美高管演讲透露美国出口管制执法方向性发展【讲稿全文翻译】

编者按：

围绕供应链安全，本公众号曾发表文章：

围绕着出口管制，本公众号曾发表文章：

今天和大家分享的是美国负责出口执法的助理部长马修·S·阿克塞尔罗德2022年11月14日的发言讲话全文翻译。

负责出口执法的助理部长马修·S·阿克塞尔罗德

在国际事务学会2022年秋季高级会议上的讲话

2022年11月14日准备的发言稿

谢谢你，汤姆，感谢你的慷慨介绍。也感谢国际事务学会今天再次接待我。自从我上次在5月份与你们交谈以来，发生了很多变化。仅举一例，上次我不得不与你们所有人进行远程交谈。我很高兴，今天我们都能亲自到场。

早在1927年，一个名叫埃德温·林克的人发明了飞行模拟器。丹尼尔·科伊尔（Daniel Coyle）在《天赋密码》一书中，讲述了一个爱上了飞行的纽约人林克的故事。1927年，飞行是一项极其危险的活动，在一些陆军航空学校，死亡率接近25%。人们相信，好的飞行员是天生的，而不是后天造就的。也就是说，如果你能在空中做几个小时的翻滚和旋转而不呕吐，你就被认为有能力驾驶飞机，只需要接受最少的额外地面训练。

林克认为，一定有一个更好的方法来训练飞行员。于是，他展示了他所具备的美国人的独创性，开发了第一个飞行模拟器。林克的技术大约只有浴缸的大小和形状，它使飞行员能够在一半的时间内学会飞行，而且成本很低，死亡率也急剧下降。最终，美国军方注意到了这一点，到二战结束时，已有50万名飞行员在林克的模拟器上记录了几个小时。你会认为，这项关键技术——它可以使美国军队在空中缠斗中获得明显的优势——会被限制出售给对美国不利的国家。但相反，在第二次世界大战之前的几年里，数百台林克的设备被允许出口到日本、德国和苏联。

一项技术——如飞行模拟器——可以改变一个国家的军事游戏规则，特别是如果它有助于提供超越对手的能力。今天更是如此，技术的力量，以及它提供超越的能力，比1927年时成倍地增加。正如国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文最近强调的那样，我们国家的科学和技术优势与我们的国家安全之间现在存在着一种根本的联系。我们在工业和安全局的工作是帮助维护我们国家的科技优势，从而帮助保护我们的国家安全。

上个月，拜登总统发布了国家安全战略，其中描述了当前的国家安全威胁环境，以及本届政府关于对如何最好地解决这个问题的看法。它为我们如何努力推进我们的重要利益和追求一个自由、开放和安全的世界提供了一个路线图。

正如该战略所表明的，我们的两个最大的优先事项是与中国竞争和限制俄罗斯。所谓的"传统"国家安全威胁——如军备控制和恐怖主义——仍然紧迫。我们专注于所有这些挑战，但今天我想重点谈谈这两个国家行为体。

自从俄罗斯在2月24日进一步入侵乌克兰以来，我们已经利用出口管制来削弱俄罗斯的军事能力。普京的战争机器被剥夺了它所需要的关键物资和备件，以取代其战场上的损失。我们与其他37个国家建立了一个联盟，建立了历史上针对一个特定国家的最广泛的出口管制。而且它们正在发挥作用。例如，自入侵开始以来，全球对俄罗斯的半导体出口持续下降了约70%，使俄罗斯公司没有他们所需的芯片，如精确制导导弹、无人驾驶航空器和坦克。

俄罗斯军方被迫依赖违禁芯片、变通方法和较低质量的进口产品，这削弱了其武器系统的有效性。据报道，俄罗斯军方正在从洗碗机和冰箱上拆取芯片来修复他们的军事硬件。他们已经把苏联时代的坦克从仓库中取出。他们还求助于第三方国家——如朝鲜和伊朗——用于供应和设备。由于缺乏芯片，俄罗斯的高超音速弹道导弹生产几乎已经停止。而轴承的严重短缺已经破坏了他们的坦克、飞机、潜艇和其他军事系统的生产。

这一成功的一个关键部分是美国和国际产业，我们与它们合作以确保我们的控制是有效的。我们BIS的官员已经联系了600多家公司——他们或者过去与俄罗斯有出口关系，或在乌克兰发现的俄罗斯武器系统中发现其部件。我们还通过网络研讨会和培训，教育了数百家国际公司。

我们在执法方面也一直很积极。我们已经对10家俄罗斯和白俄罗斯的航空公司——包括俄罗斯的头部航空公司——发出了临时拒绝令（TDO），这些航空公司违反我们的规则，将受美国法律管辖的飞机开进俄罗斯和白俄罗斯。这些航空公司现在被禁止为其飞机进口美国的零部件。随着时间的推移，俄罗斯航空公司、乌泰尔航空公司、蔚蓝航空公司和其他航空公司将无法继续飞行，无论是在国际上还是在国内，因为他们现在被切断了国际支持，以及美国的零部件和相关服务，他们需要维护和支持他们的机队。

而且我们也一直在关注个别的飞机。我们已经公开列出了183架明显违反我们的规则而飞入俄罗斯和白俄罗斯的飞机。9月，我们还对四架伊朗货机采取了行动，其中一架与伊朗空军签订了合同，这些货机一直在将电子产品和备件运往俄罗斯，在没有我们授权的情况下。上周，我重申了我们对马汉航空公司的TDO，该公司除了支持伊朗的伊斯兰革命卫队外，还向俄罗斯运送物资。现在全世界都知道，与这些飞机有关的任何动作——包括加油、维护、修理或提供备件和服务——都要遵守我们规则中的第十条“一般性禁止规则”。

更广泛地说，我们正在持续开展大量与俄罗斯有关的调查。例如，就在上个月，司法部公布了一份起诉书，指控欧洲的个人和公司违反美国出口法，试图将一台夹具磨床走私到俄罗斯。幸运的是，该夹具磨床——一种可能用于核扩散和国防项目的高精度磨床系统——在到达目的地之前就被执法部门截获。

除了制约俄罗斯之外，《国家安全战略》明确指出，我们必须超越中国。我们的国家安全要求我们防止中国滥用美国的先进技术。这时，BIS就开始发挥作用。

10月7日，BIS宣布了新的规则，以防止中国获取和使用先进的美国技术来支持中国的军事现代化。我们已经对参与中国军事超级计算和量子计算工作的公司的出口施加了限制。然而，这些新规则的目的是建立一个与军事应用相关的明确的技术界限。

新的管制措施从三个方面做到这一点：首先，限制中国获得与军事现代化或侵犯人权相关的人工智能应用的先进集成电路的能力；其次，防止中国利用某些美国技术来支持其超级计算机计划，这直接使其大规模毁灭性武器和军事现代化。第三，防止中国利用美国的半导体制造设备，在本国开发或生产先进的芯片，作为其军民融合计划的一部分。

这些新规则要求公司在涉及特定项目和相关活动的交易时，必须到BIS进行审批。商务部、国防部、能源部和国务院等机构将审查任何许可证申请，而对中国最终用户的申请审查标准为“推定为拒绝”。我们出口执法部门将通过我们掌握的所有资源努力执行新的规则，包括机密和公开来源的报告，与美国公司的伙伴关系，行政和刑事调查，以及我们的全球最终用途检查计划。

我分管的出口执法部门在10月7日也有一项声明。我们已经改变了关于我们如何应对第三国政府阻止我们在海外进行最终用途检查的能力的政策。

我们发现，外国政府通常欢迎我们的最终用途检查，因为他们渴望接受美国的出口并自由参与全球经济。然而，当一个外国政府持续阻止我们进行最终用途检查的尝试时，我们就面临着美国原产货物或技术被滥用的不可接受的风险，因为我们无法核实一个公司是否符合我们的控制。

因此，我们在10月7日宣布了一项新的、分两步走的政策，以解决外国政府通过持续的时间安排拖延而使我们的最终用途检查受挫的情况。

首先，必须安排最终用途的检查，并及时完成。如果60天后没有进行所要求的检查，我们将启动监管程序，将该外国公司列入未经核实的名单（UVL）。甚至在我们的政策宣布之前也是如此，列入UVL会触发对被列入名单的公司出口的额外监管要求，并通知美国工业界，我们无法确定该公司作为受控出口接受者的合法性。在成功完成最终用途检查之前，我们停止处理该公司的许可证，并对随后收到的所有向其出口的许可证申请进行预许可检查。

第二，一旦外国当事方被添加到UVL，另一个60天的时间就开始了。如果我们不能在第二个60天窗口内成功完成最终用途检查，我们将启动监管程序，将该外国方加入实体名单。

10月7日宣布的规则将31个实体加入UVL，所有这些实体——连同之前在UVL上的其他50家公司——现在都有风险，如果我们无法在12月6日（即从10月7日开始的60天）之前完成最终用途检查，所有这些实体就会转到实体名单上。我想指出的是，10月7日的规则还将9个实体从UVL中删除，因为它们已经成功完成了最终用途检查。换句话说，未经核实的名单并不是自动进入实体名单的管道。我们希望核实一个公司的善意，以便它能够参与全球经济。当一个公司的最终使用检查成功后，它就会从UVL上消失。

最终用途检查是美国国家安全的一个重要组成部分。当我们因为东道国政府的不合作或其他因素而无法进行这些检查时，我们的名单上就会出现。

除了我们的最终用途检查政策变化外，让我快速回顾一下自我上次在5月份与你们谈话以来我们所做的其他一些重大政策变化。

6月，我宣布了四项重大变革，以加强我们的行政执法工具。

首先，我们现在正在利用我们现有的权力，确保最严重的行政违规行为引发相应的严重处罚。如果你投资于一个出口合规计划，而你的竞争对手却藐视规则以获得经济优势，我们将积极地对你的竞争对手进行处罚，以帮助确保一个公平的竞争环境。

第二，我们已经取消了"不承认，不否认"的和解方式。我们希望公司——以及整个行业——有机会向他人学习，避免重蹈覆辙。当我们达成一项决议时，和解方会以减少处罚的形式获得很大的好处。但是，为了获得减少的处罚，我们现在要求同时承认发生了相关的事实行为。这样一来，其他人就可以清楚地了解到公司或个人的行为使他们陷入困境，并可以相应地修改自己的行为。

第三，在违法行为没有反映出严重的国家安全危害的行政案件中，我们一直在达成不要求货币处罚的和解协议。我们一直在解决这些案件，把重点放在补救上——通过实施带有某些条件的暂停拒绝令，如培训和合规要求。对于迄今为止我们已经解决的案件，我们已经施加了一个为期两年的暂停拒绝出口特权的命令，并要求这些实体接受合规培训。在一个案例中，我们还要求对该公司的出口管制合规计划进行内部审计。

第四，我们修改了我们处理自愿自我披露（VSD）的方式。对于那些涉及轻微或技术性违规的VSD，我们现在以 "快速通道"的方式解决，即发出警告信或不发出警告。

在收到最终提交的文件后60天内，我们会发出行动函。然而，对于那些表明可能更严重的违规行为的VSD，我们正在进行更深入的调查，以确定是否有必要采取执法行动，同时坚持这样的原则，即公司应得到并将得到自愿提交的重要信用。通过快速处理轻微的违法行为，同时指派专门人员处理可能更严重的违法行为，我们正在更有效地利用我们有限的资源，同时也让那些提交更多轻微VSD的公司得到更快的周转。对于那些想知道我们的新程序是否"冷落"了提交VSD的人来说——它并没有。自政策变化以来，我们已收到150份新的披露文件，与前两年同期收到的披露文件的平均数量大致相同。公司继续认识到，在我们敲开你的门之前，最好先敲开我们的门。

6月，我们还进行了一项监管改革，将指控信公开。自从这一变化以来，我们已经公布了五封指控信，包括一封指控俄罗斯寡头罗曼-阿布拉莫维奇（Roman Abramovich）非法将其两架私人飞机飞往俄罗斯，估计总价值为4亿美元。就在上周，我们发布了一封指控信，指控WEBS电子贸易公司非法向伊朗和叙利亚再出口原产于美国的电信设备。这些指控信让出口界——以及更广泛的世界——了解到我们看到了哪些类型的违规行为，以及我们正在对它们采取的行动。

虽然我们的许多工作是与工业界合作完成的，但工业界并不是我们唯一的重要合作伙伴。6月，我宣布了我们的 "学术推广计划"，这是我们帮助教育的努力。

鉴于国家安全和学术界的领域现在越来越多地相互联系，我们需要向大学提供有关出口管制的信息。我们需要保护我们的敏感技术，这些技术往往来自于研究领域。

在我们的大学里进行，并防止它们被对手利用来对付我们。

以下是我们到目前为止所做的工作。我们确定了20个学术研究机构，这些机构的工作使它们具有较高的风险特征。今年夏天，我联系了这20个机构中的每一个，看他们是否有兴趣与我们合作。令人高兴的是，所有20个机构都表示愿意，而且我们已经为每个机构分配了一名特别探员与他们合作。9月，副部长Estevez向每所优先考虑的大学发了一封信，指出保持一个强大的合规计划以防范未经授权的出口风险的重要性。

10月和11月，我们为20所大学举办了一次网络研讨会，讨论出口管制如何适用于学术环境以及如何识别学术研究机构面临的国家安全威胁。12月，我们将提供更多关于如何最好地进行开源研究的培训，以更好地审查潜在的合作伙伴。而明年初，我们将就监管要求进行更广泛的培训，包括学术环境中的基础研究。简而言之，我们致力于尽我们所能，既保护国家安全，又保持美国在学术研究和创新方面的领先地位。

今天我还想和大家分享一件我们正在做的事情。这就是我们对我们的指标所做的思考——我们如何跟踪我们的调查和分析工作，这样我们就可以评估我们的最高优先事项和我们花费最多时间的事项之间的配合程度。中国和俄罗斯是美国政府和BIS的关键优先事项。在出口执法部门，我们希望确保我们有限的执法资源与这些重大的国家安全挑战有效匹配。要做到这一点，我们需要确保我们正在衡量正确的事情。

我们当然不是唯一在尝试正确测量的机构。几乎所有的执法机构——包括联邦调查局、毒品管制局和HSI等联邦机构——都面临着如何最好地衡量成果的挑战。而且，在整个执法界，衡量标准也在不断发展。多年来，人们默认的做法是简单地计算逮捕人数、定罪人数和判处的刑期。逮捕、定罪和判刑是相当容易追踪的。而且，在过去，它们经常被用来作为执法"成功"的替代性指标。但是，正如更广泛的执法界已经开始寻找不同的衡量标准，试图更好、更准确地衡量其行动的影响，我们出口执法局也是如此。

在某些方面，对我们来说，提出成功的衡量标准应该没有我们的一些姐妹执法机构那么复杂。与许多其他联邦、州或地方机构不同，我们不负责广泛的法规或广泛的犯罪。相反，我们的任务是单一的——执行国家的出口法律，以防止最敏感的美国技术落入我们的对手手中。但是，即使有这样的激光聚焦，要辨别哪些措施是正确的，仍然具有挑战性。

我们仍在确定衡量我们影响的最佳方式。但是，作为一个初步步骤，我们已经开始根据三个标准评估我们的执法线索和案件：(1）技术的关键性，（2）最受关注的最终用户，以及（3）最受关注的最终用途。我们的想法是，通过对照这些标准清点我们的工作，我们可以帮助确保我们的执法资源集中在国家安全的最高优先事项上。

对于第一条标准——技术的关键性，我们主要关注的是那些最终可能导致外国对手在军事上超越的技术。我们与来自商务部、国防部、能源部和国务院的许可官员合作，确定商业管制清单上最优先的项目，以及有关国家或最终用户依赖美国提供的其他能够造成“扼杀点”的技术。我们还评估我们自己的执法线索和案件，以确定明确寻求用于军事用途或使人权受到侵犯的技术。

关于最终用户——第二条标准，我们专注于中国、俄罗斯和伊朗等国家的军事、情报和安全组织。此外，我们与财政部和国务院一起，已经确定了其他高度关注国家安全的行为者。我们也在关注他们。

我们的最后一条标准是看最终用途，或者更具体地说，滥用军民两用技术的应用，如核武器、导弹、化学和生物武器、先进的常规武器和侵犯人权。

虽然我们仍在完善衡量我们影响的最佳方式，但我们已经开始使用这三个标准，并根据它们清点我们现有的案例。到目前为止，这些新的标准和衡量标准已被证明是有帮助的，既能确认我们的案件量大致符合我们的优先事项，又能确定需要进一步分析的领域。

埃德温1林克发明的飞行模拟器改变了第二次世界大战的战场，因为它给美国飞行员（不幸的是，也给一些苏联、德国和日本飞行员）提供了有效驾驶飞机所需的训练和基础技能。今天的技术进步甚至更有力地改变了游戏规则。战争不再需要飞行员来进行空中监视和打击地面目标。正如我们在乌克兰发现的那样，无人驾驶飞机是空战的新领域——成本只是有人驾驶飞机的一小部分。这就是埃德温·林克的核心信念的现代版本——通过技术进步，我们可以提高作战效率和效力。这也是技术上的过度

相匹配的对手将试图克服我们的军事优势。

这就是为什么不让美国技术——从下一代飞行模拟器到下一代人工智能芯片——落入我们的对手手中的斗争从未如此重要。

再次感谢该协会今天接待我。你们所做的工作是对我们在BIS所做工作的一个重要补充。防止敏感的美国技术落入坏人之手是一项共同的努力。我们所有在BIS的人都致力于帮助行业了解贸易管制的重要性和如何遵守贸易管制的机制。我期待着继续

在未来的几个月和几年里，当我们一起努力保持我们国家的安全和保障时，出口执法局和贸易界之间的伙伴关系将得到加强。

Remarks as Preparedfor Delivery by Assistant Secretaryfor Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod to the Society for International Affairs 2022 Fall Advanced Conference November 14, 2022

Thank you, Tom, for the generous introduction. And thank you to the Society for International Affairs for hosting me again today. A lot has changed since I last spoke with you in May. As just one example, last time I had to speak with you all remotely. I’m glad that today we can all be together in person.

Back in 1927, a man named Edwin Link invented the flight simulator. The story of Link, a New Yorkerwho fell in love with flying, is recounted in Daniel Coyle’sbook, “The TalentCode.” In 1927,flying was an incredibly dangerous activity, where fatality rates at some Army aviation schools approached 25%. The belief was that good pilots were born, not made. That is, if you could survive a few hours in the air doing rolls and spins without throwing up, you were assumed to be capable of piloting an airplane, in need of only minimal additional ground training.

Link thought that there must be a better way to train pilots. And so, displaying his own brand of American ingenuity, he developed the first flight simulator. Roughly the size and shape of a bathtub, Link’s technology allowed pilots to learn to fly in half of the time, at a fraction of the cost, with sharply reduced fatality rates. Eventually, the U.S. military took notice, and, by the end of World War II, a half-million airmen had logged hours in Link’ssimulator. You would think that this critical technology – which could give the U.S. military a distinct advantage in a dogfight – would be restricted from sale to nations adverse to the United States. But instead, hundreds of Link’s devices were permitted to be exported to Japan, Germany, and the USSR in the years leading up to World War II.

One piece of technology – like a flight simulator – can be a military game-changer for a country, especially if it helps to provide overmatch. That’s even more true today, where the power of technology, and its ability to provide overmatch, is exponentially greater than it was in 1927. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently highlighted, a fundamental connection now exists between our country’s scientific and technological advantages, on the one hand, and our nationalsecurity on the other. Our job at the Bureau of Industryand Security is to help preserve our country’s scientific and technological advantages and thereby help protect our national security.

*       *       *

Last month, PresidentBiden released the National Security Strategy, which describes the current national security threat

environment and the Administration’s vision on how best to address it. It provides a roadmap for how we will work to advance our vital interests and pursue a free, open, and secure world.

As the Strategymakes clear, our two greatestpriorities are out- competing China and constraining Russia. So-called “traditional” national security threats – like arms control and terrorism – remain pressing. We are focusedon all these challenges, but today I want to focus on those two nation-state actors.

Since Russia further invaded Ukraine on February 24, we’ve used export controls to degrade Russia’s military capabilities. Putin’s war machine has been denied the critical supplies and spare parts it needs to replace its battlefield losses. We’ve built a coalition with 37 other countries to put in place the most expansive export controls in history aimed at a specific country. And they’re working. Global exports of semiconductors to Russia,for example, have seen a sustained declineof approximately 70 percent since the invasion began, leaving Russian companies without the chips they need for weapons like precision guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and tanks.

The Russian military has been forced to rely on contraband chips, workarounds, and lower quality imports, which has undermined the effectiveness of their weapons systems. The Russian military is reportedly cannibalizing chipsfrom dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military hardware. They’ve taken Soviet-era tanks out of storage. They’vealso turned to third party countries – like North Korea and Iran

– for supplies and equipment. Russian hypersonic ballistic missile production has nearly ceased due to a lack of chips. And a critical shortage of bearings has undermined theirproduction of tanks,aircraft, submarines, and other military systems.

A critical part of this success has been both U.S. and international industry, with whom we have partnered to ensure that our controls are effective. Our agents have reached out to more than 600 domestic companies with past export ties to Russia or whose components have been identified inside Russian weaponssystems found in Ukraine. And we’ve educated hundreds of international companies as well, through webinars and trainings.

We have also been active on the enforcement front. We’ve issued Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs) against ten Russian and Belarussian airlines – including Aeroflot, Russia’s flag carrier – that were flying airplanes subject to U.S. law into Russia and Belarus in violation of our rules. These airlines are now prohibited from receiving U.S. parts for their airplanes. Over time, Aeroflot,Utair, Azur Air, and the others will be unable to continue flying, either internationally or domestically, as they are now cut-off from the international support, and U.S. parts and related services, they need to maintain and support their fleets.

And we’ve been payingattention to individual airplanes as well.

We’ve publicly listed 183 aircraft that have flown into Russia and Belarus in apparent violation of our rules. In September, we also took action against four Iranian cargo planes, one of which contracts with the Iranian Air Force, that had been shipping electronics and spare parts to

Russia without our authorization. And last week, I reupped our TDO against Mahan Air, which in addition to supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has ferriedmateriel to Russia.The world is now on notice that any action related to these planes – including refueling, maintenance, repair, or the provision of spare parts and services – is subject to General Prohibition Ten of our rules.

More broadly, we have a significant number of ongoing investigations related to Russia. Just last month, for example, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging individuals and companies in Europe with violating U.S. export laws by attempting to smuggle a jig grinder to Russia.Luckily, the jig grinder – a high- precision grinding machine system with potentialapplication in nuclear proliferation and defense programs – was intercepted by law enforcement before it reached its destination.

*       *       *

In addition to constraining Russia,the National SecurityStrategy makes clear that we must out-compete China. Our national security requires that we prevent the PRC from misusing advanced U.S.

technology. That’s where we come in.

On October 7, BIS announced new rules to prevent the PRC from acquiring and using advanced U.S. technology to support China’s military modernization. We had alreadyimposed restrictions on exports to companies involved in China’smilitary supercomputing and quantum computing efforts. These new rules, however, are meant to establish a clear technical line connected to military applications.

The new controls do this in three ways: first, by limiting China’s ability to acquire advanced integrated circuits that have been used in AI applications tied to military modernization or human rights abuses; second, by preventing China from leveraging certain U.S. technology to support its supercomputer program, which directly enablesits WMD and

military modernization efforts; and, third, by preventing China from leveraging U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment to indigenously develop or produceadvanced chips as part of its military- civil fusion program.

These new rules require companies to come to BIS for approval of transactions involving specific items and activities of concern. The interagency—Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State—will then review any license applications under a presumption of denial for PRC end users. And we in ExportEnforcement will be hard at work enforcing the new rules through all resources at our disposal, including classified and open-source reporting, partnerships with U.S. companies, administrative and criminal investigations, and our global end-use check program.

*       *       *

My side of the house in Export Enforcement also had an announcement on October 7. We’ve changed our policy on how we respond to a host government that is preventing our ability to conduct end-use checks overseas.

We’ve found that foreign governments generally welcome our end- use checks, as they are eager to receive U.S. exports and participate freely in the global economy. When a foreign government prevents our attempts to conduct an end-use check for a sustained period of time, however, we are faced with the unacceptable risk that U.S.-origin goods or technology will be misused, given our inability to verify a company’s compliance with our controls.

Accordingly, we announcedon October 7 a new, two-step policy to address instances of foreign governments frustrating our end-use checks through sustained scheduling delays.

First, end-use checksmust be scheduledand completed promptly.

If 60 days pass withouta requested checkbeing conducted, we will

initiate the regulatory process to add the foreign company to the Unverified List (UVL). As was true even before our policy announcement, placement on the UVL triggers additional regulatory requirements on exports to the listed company and notifies U.S. industry of our inability to determine the company’s legitimacy as a recipient of controlled exports. Until a successful end-use check is completed, we stop processing licenses for the company and impose pre-license checks on all subsequent license applications received for exports to it.

Second, once the foreign party is added to the UVL, another 60- day clockstarts. If we are not able to successfully completean end-use check within the second 60-day window, we will initiate the regulatory process to have the foreign party added to the Entity List.

The rule announced on October 7 added 31 entities to the UVL, all of whom – along with 50 other companies previously on the UVL – are now at risk of moving to the EntityList as soon as December6 (which is 60 days from October 7) if we are unable to complete an end-use check by then. I want to point out that the October 7 rule also removed nine entities from the UVL based on their having had a successful end-use check completed. In other words, the Unverified List is not an automatic pipeline to the Entity List. We want to verify the bona fides of a company so that it can participate in the global economy. When a

company’s end-use check is successful, it comes off the UVL.

End-use checks are a critical component of U.S. national security. And when we’re not able to do those checks because of non-cooperation from a host government or other factors, placement on our lists will follow.

*       *       *

In addition to our end-use check policy change,let me quickly recap some other significant policychanges we’ve made since I last spoke with you in May.

In June, I announced four significant changesto strengthen our administrative enforcement tools.

First, we’re now using our existing authorities to ensure that the most serious administrative violations trigger commensurately serious penalties. If you invest in an export compliance program while your competitor flouts the rules to gain an economic advantage, we are going to aggressively impose penalties on your competitor to help ensure a level playing field.

Second, we have done away with “no admit, no deny” settlements. We want companies – and industry generally – to have the opportunity to learn from others and avoid repeating their mistakes. When we enter a resolution, the settling party gets significant credit, in the form of a reduced penalty. But to earn that reduced penalty, we now require an accompanying admission that the underlying factual conduct occurred. That way, others can have a clear sense of what the company or individual did that got them into trouble and can modify their own behavior accordingly.

Third, in administrative cases where the violations do not reflect serious national security harm, we have been entering settlement agreements that do not require monetary penalties. We have been resolving these cases by focusing on remediation – through the imposition of a suspended denial order with certain conditions, such as training and compliance requirements. For the cases that we’ve resolved so far, we’ve imposed a two-year suspended denial of export privileges and required that the entities undergo compliance training. In one case, we also required an internal audit of the company’s export controls compliance program.

Fourth, we amended how we processVoluntary Self-Disclosures (VSDs). For those VSDs involving minor or technical infractions, we are now resolving them on a “fast-track” with a warning letter or no-

action letter within 60 days of receipt of a final submission. For those VSDs that indicate potentially more serious violations, however, we are doing a deeper dive to determine whether enforcement action may be warranted, while at the same time adhering to the principle that companies deserve, and will get, significant credit for coming forward voluntarily. By fast-tracking the minor violations while assigning specific personnel to the potentially more serious ones,we are using our finite resources more effectively while also allowing companies that submit more minor VSDs to receive a quicker turnaround. For those wondering if our new processhas “chilled” the submission of VSDs – it hasn’t. We’ve received 150 new disclosures since the policy change, approximately the same average number of disclosures received for the same time period in the preceding two years. Companies continue to recognize that it is always better to knock on our door before we knock on yours.

In June, we also made a regulatory change to make charging letters public. Since that change, we’ve published five charging letters, including one alleging that Roman Abramovich, a Russian oligarch, unlawfully flew his two private jets worth an estimated combined $400 million to Russia. Just last week,we published a charging letteralleging that WEBS Electronics Trading Company unlawfully reexported U.S.- origin telecommunications equipment to Iran and Syria. These charging letters give the export community – and the wider world – visibility into what types of violations we see occurring and what we’re doing about them.

*       *       *

While much of our work is done in partnership with industry, industry isn’t our only important partner.In June, I announced our “Academic Outreach Initiative,” which is our effort to help educate

universities about export controls, given that the domains of national security and academia are now increasingly interconnected. We need to protect our sensitive technologies, which often stem from research

conducted at our universities, and prevent them from beingused against us by adversaries.

Here’s what we’ve done so far. We identified twenty academic research institutions whose work gives them an elevated risk profile. This summer, I reached out to each of the twenty institutions to see if they would be interested in partnering with us. Happily,all twenty said yes, and we’ve assigned each one an individual special agent to work with them. In September, Under Secretary Estevez sent a letter to each prioritized university noting the importance of maintaining a strong compliance program to guard against the risk of unauthorized exports.

In October and November, we conducted a webinar for the twenty universities on how export controls apply in academic settings and on ways to identify the national security threats facing academic research institutions. In December, we will be providing additional training on how best to conduct open-source research to bettervet potential partners. And early next year, we’ll conduct a broader training on regulatory requirements, including fundamental research in academic settings. In short, we’re committed to doing all that we can to both protect national security and maintain U.S. leadership in academic research and innovation.

*       *       *

There’s one more thing we’re working on that I want to share with you today. And that’s the thinking we’ve been doing about our metrics

– how we track our investigative and analytic efforts – so that we can evaluate how tight the fit is between our highest priorities and what we’re spending most of our time on. China and Russiaare key priorities for the U.S. government and for BIS. At Export Enforcement, we want to make sure that our finite enforcement resources are effectively matched against these significant national security challenges. To do that, we need to make sure we’re measuring the right things.

We are certainly not alone in this attempt to get our measurements right. Almost all law enforcement agencies – includingfederal ones like the FBI, DEA, and HSI – have confronted the challenges of how best to measure outcomes. And, throughout the law enforcement community, metrics are continuing to evolve.For many years, the default was simply to count the numbers of arrests made, convictions obtained, and jail terms imposed. Arrests, convictions, and sentences are fairly easily tracked. And, in the past, they were frequently used as proxies for law

enforcement “success.” But just as the broader law enforcement community has begun to search for different metrics in an attempt to better and more accurately measurethe impact of their actions,so too are we at Export Enforcement.

In some ways,it should be less complicated for us to come up with metrics for success than it is for our some of our sister law enforcement agencies. Unlike many other federal, state, or local agencies, we are not responsible for a broad swath of statutes or a widely divergent set of crimes.Instead, our mission is singular – to enforce the nation’s export laws in order to prevent the most sensitive U.S. technologies from falling into the hands of our adversaries. But even with that laser focus, it can still be challenging to discern which measures are the right ones.

We’re still settlingon the best way to measure our impact. But, as a preliminary step, we have begun evaluating our enforcement leads and cases against three criteria: (1) the criticality of the technology, (2) the end users of most concern, and (3) the end uses of most concern. Our thinking is that by inventorying our work against these criteria, we can help ensure that our enforcement resources are focused on our highest national security priorities.

For the first criterion – the criticality of the technology – our primary focus is on technologies that could eventually lead to military overmatch by a foreign adversary. We work with licensing officers from across the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State to determine the highest-priority items on the Commerce ControlList, as

well as additional chokepoint technologies that countriesor end users of concern are dependent on from the United States. We also evaluate our own enforcement leads and cases to identify technologies explicitly sought for military applications or that enable human rights abuses.

With regardto end users – the second criterion – we are focused on military, intelligence, and security organizations in countries like China, Russia, and Iran. In addition, we, along with Treasury and State, have identified other actors of heightened national security concern. We’re focused on them as well.

Our final criterion looks at end uses – or, more concretely, misuses of dual-use technology for applications such as nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons, advanced conventional weapons, and human rights abuses.

While we’re stillrefining the best way to measure our impact, we have started to use these three criteria and to inventory our existing caseload against them. So far, these new criteria and metrics have proved helpful, both in confirming that our caseload is broadly in line with our priorities and in identifying areas for further analysis.

*       *       *

Edwin Link’s invention of the flight simulator changed the battlefield of World War II, as it gave U.S. airmen (and, unfortunately, also some Soviet, German, and Japanese ones) the training and foundational skillsthey needed to pilot an airplane effectively. Today’s technology advances are even more powerfully game-changing. No longer do wars require pilots to conduct aerial surveillance and strike ground targets. As we’re finding out in Ukraine, unmanned drones are the new frontier in aerial combat – at a fraction of the cost of a manned airplane. This is the modern-day version of Edwin Link’s core belief – that, through technological advances, we can increase warfighting efficiency and effectiveness. It is also how technologically over-

matched adversaries will try to overcome our military superiority.

That’s why the fight to keep U.S. technology – from the next-generation flight simulator to the next generation AI chip – out of the hands of our adversaries has never been more important.

Thank you, again, to the Society for hosting me today. The work that you’re doing is an important complement to the work that we’re doing at BIS. Keeping sensitiveAmerican technology out of the wrong hands is a shared endeavor. All of us at BIS are committed to helping industry understand both the importance of trade controls and the mechanics of how to comply with them. I look forward to continuine the partnership betweenExport Enforcement and the tradecommunity in the coming months and years as we work together to keep our country safe and secure.

数据保护官（DPO）社群主要成员是个人信息保护和数据安全一线工作者。他们主要来自于国内头部的互联网公司、安全公司、律所、会计师事务所、高校、研究机构等。在从事本职工作的同时，DPO社群成员还放眼全球思考数据安全和隐私保护的最新动态、进展、趋势。2018年5月，DPO社群举行了第一次线下沙龙。沙龙每月一期，集中讨论不同的议题。目前DPO社群已超过400人。关于DPO社群和沙龙更多的情况如下：

DPO线下沙龙的实录见：

域外数据安全和个人信息保护领域的权威文件，DPO社群的全文翻译：

传染病疫情防控与个人信息保护系列文章

关于数据与竞争政策的翻译和分析：

健康医疗大数据系列文章：

网联汽车数据和自动驾驶的系列文章：

网络空间的国际法适用问题系列文章：

关于保护网络和信息系统安全的相关文章包括：

《网络数据安全管理条例（征求意见稿）》系列文章：

《数据安全法》的相关文章包括：

赴美上市的网络、数据安全方面的两国监管乃至冲突方：

个性化广告或行为定向广告（behavioral targeting advertising）系列的文章：

人脸识别系列文章：

内容安全方面的文章如下：

关于中美与国家安全相关的审查机制的文章：

地缘政治与跨国科技公司运营之间的互动影响：

围绕着TIKTOK和WECHAT的总统令，本公号发表了以下文章：

关于个人数据和域外国家安全审查之间的关系，见：

关于健康医疗数据方面的文章有：

关于数据执法跨境调取的相关文章：

第29条工作组/EDPB关于GDPR的指导意见的翻译：

数字贸易专题系列：

关于《数据出境安全评估办法》的系列解读文章

美国方面的个人信息保护立法的文章：

关于个人信息安全影响评估的文章如下：

关于业务场景中数据跨境流动的文章如下：

关于数据要素治理的相关文章包括：

关于印度的数据保护和数据治理政策和技术文件的文章有：

关于欧盟技术主权相关举措的翻译和分析：

关于人工智能安全和监管的文章：

关于我国《个人信息保护法》的文章：

关于数据的安全、个人信息保护、不正当竞争等方面的重大案例：