《Journal of Accounting Research》2017年第一、二期目录摘要
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1. Disclosure Versus Recognition: Inferences from Subsequent Events
JEREMY MICHELS ;
2 .The Effect of Regulatory Harmonization on Cross-Border Labor Migration:Evidence from the Accounting Profession
MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD;ULF BRÜGGEMANN;HANS B. CHRISTENSEN;CHRISTIAN LEUZ;
3. IRS Attention
ZAHN BOZANIC;JEFFREY L. HOOPES;JACOB R. THORNOCK;BRADEN M. WILLIAMS;
4 .The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending
ROBERT M.BUSHMAN;CHRISTOPHER D.WILLIAMS;REGINA WITTENBERG-MOERMAN;
5. Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role
QI CHEN;TRACY R. LEWIS;KATHERINE SCHIPPER;YUN ZHANG;
6. Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms:Evidence from Small Commercial Loans
MICHAEL MINNIS;ANDREW SUTHERLAND;
1.DisclosureVersus Recognition: Inferences from Subsequent Events
JEREMY MICHELS
University ofPennsylvania
Abstract:Standardsetters explicitly state that disclosure should not substitute for recognitionin financial reports. Consistent with this directive, prior research shows thatinvestors find recognized values more pertinent than disclosed values.However,it remains unclear whether reporting items are recognized because theyare more relevant for investing decisions, or whether requiring recognitionitself prompts differing behavior on the part of firms and investors. Using thesetting of subsequent events, I identify the differential effect of requiringdisclosure versus recognition in a setting where the accounting treatment of anitem is exogenously determined. For comparable events, I find a strongerinitial market response for firms required to recognize relative to firms thatmust disclose, although the large magnitude of the identified effect calls intoquestion whether this difference can be attributed to accounting treatmentsalone. In examining various reasons for the stronger market response torecognized values, I fail to find support for the hypothesis that thisdifference is due to differential reliability of disclosed and recognized values.I do find some evidence that investors underreact to disclosed events,consistent with investors incurring higher processing costs when usingdisclosed information.
2.The Effect ofRegulatory Harmonization on Cross-Border Labor Migration: Evidence from the Accounting Profession
MATTHEW J.BLOOMFIELD
Booth School ofBusiness, University of Chicago
ULF BRÜGGEMANN
Humboldt-Universitätzu Berlin
HANS B.CHRISTENSEN;CHRISTIAN LEUZ
Booth School ofBusiness, University of Chicago
Abstract:The paper examines whether internationalregulatory harmonization increases cross-border labor migration. To study thisquestion, we analyze European Union initiatives that harmonized accounting andauditing standards. Regulatory harmonization should reduce economic mobilitybarriers, essentially making it easier for accounting professionals to moveacross countries. Our research design compares the cross-border migration ofaccounting professionals relative to tightly matched other professionals beforeand after regulatory harmonization. We find that international labor migrationin the accounting profession increases significantly relative to otherprofessions. We provide evidence that this effect is due to harmonization,rather than increases in the demand for accounting services during theimplementation of the rule changes. The findings illustrate that diversity inrules constitutes an economic barrier to cross-border labor mobility and, morespecifically, that accounting harmonization can have a meaningful effect oncross-border migration.
3.IRS Attention
ZAHN BOZANIC;JEFFREY L.HOOPES;
The Ohio StateUniversity;City of NorthCarolina at Chapel Hil;
JACOB R.THORNOCK;BRADEN M.WILLIAMS;
Brigham YoungUniversity;University ofTexas at Austin;
Abstract:We study how public and private disclosurerequirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firmdisclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel dataset of IRS acquisition of firms’ publicfinancial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine theimplementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRSattention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements,andSchedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRSattention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased followingSchedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting toinfluence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosurerequirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ publicdisclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantlyincreased the quantity and altered the content of their tax-relateddisclosures, consistent with lower tax-related proprietary costs of disclosure.Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS’s behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and,relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to changefirms’ public disclosure behavior.
4.The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending
ROBERT M.BUSHMAN
Kenan-FlaglerBusiness School,University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
CHRISTOPHER D.WILLIAMS
Ross School ofBusiness, University of Michigan
REGINAWITTENBERG-MOERMAN
Marshall Schoolof Business, The University of Southern California
Abstract:We investigate whether a borrower’s media coverage influences the syndicated loanorigination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantagedlenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loandeals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have arelationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenderscompeting to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between leadarrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that theaggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan dealincreases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. Weextend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood ofless informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicateis increasing in the sentiment of media-initiated, borrowerspecific articlespublished prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases(1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originatingloans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previousrelationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lowerpercentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.
5.Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision anda Coordination Role
QI CHEN; TRACY R. LEWIS; KATHERINESCHIPPER;
Duke University
YUN ZHANG
GeorgeWashington University
Abstract:We examine uniform and discretionary regimesfor reporting information about firm performance from the perspective of astandard setter, in a setting where the precision of reported information isdifficult to verify and the reported information can help coordinate decisionsby users of the information. The standard setter’s task is to choose a reporting regime to maximize the expecteddecision value of reported information for all users at all firms. The uniformregime requires all firms to report using the same set of reporting methodsregardless of the precision of their information, and the discretionary regimeallows firms to freely condition their sets of reporting methods on theprecision of their information. We show that when unverifiable informationprecision varies across firms and users’ decisionsbased on reported information have strong strategic complementarities, auniform regime can have a beneficial social effect as compared to adiscretionary reporting regime. Our analysis generates both normative andpositive implications for evaluating the necessity and effectiveness ofreporting under standards.
6.Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans
MICHAEL MINNIS
University of ChicagoBooth School of Business
ANDREWSUTHERLAND
MIT SloanSchool of Managemen
Abstract:Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercialborrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowersafter loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements forhalf the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk,relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, butin complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statementrequests has an inverted U-shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes andcomplements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristicsand the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry.Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessibleto lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamentalinformation demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercialborrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role asdelegated monitors.
1. Procyclicality of U.S. Bank Leverage
CHRISTIAN LAUX,THOMASRAUTER;
2 .Perceptions and Price: Evidence from CEO Presentations at IPO Roadshows
ELIZABETH BLANKESPOOR;BRADLEY E. HENDRICKS;GREGORY S. MILLER;
3. Dynamic Effects of Information Disclosure on Investment Efficiency
SUNILDUTTA,ALEXANDER NEZLOBIN;
4. Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts
SCOTT D. DYRENG,RAHUL VASHISHTHA;JOSEPH WEBER;
5. Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample-Wide and Cross-Sectional Evidence
DAVID GODSELL;MICHAEL WELKER,NING ZHANG;
6. Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in aHigh-Frequency World
JONATHAN L. ROGERS;DOUGLAS J. SKINNER;SARAH L. C. ZECHMAN;
1.Procyclicality of U.S. Bank Leverage
CHRISTIAN LAUX,THOMASRAUTER
WU (ViennaUniversity of Economics and Business)
Abstract:In light of thecurrent debate about the link between accounting and financial stability, weinvestigate the determinants of procyclical book leverage for U.S. commercialand savings banks. We find that total asset growth and GDP growth are bothpositively related to book leverage growth. Our evidence is not consistent withthe notion that fair value accounting contributes to procyclical leverage orthat historical cost accounting reduces procyclicality. Overall, the businessmodel of banks is more important for procyclical leverage than accounting orregulatory risk weights.
2.Perceptions and Price: Evidence from CEO Presentations at IPO Roadshows
ELIZABETHBLANKESPOOR
Graduate Schoolof Business, Stanford University
BRADLEY E.HENDRICKS
Kenan-FlaglerBusiness School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
GREGORY S.MILLER
Stephen M. RossSchool of Business, University of Michigan
Abstract:This paper examines the relation betweencognitive perceptions of management and firm valuation. We develop a compositemeasure of investor perception using 30-second content-filtered video clips ofinitial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentations. We show that thismeasure, designed to capture viewers’ overall perceptions of a CEO, ispositively associated with pricing at all stages of the IPO (proposed price,offer price, and end of first day of trading). The result is robust to controlsfor traditional determinants of firm value. We also show that firms with highlyperceived management are more likely to be matched to high-qualityunderwriters. In further exploratory analyses, we find the impact is greaterfor firms with more uncertain language in their written S-1. Taken together,our results provide evidence that investors’ instinctive perceptions ofmanagement are incorporated into their assessments of firm value.
3.Dynamic Effects of Information Disclosure on Investment Efficiency
SUNILDUTTA,ALEXANDER NEZLOBIN
Haas School ofBusiness, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract:This paper studies how information disclosureaffects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting inwhich a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock overtime. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investmentefficiency and investor welfare crucially depend on whether such disclosuresconvey information about the firm's future capital stock (i.e., balance sheet)or about its future operating cash flows (i.e., earnings). Specifically,investment efficiency and investor welfare unambiguously increase in theprecision of disclosures that convey information about the future capitalstock, since such disclosures mitigate the current owners' incentives tounderinvest. In contrast, when accounting reports provide information aboutfuture cash flows, the firm can have incentives to either under- or overinvestdepending on the precision of accounting reports and the expected growth indemand. For such disclosures, investment efficiency and investor welfare aremaximized by an intermediate level of precision. The two types of accountingdisclosures act as substitutes in that the precision of capital stockdisclosures that maximizes investment efficiency (and investor welfare)decreases as cash flow disclosures become more informative and vice versa.
4.Direct Evidenceon the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts
SCOTT D.DYRENG,RAHUL VASHISHTHA
Fuqua School ofBusiness, Duke University
JOSEPH WEBER
Sloan School ofManagement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract:Using a sample of firms that disclose therealizations of earnings used for determining covenant compliance in loancontracts, we provide direct evidence on the informational properties ofearnings used in the performance covenants included in debt contracts. We findthat the earnings measure used in performance covenants does not exhibitasymmetric loss timeliness and has significantly greater cash flow predictiveability than GAAP measures of earnings. We suggest that these results reflectthe idea that contracting parties design accounting rules for performancecovenants to enhance their efficacy as “tripwires.”
5.Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample-Wide and Cross-Sectional Evidence
DAVID GODSELL
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign
MICHAELWELKER,NING ZHANG
Queen'sUniversity
Abstract:This paper examines earnings management by EUfirms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first documenteconomically and statistically significant income-decreasing earningsmanagement around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show thatearnings management increases when accounting data directly affect themagnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find thatearnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases oras the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free-rider andcoordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when thepetition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioningfirm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. Wedocument that raising equity or debt financing moderates income-decreasingearnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade offcapital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate thatcontemporary research methods can detect accruals-based earnings management insettings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearlyidentified.
6.Run EDGAR Run:SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World
JONATHAN L.ROGERS
University ofColorado
DOUGLAS J.SKINNER,
University ofChicago Booth School of Business
SARAH L. C.ZECHMAN
University ofColorado
Abstract:We describe the process through which theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes filings “publicly available.” For a sampleof Form 4 (insider trade) filings, we show that, during the period we examine,the majority of filings are available to paying subscribers of the SEC's publicdissemination system (PDS) feed before they are posted to the EDGAR website,and so provide subscribers and their clients with a private advantage. We showthat this advantage translates into an economically significant tradingadvantage, and prices, volumes, and spreads respond to the news contained infilings beginning around 30 seconds before public posting. These findingsindicate that the SEC dissemination process does not always provide a levelplaying field and that the meaning of publicly available information in capitalmarkets is no longer simple or obvious. In response to our study, the SEClaunched an investigation and agreed to eliminate the PDS timing advantage.
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