommendations, and the investment value of recommendations. We conclude that, depending on the question, academics may need to account for the benchmarks when studying analysts’ outputs, and investors may find the benchmarks beneficial in interpreting analysts’ advice.
Keywords:analysts;benchmarks;recommendations.
12
The Effect of Voluntary Clawback Adoptions on Corporate Tax Policy
Thomas R. Kubick
Thomas C. Omer
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Zac Wiebe
University of Arkansas
Abstract：Companies are adopting executive compensation recoupment (‘‘clawback’’) policies to discourage aggressive financial reporting choices. Recent research suggests clawback policies encourage other means of meeting earnings expectations. We suggest that reducing income tax expense is a means of meeting earnings expectations. We find that effective tax rates are lower after clawback adoption due to increased investments in tax planning. We identify three tax planning activities that clawback companies invest in to lower effective tax rates:purchases of auditor-provided tax services, increased connections to other low-tax companies, and use of tax havens. We provide evidence that effective tax rate decreases do not result from use of opportunistic income tax accruals, and that decreases are stronger among companies that adopt robust clawback policies. Additional tests indicate lower tax outcome volatility and longer, more readable tax footnotes following clawback adoption. Our results suggest a positive spillover effect of clawback adoption on corporate tax policy.
Keywords:executive compensation; clawback; earnings management; tax planning
13
The Information Provision in the Corporate Acquisition Process: Why Target Firms Obtain Multiple Fairness Opinions
Tingting Liu
Iowa State University
Abstract：Using a hand-collected dataset for takeovers from 1996 to 2013, I examine why some target firms obtain a second fairness opinion and the associated wealth effects of doing so. I find that multiple opinions are more likely to be used in deals in which management/investment bank conflicts of interest are high—e.g., buyouts and stapled financing deals. In addition, the use of a second opinion has a significantly positive impact on target shareholders’ wealth in these two types of deals. Fairness opinion valuation predominantly relies on accounting data, and the benefit of seeking a second opinion increases with a firm’s earnings quality. Collectively, the results suggest that a second opinion is used to facilitate transactions.
Keywords:mergers and acquisitions (M&As); fairness opinions; target returns; buyouts; stapled financing;earnings quality.
14
Tone Concavity around Expected Earnings
Carlo D’Augusta
Middle Tennessee State University
Matthew D. DeAngelis
Georgia State University
Abstract：We examine whether the relationship between managerial tone and earnings performance depends on the performance of the firm relative to earnings expectations. Using both annual changes in earnings and the difference between realized earnings and analyst consensus forecasts, we find evidence of ‘‘tone concavity’’ around earnings expectations. Specifically, the covariance between managerial tone and earnings performance is positive when earnings are below expectations, but negative when earnings meet or exceed expectations. We interpret our results to suggest that managers downplay positive changes in earnings to attenuate future growth expectations. We also find that tone concavity is significantly attenuated by managers’ career concerns and accounting conservatism,but unrelated to litigation risk. Our results indicate that the effect of earnings performance on disclosure tone is complex and reflects managers’ incentives to manage expectations.
Keywords:qualitative disclosure; linguistic tone; meet-or-beat.
★学术板块荣誉出品★
整理：樊子华 中国矿业大学研究生
编辑：程慧煜 西安财经大学研究生
审核：孙玥 宁夏大学研究生
副主编：支瑾璠 东北财经大学本科生
指导：水皮/李高波 北京交通大学博士生
以上就是本期“学术快报”栏目分享的主要内容。
会计学术联盟，全球超过11万会计金融学者在关注，不忘初心：因缘分相聚，因互助成长，因智慧光华；牢记使命：传播会计前辈思想，引领青年一代成长。
会计思享慧②王立彦教授：以身作则，职责在心观点 | 国家审计体系:中央审计委员会机制下的转型/王立彦西安交大刘园园团队在国际会计顶级期刊AR发表文章
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