顶级期刊-MS-2020第1期七篇会计与财务类文章

梁露予齐舒月会计学术联盟 2023-02-24

中石化2020校园招聘「财会审岗位」

《Management Science》是国际上公认的历史悠久的管理类顶级期刊之一，成立于1954，Management Science是国内众多高校认定的国际A类期刊，也是教育部认可的管理科学A类期刊，由美国运筹学与管理科学学院主办。每年从全世界收到的论文有1000多篇左右，最终发表的论文不超过60篇（录取率在5％左右）。

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Management Science

Volume 66, Issue 1

（January 2020）

一、目录

[1].The Real Effects of Bank Capital Requirements

Fraisse, Henri; Lé, Mathias; Thesmar, David.

[2].Whistle Blowing, Forced CEO Turnover, and Misconduct: The Role of Socially Minded Employees and Directors

Bereskin, Frederick; Campbell II, Terry; Kedia, Simi.

[3].Age of Decision: Pension Savings Withdrawal and Consumption and Debt Response

Agarwal, Sumit; Pan, Jessica; Qian, Wenlan

[4].Debt Heterogeneity and Covenants

Lou, Yun; Otto, Clemens A.

[5].Searching for the Reference Point

Baillon, Aurélien; Bleichrodt, Han; Spinu, Vitalie

[6].One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?

Ye, Maoliang; Zheng, Jie; Nikolov, Plamen

[7].Dividend Growth Predictability and the Price–Dividend Ratio

Piatti, Ilaria; Trojani, Fabio.

[8].Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

Koçyiğit, Çağıl; Iyengar, Garud; Kuhn, Daniel; Wiesemann, Wolfram

[9].Distributionally Robust Selection of the Best

Fan, Weiwei; Hong, L. Jeff; Zhang, Xiaowei

[10].Economically Motivated Adulteration in Farming Supply Chains

Levi, Retsef; Singhvi, Somya; Zheng, Yanchong

[11].The Economics of Line-Sitting

Cui, Shiliang; Wang, Zhongbin; Yang, Luyi.

[12].Data-Driven Appointment-Scheduling Under Uncertainty: The Case of an Infusion Unit in a Cancer Center

Mandelbaum, Avishai; Momčilović, Petar; Trichakis, Nikolaos; Kadish, Sarah; Leib, Ryan; Bunnell, Craig A.

[13].Higher Market Thickness Reduces Matching Rate in Online Platforms: Evidence from a Quasiexperiment

Li, Jun; Netessine, Serguei

[14].Information vs. Automation and Implications for Dynamic Pricing

Bollinger, Bryan K.; Hartmann, Wesley R.

[15].Prosocial Compliance in P2P Lending: A Natural Field Experiment

Du, Ninghua; Li, Lingfang; Lu, Tian; Lu, Xianghua

[16].Illiquidity and Price Informativeness

Kerr, Jon; Sadka, Gil; Sadka, Ronnie.

[17].Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans

Adam, Tim R.; Burg, Valentin; Scheinert, Tobias, Streitz, Daniel

[18].Do Politicians "Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is?" Ideology and Portfolio Choice

Aiken, Adam L.; Ellis, Jesse A.; Kang, Minjeong

[19].Option-Implied Intrahorizon Value at Risk

Leippold, Markus; Vasiljević, Nikola

[20].Expertise and Discretionary Bonus Decisions

Abernethy, Margaret A.; Hung, Chung-Yu; van Lent, Laurence

[21].Conditional Life Cycle: An Examination of Operating Performance for Leaders and Laggards

Cantrell, Brett W.; Dickinson, Victoria

[22].The Role of Customer Investor Involvement in Crowdfunding Success

Cornelius, Philipp B.; Gokpinar, Bilal

[23].Lottery-Related Anomalies: The Role of Reference-Dependent Preferences

An, Li; Wang, Huijun; Wang, Jian; Yu, Jianfeng

二、题目、作者、作者单位、关键词

1.The Real Effects of Bank Capital Requirements

Fraisse, Henri

Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution, Banque de France, 75009 Paris, France

Lé, Mathias

Banque de France, 75001 Paris, France

Thesmar, David

Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, District of Columbia 20009

MIT Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

Abstract: We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing, investment, and employment using loan-level data. The Basel II regulatory framework makes capital requirements vary across both banks and firms, which allows us to control for time-varying firm-level risk and bank-level credit supply shocks. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in capital requirements reduces lending by 2.3%–4.5%. Firms can attenuate this reduction by substituting borrowing across banks, but only to a limited extent. The resulting reduction in borrowing capacity affects significantly both investment and employment: for firms whose effective capital requirements increase by 1 percentage point, fixed assets are reduced by 1.1%, capital expenditures by 2.7%, and employment by 0.8%. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance.

Keywords: Bank capital ratios, Bank regulation, Credit supply

2.Whistle Blowing, Forced CEO Turnover, and Misconduct: The Role of Socially Minded Employees and Directorsment

Bereskin, Frederick

University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 65211

Campbell II, Terry

Finance University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716

Kedia, Simi

Finance and Economics, Rutgers, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854

Abstract: We examine the response of prosocial employees and boards of directors to corporate misconduct. We develop several proxies for the presence of prosocial employees and directors based on the density of social networks and social capital in the county of the firms' headquarters and companies' relevant corporate social responsibility ratings. We document that proxies for prosocial employees and directors are associated with an increase in whistle blowing and forced chief executive officer turnover in a sample of firms that engage in misconduct. The higher expected cost of misconduct in firms with prosocial employees is associated with a lower likelihood of misconduct. Our findings highlight the role of nonfinancial imperatives of employees and directors in mitigating misconduct. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Keywords: Forced CEO turnover, Misconduct, Prosocial employees, Whistle blowing

3.Debt Heterogeneity and Covenant

Lou, Yun

School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178900

Otto, Clemens A.

School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178900

Lee Kong Chian Schoolof Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899

Abstract: Coordination failure among owners of heterogeneous debt types increases distress costs. Covenants reduce expected distress costs by lowering the probability of liquidity shortages, increasing liquidation values, and incentivizing creditor monitoring. We predict and find that new debt contracts include more covenants when borrowers' existing debt structures are more heterogeneous. Our findings suggest that covenants are not only used to address creditor–shareholder conflicts but also to reduce the expected costs of coordination failure among creditors. Furthermore, our results indicate a dynamic component missing from static debt structure models: Debt heterogeneity entails additional covenants (i.e., constraints) when raising future debt. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.

Keywords: Coordination failure, Creditor conflicts, Debt covenants, Debt heterogeneity

4. Dividend Growth Predictability and the Price–Dividend Ratio

Piatti, Ilaria

Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1HP, United Kingdom

Trojani, Fabio

University of Geneva, Geneva Finance Research Institute and Swiss Finance Institute, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland

Abstract: Asymptotic tests over-reject the null of no predictability in present-value models. We develop a nonparametric testing approach in state-space models, implying reliable finite sample inference under weak assumptions on price–dividend ratio and dividend shocks. We find sharp evidence of return predictability in postwar U.S. data but less consistent evidence of dividend predictability, which is significant only using cash-flow proxies reflecting information from mergers and acquisitions. These findings reconcile the diverging conclusions of present-value models and common predictive regressions in a way that is robust to the choice of the predictive variables, the sample period, and alternative cash-flow proxies. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Keywords: Bootstrap, Likelihood ratio test, Predictability, Present-value model, State-space model

5. Illiquidity and Price Informativeness

Kerr, Jon

Accounting and Management Information Systems, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210

Sadka, Gil

Department of Accounting, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas 75080

Sadka, Ronnie

Department of Finance, Carroll School of Management, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts 02467

Abstract: This paper shows that liquidity conditions are important determinants of the predictability of earnings. Liquid stock prices are more informative about future firm earnings growth than illiquid stock prices. Because information-related illiquidity can arise when uncertainty is high, we focus our analysis on evidence that noninformational liquidity affects price informativeness. Endogeneity is further addressed using controls for market uncertainty and several exogenous shocks as natural experiments. Thus, our results lend support for the impact of liquidity on price discovery. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, financ.

Keywords: Aggregate earnings, Expected earnings, Expected returns, Illiquidity, Price informativeness, Stock prices

6. Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans

Adam, Tim R.

Accoun

Department of Finance, Humboldt University of Berlin, 10099 Berlin, Germany

Burg, Valentin

Department of Finance, Humboldt University of Berlin, 10099 Berlin, Germany

Scheinert, Tobias

Danish Finance Institute, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

Streitz, Daniel

Danish Finance Institute, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

Abstract: We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Keywords: Behavioral biases, Debt contracting, Overconfidence, Performance-sensitive debt, Syndicated loans

7. Conditional Life Cycle: An Examination of Operating Performance for Leaders and Laggards

Cantrell, Brett W.

E. H. Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi 38677

Dickinson, Victoria

E. H. Patterson School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi 38677

Abstract: The economics and management literature provides theoretical support for both leader and laggard firms to earn higher future operating returns. However, prior empirical research lacks a generalizable proxy to capture leader versus laggard behavior, thus limiting prior findings to specific contexts. This study utilizes a combination of firm-specific and industry life cycle identification to categorize leaders and laggards and validates the designation against constructs established in prior literature. Additionally, we examine each strategy's effect on future performance, finding that, in general, laggards earn greater operating returns. Laggards gain their advantage through product differentiation—specifically, through marketing/advertising expenditures. Leaders are, on average, unable to convert their first movers' advantage into sustainable future profitability once we control for other determinants of profitability. The leader/laggard classification using financial statement information has useful applications in analysis, forecasting, and valuation. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Keywords: Fundamental analysis, Life cycle, Profitability, Rates of return

学术板块荣誉出品

整理：梁露予吉林财经大学本科生

编辑：齐舒月东北财经大学研究生

审核：张瑾月汕头大学研究生

副主编：李瑞嘉东北财经大学本科生

指导：水皮 / 李高波北京交通大学博士生

END

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